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I t  i s  the purpose of  th is  study to shod soise lig h t on tho 
diplomacy Which took place between Finland and the Soviet >Mon from 
193$ to 1940* That the Finn# successfully mot end blocked Russian 
efforts to make Finland # part of the !!*$*S*fL I# ® fact* Stow i t
i s  for tho historian to seek out and evaluate hm  and why th is vu#
possib le. Because o f th® propinquity o f Finland to Russia and her
century o f axl&tfmoi as a Grand Duchy of Cserlet Russia, th®
Flm s h#va coasc to know and understand th® Russian mind and thought* 
Herein l ie s  th# valid ity o f a study of th is nature for in th® present 
world situation there i s  & need on the m rt of th# West to understand 
and evaluate &i#olan Foreign policy* through the study o f the manner 
In which t'm Finnish government conducted and s t i l l  conduct# it#  
relations with the Soviet Union the Western Fewer# ®ay wall .find a 
clue to a means o f meeting an Aggressive and dynamic Busman policy* 
Tki® author wishes to thank the s ta ff  of the Gene Employ 
library for their valuable assistance rendered during th# mo?'the 
required to complete th is  project. Appreciation i s  also oxtresaed 
to Mrs. #uth KonttSnon of Suomi College and thm Firc:i#h-^»erlc&n 
library, Hancock, Michigan, for the invaluable aid rendered in  
securing many of the sources used in  thi s study* T'fepeclal thanks 
ere due Dr* A. Stanley Trieketi, Qmirmn  of tin® frpartHiert of 
History of the University o f Omaha, fo r  the continual in terest, 
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mentioned persons, the completion o f th is work would have beer 
ln fln ie te ly  more d ifficu lt*
R*W.C.
c m p t m  fa c e
x* mjmmcfm • * « # « • * * « * * • • * • • * « » • • •  1
Finland before 1X55 « « » « » « ® « o * ® ® » « * « o o  1
Grand Bushy of Finland* Swedish Rule o o « « » e 9 ® o  3
Grand Dueby of Finland* R ussian Mt« 3
Independence and C ivil lawr • * » • * • « * • « « • * • •  1? 
Chapter Conclusion 29
II* fUCISC TFT-: STOHH H
Eusso-Fiitnlsh Non-aggression Treaty® » ® « ® e ® ® ® ® ©  Mi
ftilltaxy Appropriation# c , ® ® ® ® * ® ® * #  * « « » « *  A  
Reorganisation o f the Art^ r 36
Scandinavian Orientation » • • • • • • ♦ * * * • * • • «  33
Coaler A ttitu d e  Toward# Germany 1*1
Finnish neutrality Policy e ® * * ® ® * ® ® ® * * ® ® *  Ms 
Aaland Island Question * * « « * * • * # *  1*5
Chapter Conclusion « » * * • • • » « * • » • » • • * « *  h?
m .  m t  ctoow gather * * * * * * * * * * . * . * * * 0 ®* 1*9
C on versation s w ith  Y artaev « • • « « * * «  » 9 f t * « 9 «  1*9 
Cottvaraaiiotta in Moscow (Deeesher 1933) • • « * « • « »  61
f^ oeeoi? C larifies Its  Demands (Hereto 1939) ® * » • « ® ® 63
Boris Stein Presses Russia1•  Case * » « » « » • < . * « «  65
Aagl ©*Freneh<*Rttesi*n Kegotlatlone • • * « • » « * • • < >  70
fttteso^Gersaan negotiations and Treaty 71
Russo-Gemm Attack m  Poland 73
C h ap te r  Conclusion « « » # » «  « « « » # * «  71*
iv
CHAPTER PAG®
IV* MOSCOW WSOOTIATOTS . . . * * ...................    77
Russian Demands cm the B altic States • • + 77
Moscow Turns to Finland • » • * • * * « « * • • » *  + • ??
Instructions to Finnish fte&otiators • • • • • « « » « »  79
F irst Trio to Moscow (October 9# 1939) • • • • • * * * «  SI 
Ha turn to Helsinki and New 'Instructions « • « « * « .  • 39
Second Trip to Moscow (O c to b e r 23? 1939) « • * « « « «  90
Appeal to Sweden 0 . < » . . « . » . » » « ...................   92
He*»examina tion of th e  Finnish Position » * « « . « « *  9h 
T h ird  T r ip  to Moscow (October 31$ 1939) • « « « « * • •  96
Breakdown of the Moscow negotiations • • • « « • • « »  lOli 
Chapter Conclusion * « . • * • » . » * • « » » » « • «  106
V* UST BATS 0? PEACE ABB UNSECURED WAR * * * ................  108
"Hainila Incident** ,  ...................   t o 108
Russian and Finnish Proposals for Settlement of 
Border Incident • * » • * » * * * * « « • # • « » « •  109 
Moscow Severs Relations with Finland 110
Attack Without ^ami.ng * » * * # ■ • * * ■ # # # * « * « *  H I 
Outside Offers to Mediate » * » * • « * • * * • • « »  112
The Dispute Taken to the Xeagus of Nations * » • * « 113
Aid from Various Rations * • * « « « * • * * » « • » •  113
Chapter Conclusion » • » « . * « « •  » » • « » » « • » «  H 5
VI. THE TOtTOBf PDA I) TO PPACK.........................................   116
Finland’s Bisadrsvttages and Advantages in War » « « » * 116
Various Offer® of Mediation » » « . » « «  « « » » « « »  117
chapter H&3R
Qemm if fe r t s  3l2.^
Mrs, Wsoli^oki Offers to Contact, '%n>, Kollcmtal * * * » 122
The Soviet Qomrmmnx Agrees to ?$e®otiate 
s i t h  the Ckwmsaewt • * « * « * * « « • •  X2li
Termer*s F irst f t e i t  to Stockholm (February li# 19h0) Q « 126 
.Mltain and franc® Consider Aid to Finland » « « » • « ® 12? 
Kaanerhetw and ffts S taff Consulted m
Possible Territorial Concessions • • • • * « • • • • «  130 
Divided Opinions in the Cabinet 131
Termer fs Second V isit to Stockholm {February 12* 19b£) » 133 
Gar*ftanry Suggests a Mediation Plan 13k
Finland 4sks Sweden to Mediate * • • » • • • » • « # • •  136
the B,S»S«R» Clarifies Its Position * # • * ...........#13?
Tanner *e Third H a lt  to Sfockholn (February 2?, I9k0) » l i i l  
Finland Beeides to Hafee Peace (February 29$ X9h0 ) « • « Hi3 
Benewed Offers of Aid from Britain and franco , « » « « lilt  
Finland Subnlta to Russian fem e * • » • • » « # • * • *  1UB 
4 Final Anglo-French Offer of Aid (March ?f 19l*€> « • • 11*9 
Moscow f;fak®s Additional Beeeads » « # * « » » « # « «  # 11*9 
The Peace Treaty Is Signed , « » « • « * • • » «  « * « «  151 
Finnish Territorial losses • « » * « « » * < > » « » « « < »  151 
Ratification of the Peace # • » « • , #  152
m u  m m ' j s r m .........................   153
APPfFMlI A • • « • .......................       159
kPWM^lt B , # , * * * , # * * . * * # * * * * * * * # * * * *  161*
n w i .w m h ^ n  # -, 168
■mFTBR I
Somewhere ab o u t th e  b e g in n in g  o f th e  C h r i s t i a n  e r a  t h e r e  appeared  
in  a  la n d  o f  la k e s  and f o r e s t s ,  b o rd e rso  by  th e  B a l t i c  Sea m  th e  so u th  
an" so u th w e s t, Sweden and Morway m  th e  w est and n o r th w e s t, and R u ss ia  
on- th e  e a s t ,  a  p e o p le  idiom T a c i tu s  c a l le d  th e  Ferns 1 . T hese w ere th e  
a n c e s to r s  of th e  p r e s m t - d a y  F in n s , th e  in h a b i t a n t s  o f F in lan d  o r in  
F in n is h ,  3 y < ^ i« Many c o n je c tu r e s  have been made co n ce rn in g  t l u  o r ig in  
o f  th e s e  p e o p le , b u t i t  i s  g e n e r a l ly  conceded by con tem porary  s c h o la r s  
t h a t  th ey  o r i g i n a l l y  a a d e  t h e i r  home in  th e  v i c i n i t y  o f th e  O ra l mour** 
t a i n s  and a lo n g  th e  V olga E lv er*  T h is  d o es  n o t mean, how ever, t h a t  th e y  
a r c  r e l a t e d  to  th e  T e u to n s , S la v s ,  o r  .Mongols. They a r e  e th n o lo g ic a l ly  
r e l a t e , ;  to  th e  V o tja k S , O h e ra is ,  and O stjak®  in  C e n t r a l  'R ussia  w h ile  
l i n g u i s t i c a l l y ,  F in n is h  b e lo n g s  t o  th e  F in n o -U ric  lan g u ag e  group  ana 
i s  r e l a t e ,  to  h s to n ia u  a n a , s o r e  d i s t a n t l y ,  t o  H u n g a rian , “T h is  
l i a g i s t i e  a f f i n i t y ,  how ever, h a s  had no in f lu e n c e  on th e  developm ent o f 
F in n is h  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  More r e c e n t  ami p ro lo n g ed  c o n ta c ts  w ith  In -o -r.u ro p ean  
p e o p le s ,  n o ta b ly  S ean aan av ian a , a rc  to d ay  dom inant in  F in n ish  c u ltu re .* * 2
For t h e  f i r s t  mSHenium >* o f  t h e i r  o c c u p a tio n  of th e  p re s e n t
*The fo llo w in g  c h a p te r  i s  b ased  m ain ly  on M antere am.! s a r v a ,  
K^Sfcikoulua Suooea ^ l ^ t p r l a . (P o rvoq , F in la n d : B ern er S o d ers tro m  G sa k c y h tib ,
19 5 1 ), p p . 1 -344 , and A a a to le  Mazour, bstw .gfn h a s t  g |^  l£ l£ «
( P r in c e to n :  c .  Van N o stru m  Co.., I n c , ,  1956), p p . 1 -93 , u n le s s  o th e rw is e
n o te d .
2H cik k i B a r is ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i s  P iT lftflti- (M in n e ap o lis , M inn, s
U n iv e r s i ty  o f M inneso ta  P r e s s ,  19 5 8 ), p . 196.
2a r e a  c a l l e d  F in la n d , th e  P in m  l iv e d  a  p r im i t iv e  l i f e .  The Roman 
h i s t o r i a n  T a c i tu s  d e s c r ib e d  th e n  a s  . . s q u a l id ly  p o o r ; n e i t h e r  arms 
n o r homes have th e y ;  t h e i r  food  i s  h e rb s ,  t h e i r  c lo th in g  s k in s ,  t h e i r
bed th e  ea rth . . * *"3 But in  one s e n s e  th e y  co u ld  n o t  be blam ed f o r
t h i s ,  f o r  th e  lan d  th e y  came to  s e t t l e  m s  f a r  from  sa lu b r io u s;  w ith  a 
h a r s h  c l im a te ,  poor s o i l ,  and a su m er  sea so n  to o  s h o r t  fo r  much s e r io u s  
f a rm in g .4 The r ig o r o u s  c l im a te  and t h e i r  p r e c a r io u s  e x is te n c e  s e rv e d  to  
h a rd e n  th e  n atu re o f th e  F in n s  and d id  much to  mold th e ir  c h a r a c te r  to  
what i t  i s  to d a y . T h is  ch a ra cter  m s  w e ll summarised by the n in e te e n th  
c e n tu ry  F in n ish  h i s t o r i a n  and n o v e l i s t ,  Z ach ris T o p c liu s , in  th e  fo llo w *  
ing m anner i
The g e n e ra l t r a i t s  o f  t h e i r  c h a r a c te r  a r e :  h a rd en ed , p a t i e n t  
s t r e n g t h ;  r e s ig n a t io n s  p a r s c r v a r a a c s  a l l i e d  t o  a  c e r t a i n  o b s t in a c y ;  
a  s lo w , eoK itesaplative way o f  th in k in g t  u n w il l in g n e s s  to  become 
a a $ ry , b u t a  ten d en cy  whm  a n g e r  h a s  b een  a ro u se d , to  in du lge ' in  
unm easured w ra th ;  c o o ln e s s  in  d e a d ly  p e r i l ,  b u t c a u t io n  a f te r w a r d s ;  
i n c l i n a t i o n  f o r  w a i t in g ,  d e f e r r in g ,  l i v in g  f o r  th e  d ay , in t e r r u p t e d  
som etim es by u n se a so n a b le  h a s t e ;  ad h e ren c e  to  t h e  o ld  and w ell-know n, 
an  a v e r s io n  to  a n y th in g  new; a t t e n t i o n  t o  d u ty ; la w -a b id in g  h a b i t  of 
m ind) lo v e  o f  l i b e r ty *  h o s p i t a l i t y ;  h o n e s ty ;  a  p r e d e l i c t i o n  fo r  
r e l i g i o u s  m e d ita t io n  r e v e a l in g  i t s e l f  in  t r u e  p i e t y ,  w hich , how ever, 
i s  a p t  to  h ave  to o  much r e s p e c t  f o r  th e  m ere l e t t e r .  . . . ” 5
The Finns had meed o f  such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  in  th e  c o u rse  of th e ir  
h i s t o r y .  As a n a t io n  s itu a te d  a t  th e  c ro s s ro a d s  o f  two c i v i l i s a t i o n s ,  
i t  was th e  m eetin g  ground o f  c o n f l ic t in g  id e a s  and id e o lo g y , in  a  w ord, 
F in land  lias been  th e  c o c k p it  in  which R ussia  and Sweden have met to  s e t t l e
^Ehs iiiisejL is.sui& M  a t  X s s U a s . S se e s sx  a s .  *r«n. a . j . , :»«« • u
and w* J .  Brodribb, (Hew York: Random House, i n c . ,  1942).
^ F in la n d  i s  s i t u a t e d  betw een 59® 39* 10” and 70* 05* 30” n o r th  
l a t i t u  c w ith  a p p ro x im a te ly  o n e - th i r d  o f h e r  t o t a l  a r e a  ly in g  above th e  
A r c t i c  C i r c l e .  She- h a s  6 0 ,0 0 0  la k e s  occupying  n in e  p e r  c e n t  o f  h e r t o t a l
3t h e i r  a i  f  f e r  c u e t&.
THE GRANT) ^UCHY OF FTKTAKDs SVT.BXffil RtfLB
Orr" o f th e  most d e c is iv e  ev en ts  in  th e  h i s t o r y  of Finland  
o c c u r re d  ir, 115? when King B rik  ( S t .  E rik*  th e  p atron  s a in t  o f Sweden) 
w ith  H m ry, an Englishman app ointed  B ishop  o f U ppsala, s e t  fo r th  on a  
c ru sa d e  to  subdue th e  h e a th e n  F in n s. I l is  aim  was to  .convert them to  
C h r i s t i a n i t y ,  and i n c i d o n t a l l y , t o  epqpaau h i s  own domains now f o r e s t a l l  
f u r t h e r  R u ss ian  in ro a d s  in to  t h e  a r e a .  In  1172 th e  f i r s t  F in n ish  
h i s t o r i c a l  document ap p ea red  in  th e  form  o f  a  B u ll  add ressed  by Pope 
Alexander i l l  t o  th e  B ishop o f U ppsa la  com plaining o f th e  d i f f i c u l t y  
In c o n ta in in g  th e  F in n s  and t h e i r  r e f u s a l  to  remain t r u e  to  th e  
C h r i s t i a n  f a i t h , 6 T h is  p o in t s  up a t t h i s  e a r ly  d a te  t h a t  r e s is ta n c e  
to  in n o v a tio n  which T ope ix u s  was to  rem ark on many c e n tu r i e s  l a t e r .
in  1211 th e  f i r s t  B ishop  o f F in la n d  w as a p p o in te d  w ith  th e  
d io c e sa n  s e a t  a t  T urku (Jkabo). S t r a in e d  r e l a t i o n s  betw een Sweden 
and th e  R u ss ian  s t a t e  of Novgorod r e s u l t e d  ana  re a ch e d  su ch  a  s t a t e  
th a t  in 124,;> tiio  B ish o p  d is p a tc h e d  an army composed o f Swedes and
a rea , w h ile  71 per cen t o f  th e  land area  i s  fo r e s te d , th ir te e n  p et  
cen t i s  a ra b le  anti ten  per cen t i s  w aste  Jana, (Based on Jukka Uiesman, 
m m i  s i s t ia g *  Paul Sjoblom , tr a a . (H e ls in k i * Otava P u b lish ­
in g  C o ., 1 9 5 $ ), p p . 3—1.
"’quoted in  J .  Hampden Jackson, ftifriend (New York* M acmillan
* | JU > K * vc 3  ^ jp^ « ■ J *
Hinshaw, ££&£&*& York a G. P. Putnam's
Sons 1952), p .  5 .
4Gtraan K n ig h ts  o f  th e  Sword a g a in s t  Novgorod, The e f f o r t  p ro v ed  
f r u i t l e s s  smd l e f t  th e  R u ss ia n s  in  c o n t r o l  o f K a r e l ia  w here th e y  
rem ained  u n t i l  1293 when T o r g i l s  K nu tson , a  Swede, le d  a  c ru sa d e  to  
convert th e  K a re l ia n s  t o  Roman C h r i s t i a n i t y ,  H is  e f f o r t s  w ere  crowned 
w ith  s u c c e s s ,  w e s te rn  K a r e l ia  was occu pied  and Y iip u r i (V ib o rg ) C a s t le  
was b u i l t  a s  th e  e a s te rn m o s t o u tp o s t  o f  th e  Sw edish dom ains. S u ccess  
d id  n o t  mean p e a c e , how ever, f o r  th e  two s t a t e s  c o n tin u e d  t o  c la s h  
s p o r a d ic a l ly  u n t i l  1293 when th e  Peace o f  F& hkin& saari (KQteborg o r 
S c h lt ts s e lh tirg )  mas co ee lu d ed  by K ing Magnus E rikson w ith  Novgorod,
The p e ac e  t r e a t y  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  tim e  d e l in e a te d  th e  F in n is h  
b o rd e r s  by e s t a b l i s h in g  an e a s te r n  demur c a tio n  l i n e  betw een Sw edish 
and R u ss ia n  c la im s  in  f in la n d *  The f i r s t  p e r io d  o f  Sw edish c o n q u e s t 
in  F in la n d  ended w ith  th e  w e s te rn  p a r t  o f V i ip u r i  p ro v in c e  a s  p a r t  
o f  t h e  Sw edish kingdom known a s  F in n ish  K a r e l ia  w h ile  th e  e a s te r n  
p o r t i o n  mm  c a l l e d  R u ss ian  o r  O u te r  K a r e l ia .  From t h i s  tim e  on , 
m ost o f  m odem  F in la n d  was t o  rem ain  u n d e r Sw edish rule and to  d e v e lo p  
a s  a  n a t io n  s h a r in g  a s  p a r t  o f  i t s  i n h e r i t a n c e s  th e  m a ss iv e  t r a d i t i o n  
t h a t  b e lo n g s  to  th e  West* Under th e  a u sp ic e #  o f  a  b e n e v o le n t Sw edish 
a d m in is t r a t io n ,  w h ile  a t  t im e s  n e g l e c t f u l ,  th e  F inn#  w ere  to  be 
in c u lc a te d  w ith  th e  co n cep ts  o f th e  in h e r e n t  d ig n i ty  o f m:nt i n d iv i ­
d u a l  freedom , and p o l i t i c a l  in d ep en d en ce . Though atm w as an i n t e g r a l  
p a r t  of th e  Swedish kingdom , F in la n d  alw ays s to o d  a p a r t  a s  a  s p e c ia l  
i ffld o r  p ro v in c e ,  f r e e  to  l i v e  by h e r  own customs and law s a s  passed  
by h e r  m n  l o c a l  assem b lies*
D e sp ite  th e  fa v o ra b le  c o n d i t io n s  u n d er which sh e  was In c o rp o ra te d  
in t o  Sweden, a l l  w as n o t  w e l l  i n  F in la n d , A sm a ll g roup  o f  d o m in a tin g ,
a r b i t r a r y ,  and p r iv i l e g e d  Sw edish n o b i l i t y  came i n t o  b e in g , who took 
l i t t l e  o r  no i n t e r e s t  i n  th e  c o u n try ,  o th e r  th a n  to  m u lc t i t  o f 
W hatever th e y  could* The s i t u a t i o n  was a g g ra v a te d  by th e  d i s ta n c e  
betw een F in la n d  ana Sweden a&u th e  d l f f  i c u l t y  o f tr a v e r s in g  t h a t  
d is ta n c e , a s  w e ll  a* by th e  dec e n tr a ils  ed n a tu r e  -of the Sw edish 
governm ent d u r in g  th e  l a t e  M iddle A ges, I t  had  alw ays been th e  
p r a c t i c e  o f  th e  Swedes to  e l e c t  t h e i r  k in g s , and su ch  le a d e r s  
m e ld e d  r e a l  power o n ly  d u r in g  th e  tim e o f  w ar. C e n t r a l ,  r o y a l ,  
a u th o r i ty  was a  n e g l i g i b l e  f a c to r  d u r in g  pea.: 2- tim e  and each  ^aq,^ 
o r  p ro v in c e  had  i t s  own a s s e m b lie s  and was governed  by i t s  awn Imm  
and c u s to m  w ith  l i t t l e  in te r f e r e n c e  on th e  p a r t  o f th e  e le c te d  mon­
a rc h . In  a d d i t io n ,  w h ile  a  p r iv i l e g e d  n o b i l i t y  e x i s t e d ,  th e  n o b le s  
w ere n ev e r a b le  to  make s e r f s  o f th e  common p eo p le*  T hese segm ents 
©f s o c ie ty  rem ained  e s s e n t i a l l y  f r e e  p e o p le  th ro u g h o u t th e  w hale 
h i s to r y  o f  Sweden and  F in la n d  w here th e  p e a s a n t  a lw ays en jo y ed  th e  
r i g h t  o f  h o ld in g  la n d  i n  h i s  own name-.
Many c la sh e s  occurred  an F inn ish  s o i l  during the p er io d  from 
1323 to  1523 whan Gust&f I Vasa ascend so  th e  th ron e  of' Sweden to  end 
th e Kalmar Onion an-a i n i t i a t e  th e  m eteoric  r i s e  o f  Sweden to  a pre­
dominant p o s i t io n  in  Europe. An em inently  cap ab le  sta tesm an , ab le  
s o ld ie r ,  and in coap arab le  r u le r , G ustaf Vasa co n so lid a te^  h is  domains 
in to  a  n a t io n  in  th e  tr u e s t  sen se  o f  th e  word, brought th e  Lutheran 
r e l ig io n  from Germany to  h i s  p e o p le , an_. s t a b i l i s e d  the government 
by staking th e  crown h ered ita ry *  In regard to  F in lan d , he began a 
program o f  c o lo n is a t io n  in  her ea stern  p a r ts ,  e s ta b lis h e d  H e ls in k i  
in  1.350 a s  p a r t o f  th e  same program, and d ec la red  F i n l a n d  a Grand
6Duchy u n d e r h i s  son John in  1506.
D uring th e  n e * l two c e n tu r i e s  F in la n d  gave h e r  young men, 
her money, and her heart t o  th e  fwediah k in g s  as they s t r o v e  to  
com plete  Swedish ascendency  in  th e  B a l tic *  F in n is h  s o l d i e r s  made- 
th e  backbone o f  th e  Swedish armies a s  they marched back and f o r th  
a c r o s s  Europe u n t i l  t h a t  f a t a l  day  in  1718 when th e  b r i l l i a n t  b u t  
e r r a t i c  C h a r le s  I I I  met h i s  d e a th  a f t e r  h av in g  seen  Sweden humbled 
by d e fe a t*  By th e  Peace o f  Uusikaupunki ( H y s ta r t )  a l l  th e  terr i­
t o r y  t h a t  had been gained in Karelia by th e  e a r l i e r  Peace c f  S to lb o v a  
(1 6 1 ? ) , i . e .  Kakisalmi (Kexholm) and Inkeriro&a (1'ngria), p lu s  Fiipuri, 
w ere l o s t  t o  th e  Hus e la n s ,  th e  c e s s i o n  o f  t f i ip u r l  was c o n s id e re d  
© s p e c ia lly  n e c e s sa ry  by th e  Horaanov C ra r ,  P e te r  th e  G re a t, f o r  th e  
d e fe n se  o f  h i s  new ly founded  c a p i t a l  c ity , S t .  P e te r s b u rg ,  o r th e  
H eva.
Though F in la n d  rem ained  a p e r t  o f  Sweden f o r  a n o th e r  c e n tu r y ,  
th e  d ie  had been e a s t  and i t  was o n ly  a m a tte r  o f  t i n e  u n t i l  R u ss ia  
sh o u ld  d e c id e  t h a t  th o  anom alous s i t u a t i o n  o f F in la n d  th r e a te n e d  
h e r  p o s i t io n  on th e  B a l t i c .  Sweden, how ever, had n o t f o r g o t te n  
h e r  former g lo ry  and tw ic e  d u r in g  th e  e n su in g  c e n tu ry  a tte m p te d  
t o  w re s t  th e  l o s t  t e r r i t o r i e s  back from  th e  R u ss ia n s . These w ere 
b u t  th e  d e a th  c o n v u ls io n s , how ever, of a once p o w erfu l nation and 
bo th  w ere destined t o  f a i l .  The f i r s t  o c c u rre d  in  1 7 k l and l a s t e d  
u n t i l  17k3 when th e  Peace o f  Turku was s ig n e d  and w ith  th e  s ig n in g  
w ent th e  r e s t  o f ^ i i p u r i  p ro v in c e .  Again in  1788 Guetef I I I  th rew  
h i s  n e t io n  i n t o  war in  an e f f o r t  t o  re g a in  what had been  l o s t .  Hie 
a t te m p t  ended in  f a i l u r e ,  b u t p roved  t h a t  a c o n s id e ra b le  p a r t  o f  th e  
F i n i s h  n o b i l i t y  d e s i r e d  to  s e p a r a te  F in la n d  from Sweden, even i f
1t h i s  w ere only. p o s s ib le  u n d e r th e  .sp o n so rsh ip  o f  R u s s ia . The 
dc.«lr,: f o r  F in n is h  in dependence  found e x p re s s io n  in  th e  e f f o r t s  o f 
san e  o f th e  F in n ish  n o b i l i t y  to  e x p lo i t  th e  A n ja ia  League e p is o d e .7 
The p l o t t e r s 9 m o tiv a t in g  f a c t o r  was th e  r e t e h t i o h  o i  t h e i r  p r iv i le g e d  
s t a t u s  in  Finland w hich had become threatened  by th e  in c re a s e d  a u th o r -  
i t y  o f  th e  k in g  a f t e r  1772. They a ls o  hopeo t h a t  an independent 
F in la n d  m igh t p ro v e  v a lu a b le  enough a s  a  b u f f e r  betw een Sweden and 
R u s s ia  to  p re v e n t  f u r th e r  co n q u es t and. d e s o la t io n  a t  th e  hands o f 
th e  s t r o n g e r  n o r th e rn  pow ers. Among th e  le a d e r s  o f  t h i s  g roup  were 
J .  A. J% c urhorn, K li ;k , an<' G e n e ra l S p re n g tp o r to n . These* men jo u rn e y e d  
to  th e  c o u r t  o f  C a th e r in o  I I  to  seek  h e r  a id  in  the e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  
a  F in n ish  r e p u b l ic .  G a th e r in c  evad.ee th e  i s s u e ,  s t a t i n g  th a t  Such a  
proj^. • t  oul*.: os u n d e rta k e n  o n ly  by d u ly  a p p o in te d  a u t h o r i t i e s  o f  th e  
F in n is h  p .-o p le . D is a p p o in te d , th e  men re tu rn e d  to  F in la n d , w here 
th e  p l o t t i n g  was soon expose .i. They back to  R u ss ia  to  Seek
p r o t - '••'t io n  and rem ained  th e r e  u n t i l  IbOV, when C sa r A1 chancier i  
assumed th e  r o l e  o f G ratis ;.)ukc o f F in la n d . pt.&-o was r e s to r e d  in  
17'X), w ith  n e i t t n r  s id e  hav ing  g a in ed  or l o s t  any t e r r i t o r y  a s  a 
r e s u l t  of th e  e p iso d e .
d u rin g  th e  t w i l ig h t  oi Dwe-.ii.sh r u l e ,  th e re  was o n ly  one o th e r  
d^-velopwent o f any im p o rtan ce , th e  c o n fin sa t.io n  by G u s ta f  I I I  o f  th e
7
The- s o - c a l le d  An j  aim League was healer! by I .  H. K lick  and 
o th e r s  who claim ed. t h a t  G u s ta f  111 haa  a c te d  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  by 
go ing  to  war w if  h o u t th e  M dkaoagls c o n se n t, T fvy  p la n n e d . to  k idnap  
th e  k in g  and b r in g  ab o u t an in d ep en d en t s e t t le m e n t  w ith  R u ss ia
th em se lv es .
fu n d am en ta l law s o f th e  kingdom c o n s i s t in g  o f  two a c t s :  th e  "Form o f
Governm ent o f  1772" and th e  " g e t  o f  Union and S a fe ty  o f  1709"• Both 
o f  th e s e  a c t s  w ere o f  e s p e c ia l  im p o rtan ce  f o r  F in la n d  in  t h a t  th e y  
se rv ed  a s  th e  b a s i s  o f  F in n is h  law  down to  1917* The "Form o f  Govern­
m ent" k e p t th e  power o f  th e  p u rs e  in  th e  hands o f  th e  R iksdag  b u t th e  
k in g  r e ta in e d  th e  power t o  summon and d is m is s  th e  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  body.
I t  a l s o  p ro v id e d  t h a t  th e  th r e e  n o n -n o b le  E s ta te s  co u ld  o u tv o te  th e  
E s ta te  o f  C o b le s . The "A ct o f  Union and S a fe ty  o f l? 0 9 n was d e sig n ed  
to  p la c e  th e  power ov er f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s  e n t i r e l y  in  th e  hands o f  th e  
monarch w h ile  s t i l l  d e le g a t in g  th e  Hlkgdag power t o  c o n t r o l  f in a n c e *
THE GRAND PUCHI OF FINLAND RUSSIAN RULE
D uring th e  N apo leon ic  w ars th e  F ren ch  d e s i r e  t o  co m p le te  th e  
C o n tin e n ta l  B lockade by e x c lu d in g  th e  B r i t i s h  from  th e  B a l t i c  le d  
to  an a l l i a n c e  w ith  Denmark and to  open n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  Sweden*
Sweden for h e r  p a r t  ad am an tly  re fu s e d  t o  ta k e  o rd e r s  from  th e  Em peror 
o r  t o  J o in  him in  h i s  g ra n d io se  schem es to  co n q u er h e r  n o r th e rn  
n e ig h b o rs*  N apoleon th e n  tu rn e d  to  A lex an d e r I  o f  R u ss ia  and con­
c lu d ed  th e  T re a ty  o f  T i l s i t  (1 8 0 ?) t o  which was appended s e v e r a l  
s e c r e t  c l a u s e s ,  one co n cern ed  w ith  F in lan d *  By i t ,  R u ss ia  was 
g ra n te d  th e  r i g h t  to  annex F in la n d  a s  com pensa tion  f o r  th e  war w hich 
th e  C zar ag reed  to  wage a g a in s t  Sweden to  p u n ish  h e r  f o r  h e r  p e rv e r s i ty *
In  F eb ru a ry  o f  1808 th e  Czar's a rm ie s  Invaded F in la n d  in  
c o n ju n c t io n  w ith  th o s e  o f  Denmark w hich a t ta c k e d  Sweden from  th e  
south*®
o
Jac k so n , op* c i t * . p* h6 .
a s h o r t  tin " - the* Sw edish a m u ’S f e ? t  th o  onus o f .lo fo a t  a s  S u o n e a liw it i  
t h :.* " G ib r a l t a r  of tb : N orth"  f e l l  w ith o u t a  s h o r t  b r in g  f i r e d .  For 
a l l  p r a c t i c a l 'p u r p o s e s  t h r  f a i l  o f t h i s  v i t a l  f o r t r e s s  s e a le d  th e  f a t e  
o f F in la n d , a lth o u g h  th e  ran k  and f i l e  o f  th e  F in n ish  p o p u la c e , lung  
in n o c u la te d  w ith  a  h a t r e d  f o r  a n y t h i n  R u ss ia n , c o n tin u e d  th e  uneven 
s tru g g le *  F ig h t in g  f o r  heme and f i e l d ,  th e  sm a ll fo r c e  o f  12 ,000  
p ea sa n ts  u n d er th e  l e a d e r s h ip  o f  Adlercretxts, i'ffibtm  ana Sand els  
fo u g h t on a g a in s t  some 3 5 ,000  R u ss ia n  t ro o p s  fo r  f iv e  m onths lo n g e r .^
F in a l ly ,  on Sep tem ber 17, 1809, th e  Swedes and F irm s c a p i tu la t e d  and 
th e  P eace o f  Haraina (Fretiriks& aaa) was d r a m  u p , whereby, Sweden 
surrendered a l l  o f F in la n d  to  th e  O sa r .
A lex an d e r had a n t i c ip a t e d  th e  f i n a l  p e ac e  by ab o u t s i x  m onths 
when he  summoned a  F in n is h  rump P a r lia su s it  to  m eet a t  Porvoo (Borgaa) 
and d eclared  h i s  i n t e n t i o n  to  in c o r p o r a te  th e  n a t io n  i n t o  h i s  em pire  
a s  m  autonom ous G rand auchy . F in land  was to  become " a  s e lf -g o v e r n in g  
p a r t — th e  o n ly  s e lf -g o v e r n in g  p a r t — o f th e  em pire* I t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
law s, c o u r t s ,  ch u rch , and r e l i g i o n  ( L u th e r a n ) , e d u c a tio n a l  sy stem  and 
econom ic l i f e  w ere  l e f t  a lm o s t w h o lly  unchanged. T hus, autonom ous 
F in la n d  was a b le  to  c a r ry  on , a f t e r  1309, <m th e  b a s i s  w hich th e  
pr;- ced in g  c e n tu r ie s  had g iv e n  to  th e  n a t i o n " . Only c o n t r o l  o f
10John  Ivuorincn , e d , t f l n j Lana and th e  ftg q gnd World War— 1939—  
IM lfN cw  Y ork : The Ronald P re s s  Company, 1948), p . 5 ."
fo r e ig n  p o l ic y  was to  r e s t  in  th e  hands o f  th e  Im perial government 
o f  R u ssia .
The Finland th a t  was annexed to  R u ssia  In 1809 was econ om ica lly
p o o r w ith  a predom inantly a g r a r ia n  p o p u la t io n  th a t had n o t a s  y e t  
m odernised i t s  m ethods o f  c u l t i v a t i o n .  At th e  tim e  th e  p o p u la tio n  
s to o d  sit abou t 363,00'.). In  13.U th e  f lg u r v  reach ed  1 ,0 5 3 ,0 0 0  wb*» 
K ftk isa ln i and is ifcc riaaa  in  K a r e l ia  were r e s to r e d  to  F in la n d . Of th e  
t o t a l  p o p u la t io n  o n ly  40 ,800 >;*.re u rb an  d w e lle r s  w ith  th e  l a r g e s t  
c i ty  b e in g  Turku w hich in c lu d e d  j u s t  o v e r 10 ,000  p e o p le .* *
T hroughout t i le  c e n tu ry  t h a t  p reced ed  World lia r  I ,  F in lan d  
aadu ii.re.at s t r i d e s  in  th e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  m o d e rn iz a t io n ; f a m in g  began 
to  be con hints- • s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  a t t e r  th e  open ing  o f  s e v e r a l  s c h o o ls  
of  a g r i c u l t u r a l  i n d u s t r i a l s n a t i o n  began a f t e r  1170 when t e x t i l e  m i l l s  
W 'tf' •-stab iigfced  a t  Tarap.'re and when th e  in c re a s e d  us* o f th e  c i r c u l a r  
saw ^roim deu th e  lum ber in d u s t r y .  In  1*166 law s were e n ac ted  e s t a b l i s h *  
ing  a p r  im ary s c h o o l system  an ; by 1875 p u b l ic  sc  ~ond a ry  sc h o o ls  w ere 
o p e r a t in g .  S team sh ip s  m u s  t h e i r  ap p ea ran ce  ab o u t th e  m idd le  o f  th e  
c e n tu ry  and by 1870 r a i l r o a d s  began t o  e a se  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  p ro b le m s. 
A f te r  ibdO th e  t 'T c p h o f it  came in to  omnion uc-e, h a v in g  been  p re c ed e d  
IT  th e  t e l e s  {faph ab o u t ;iii• i«»century• By th e  on-:5 o f  th e  r, f n tu r y , th e  
population ha*. in c re a s e d  to  3 ,2 5 0 ,0 0 0  w ith  wore th a n  500,000 u rb an
«* dWWtt — ■ « nu Will r m m
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duellers available t o  meet the demands f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  i a b o r . ^
F o r a ll  t h a t  th e y  enjoyed a s p e c ia l  s t a t u s  in  th e  Empire* 
and though  t h e i r  own cu sto m s, la w s , and c u l tu r e  s t i l l  o b ta in e d , th e r e  
was a good, d e a l  o f u n r e s t  among th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  in th e  Grand duchy* 
'This wee in  p a r t  due t o  th e  r e t e n t io n  by th e  o ld  Sweee-Fian n o b i l i t y  
o f  th e  c o n t r o l  o f  governm ent and t h e i r  i n s i s t e n c e  o f retaining Sw edish 
as t h e  o n ly  l e g a l  lan g u ag e  in  c o u r t s ,  s c h o o ls ,  D ie t ,  S e n a te , and f o r  
a l l  o f f i c i a l  documents* The i n t e l l e c t u a l s  who c e n te re d  around  th e  
U n iv e r s i ty  o f  T u r k u ^  w ere th e  f i r s t  to r e a l i s e  th e  anomaly of th e  
s i t u a t i o n  and lo n g ed  t o  change i t *  They b e lie v e d  w ith  Adolf I v s r  
A rv id sso n  that: "Swedes we a r e  no longer} R u ss ia n s  we c an n o t be;
t h e r e f o r e ,  we m ust become F in n s .*  In o rd e r  t o  a c h ie v e  t h i s  end th e  
iauantaina Spura (S a tu rd ay  S o c ie ty )  came in to  b e in g  t o  p ro m u lg a te  th e  
us® o f  th e  F in n is h  lan g u ag e  a s  a literary  medium* I t s  le a d e r s  were 
men l i k e  Johan Ludvig H uoeberg, writer o f th e  F in n ish  n a t io n a l  anthem, 
"Ksemm© Laulu* ( wOur land*), and Elia® L B nnro t, th e  collector o f  th e  
songs and rhym es which he e d i te d  to  form th e  Kalevala, th e  n a t io n a l  
e p ic  o f  F in lan d *  " T i f f ©ring w id e ly  in  o u tlo o k , t r a i n i n g  and tem p era ­
m en t, th e y  [ th e  members o f  th e  taueotaina S e a ra j w ere u n i te d  in  th e  
f a i t h  t h a t  th e  f u tu r e  o f  th e  c o u n try  la y  w ith  th e  p e a s a n t s . " ^ 1
12w ourinen , F in la n d  and th e  Second w orld War, p .  6 .
* 3 fh e  U n iv e r s i ty  o f Turku was founded In 16L0 and rem ained there 
until the disastrous fire  that destroyed most of the c ity  in 1627* The 
University was moved to Helsinki In  that year and has sine® been called  
the University of Helsinki.
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to© l a t e  t o  b e lo n g  to  th e  Im ffl& M m  ***t s t i l l  i n f l u e a -
t i a l  f ig u r e  in  th e  e f f o r t s  t o  make F in n is h  s o r e  th a n  th e  language o f 
th e  p easan try  was A le x is  KJLvi, d r a m a t i s t ,  and n o v e l i s t .  Jo h an  V ilhelm  
Snellm an, p r o f e s s o r ,  s e n a to r , reform er, and one o f  th e  forem ost o f  
n in e te e n th  cen tury  n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  a l s o  looms la r g e  a s  one o f th o s e  
who recogn ised  th e  im p o rtan ce  o f  a n a t i o n a l  language a s  a  d i s t i n c t  
n e c e s s i ty  f o r  th e  p ro p a g a tio n  o f  n a t io n a l u n ity . I t  was due to  h i s  
u n s t in t in g  e f f o r t s  t h a t  F in n is h  was r a i s e d  to  e q u a lity  w ith  Sw edish 
in  a l l  a r e a s  o f n a t io n a l  l i f e .  By c au s in g  i t  to  become a  p a r t  o f  a l l  
s c h o o l c u r r ic u la  and m aking i t  incum bent upon a l l  o f f i c i a l s  to  be  
a b le  t o  u se  F in n is h  a s  w e l l  a s  Sw edish, h e  en su red  th e  F in n is h  lan g u ag e  
i t s  d e se rv e d  p o s i t i o n  in  th e  l i f e  o f  th e  n a t io n .
During th e  l i b e r a l  r e ig n  o f  A lex an d er I I  CIS55-1&81> F in la n d  
fared  w e l l ,  h e r  economy was b o o s te d  and fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e  in  f i f t y  
y e a r s  a  n e s t in g  o f  th e  D ie t was summoned in  1863. I t  w as d u rin g  h i s  
r e ig n  t h a t  m ost o f  t h e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  improvements i s  l i f e  w ere 
e f f e c te d  and t h a t  F in la n d  was a llo w ed  c o n s id e ra b le  autonomy in  n a t io n a l  
a f f a i r s ,  With h i s  a s s a s s in a t io n  in  1881, how ever, hi® so n , A lexander I I I  
(1 8 8 1 -1 8 9 4 ), to o k  a  l e s s  b e n e v o le n t v iew  o f  F in n is h  n a t i o n a l i s t  
a s p i r a t io n s *  In  1891 th e  f i r s t  o v e r t  v io l a t i o n s  o f  th e  F in n is h  c o n s t i tu ­
t io n  o c c u rre d  w ith  d i r e c t  R u ss ia n  in te r f e r e n c e  in  th e  F in n is h  p o s t a l  
sy stem , custom s r e g u la t io n s ,  and f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y .  A lex an d er I I I ,  
how ever, was s e n s i t i v e  to  F in n ish  f e e l in g  and when vehement p r o t e s t s  
w ere v o ic e d , he allow ed  th e  m a tte r  to  d ro p . Hot s o  h i s  s u c c e s s o r ,  
N ic h o la s  I I  < 1894-191?), who u n der th e  g u id an ce  an a d v ice  o f h is  m en to r, 
K. p . PobC'donostscv, began a p o l ic y  o f h a rs h  m easu res  to  o b v ia t : any
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nation alistic  aapira'. ions or. the part o f  the minority g ro u p s  in  th e  
empire* With r-’obedonostaev as a motivating factor, there v tt  in itia ted  
a vigorous c^irpaigr to crush out a l l  forms of nationalism, except, of 
c o u r se , G re a t Hessian*
t h e  R u s s i f i c a t io n  program  soon g a in e d  Impetus] R u ssian  was made 
th e  o f f i c i a l  la n g u ag e  in  sen? a r e a s  o f  F in n is h  governm ent* and a p p o in t*  
m ent o f  R u ssian  o f f i c i a l s  in  t h e  F in n is h  c i v i l  s e r v ic e  became ( ? ® o n .  
O il  me poured on the fire  in 1196, when in  February an Imperial 
M a n ife s to  d e c la re d  that h e n c e fo r th  a l l  F in n is h  P a r lia m e n ta ry  a c t s  
m ust be approved  by th e  G o v e rn c r-G e n e ra l, th e n  fo rw arded  to  th e  
B u es lsn  Bums f o r  f i n a l  a p p ro v a l*  As I f  t h i s  w ere n o t  bad enough, th e  
D am  was d e le g a te d  a u th o r i t y  to p a s s  b i l l s  that concerned th e  i n t e r n a l  
a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  Grand Fuchy, som eth ing  w hich had been e x p r e s s ly  d en ied  
the 'im p e ria l C everm aeat by Alexander 1* To wake natters w o rse , in  
A ugust o f  th e  same y e a r ,  $ • I* Bobrikov was a p p o in te d  G o v erno r-G enera l*  
The historian A n a to le  Mmtmr says o f hint
Bobrikov1s stamina was as admirable as hi® p o lit ic a l acumen 
m*i deplorable. Flexible as a concrete block, imaginative m  the 
p r o v e rb ia l Tsarist bureaucrat, blindly loyal, to the imperial idee, 
and to ta lly  void cf any insight into the true nature of the issues  
at stake, the new governor general met out with a hard-fisted  
policy immediately to administer the Grand r’uchy of Finland in a 
wanner of a colonial satrap*^
F u rther in te r fe r e n c e  in  F in n ish  a f f a i r s  fo llow ed *  The F in n ish  
army was Incorporated in i©  th e  im p er ia l eray In 1901# A declaration 
in IS 99 s ta te d  th a t  a l  m atters o f  im p er ia l concern, would be decided by
15Faaour, op* clt»* p* 1?*
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th e  pisyfr and t h a t  i t s  p ro n o u n :m e a ts  would be e f f e c t i v e  th ro u g h o u t th e  
a s p i r e ,  in c lu d in g  F in la n d , in  t h e  future* o n ly  m a t te r s  c l e a r l y  and 
e x c lu s iv e ly  concerned  w ith  F in lan d  co u ld  be a c te d  on by th e  P la n is h  
.d ie t and th e  power o f d e c id in g  w hat th o s e  m a t te r s  m ig h t be w as v e s te d  
in  a  s p e c i a l l y  a p p o in te d  com m ittee t h a t  would m eet in  S t ,  P e tersburg .*  
t h u s , a lm o s t in  an  i n s t a n t  F in n is h  autonomy was sw ep t away.
The i n i t i a l  r e a c t io n  in  F in lan d  was m ie o f  p a s s iv e  r e s i s t a n c e  
and non-* coop o r a t io n  a s  u rg ed  by a s s t  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s ,  c lerg y m an , and 
s c h o la rs *  However, when re p e a te d  a tte m p ts  to  have th e  s i t u a t i o n  rec ti* *  
f i e b  by p e t i t i o n s  t© th e  Cmax p ro v ed  u s e l e s s  and allowed t h a t  Bobrikov*® 
p o l i c i e s  had th e  im p e r ia l  government*® f u l l  a p p ro v a l ,  r e s i s t a n c e  began  
to  s t i f f e n .  B o b rik o v  on h i s  p a r t  had n o t  b een  id le *  h e  p la c e d  a  s t r i n g e n t  
c e n s o rs h ip  m  a l l  paper®  t h a t  a d v o ca ted  p a s s iv e  r e s i s t a n c e  o r t h a t  
a t ta c k e d  hi® p o l i c i e s ,  j a i l e d  th o s e  who d a red  to  oppose him , me! so u g h t 
in  every  way p o s s ib le  t o  s tem  th e  t i d e  o f  p o p u la r  op in io n *  A R u ss ian  
lan g u ag e  new spaper m s  e s ta b l i s h e d  in  H e ls in k i ,  R u ss ia n -b o rn  s u b je c t s  
w ere g iv m  th e  r i g h t  t© h o ld  p ro p e r ty  in  F in la n d , th e  u s e  of R u ss ian  
was m&^e m aaoa-tory i n  th e  S e n a te , and. th e  te a c h in g  o f  R u ss ian  i n  th e  
s c h o o ls  was i n t e n s i f i e d .  Freedom o f  assem bly  was a b o lis h e d  in  1901, 
and in  1902f B o b rik o v  w as g ra n te d  v i r t u a l  d i c t a t o r i a i  p ow ers, in c lu d in g  
th e  r i g h t  t o  d is m is s  ju d g e s , c i v i l  s e r v a n t s ,  and p o l i c e  o f f i c e r s ,  a l l  
of whoa were* o f  c o u rs e , re p la c e d  by R u ssian s*  Such measures only 
s e rv e d  to  i n f u r i a t e  th e  p o p u la c e  u n t i l  f i n a l l y  th e  e a r l i e r  a t t i t u d e  
o f  p a s s iv e  r e s i s t a n c e  and s u l l e n  su b m iss io n  gave way to  v io le n c e .
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h is  p o l i c i e s ,  j a i l e d  th o se  who dared to  oppose him, and sought in  every  
way p o s s ib le  to  stem  th e  t id e  o f  popular o p in io n . A R ussian  language  
newspaper was e s ta b lis h e d  in  H e ls in k i,  R ussian-born  s u b je c ts  were g iv en  
th e  r ig h t  to  h o ld  prop erty  in  F in lan d , th e  u se  o f  R ussian  was made manda­
to r y  in  th e  S en a te , and th e  tea ch in g  o f R ussian  in  th e  sc h o o ls  was 
in t e n s i f i e d .  Freedom o f  assem bly was a b o lish ed  in  1901, and in  1902, 
Bobrikov was gran ted  v ir t u a l  d ic t a t o r ia l  powers, in c lu d in g  th e  r ig h t  to  
d ism is s  ju d g es, c i v i l  s e r v a n ts , and p o l i c e  o f f i c e r s ,  a l l  o f whom w ere, 
o f  co u rse , r ep la ced  by R u ssia n s. Such m easures on ly  served  to  in f u r ia t e  
th e  pop ulace u n t i l  f i n a l l y  th e  e a r l ie r  a t t i tu d e  o f  p a s s iv e  r e s is ta n c e  
and s u l le n  su b m ission  gave way to  v io le n c e .
In June, 1904, Bobrikov was a s s a s s in a te d , and in  1905, concur­
ren t w ith  th e  g e n e r a l s t r ik e  in  R u ssia  and R usso-Japanese War, th e  F inns  
a ls o  s tr u c k . The r e s u l t  was th e  rep ea l o f  th e  M anifesto  o f  1899, th e  
R ussian  language no lon ger  req u ired  in  th e  sc h o o ls  or in  th e  S en a te , 
d isc la im e n t  o f  R u ssian s from en try  in t o  th e  F in n ish  c i v i l  s e r v ic e ,  and 
th e  red u ctio n  o f  th e  powers o f  th e  G overnor-G eneral. In keeping w ith  
th e  g en era l improvement o f  her p o s i t io n  in  th e em pire, the F in n ish  
C o n s titu t io n  was revamped in  1906. The D ie t was made un icam eral, w ith  
th e  Senate se r v in g  as a co u rt, th e  E s ta te s  were a b o lish ed , and u n iv e r sa l  
s u ffe r a g e  was in i t i a t e d  fo r  a l l  men and women tw en ty -fou r  y ea rs  o f  age 
or o ld e r . At th e  same tim e freedom o f  sp eech , p r e s s , and assem bly, were 
c o n s t i t u t io n a l ly  a ssu red .
For a tim e a l l  went w e ll fo r  F inland as th e  C z a r is t  regim e
16Fin land  was th e  f i r s t  n a t io n  in  Europe to  en fra n ch ise  women, 
and th e  second in  th e  world a f t e r  New Z ealand.
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&** Ju n e , 1904, B obrifciv  was a s s a s s in a te d ,  and i n  .1905, concur-* 
r e n t  w ith  th e  g e n e r a l  s t r i k e  .in R u ss ia  aavl R u aso -Jap an esc  War, th e  F in n s  
a l s o  s t r u c k .  The r e s u l t  was t h e  r e p e a l  o f  th "  M an ife s to  o f  1399, th e  
R u ss ian  lan g u ag e  no lo n g e r  req u ired - in  th e  s c h o o ls  o r in  th e  S e n a te , 
t i i* « l# ia a n t  o f  R u ss ian #  from  « n tx f  i n t o  th e  F in n is h  c i v i l  s e r v ic e ,  and 
th e  r e d u c t io n  o f  th e  pow ers -of th e  O ta*anior""O etteral, In  k eep in g  w ith  
th e  g en era l. Approvement of h e r  p o s i t i o n  in  th e  em p ire , th e  F in n ish  
C o n s t i tu t io n  was revam ped in  1906* The O ie t was made unicam eral, w ith  
th e  S en a te  s o r t i n g  a s  a  c o u r t ,  th e  Bat a t  eg w ere a b o l is h e d , an:., u n iv e r s a l  
s u f f r a g e  i n i t i a t e s !  f o r  a l l  men ane women tw e n ty -fo u r  y e a rs  o f  age
ox olv.,-er,i ^ A t th e  same tim e  f r e e d a a  o f  sp e e c h , p r e s s ,  and assem bly ,
Whre c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  assure;,**
F o r a  tim e  a l l  w ent w e l l  f o r  F in lan d  as th e  C z a r is t  reg im e 
re c u p e ra te d  from  th e  blow s i t  had r e c e iv e d .  But a n o th e r  p e r io d  o f 
R u s s i f ic a t io n  was t o  fo llo w  w ith  th e  ad v en t o f P e te r  A, S to ly p in ,  a 
r ea c tio n a ry  who hate-.; a l l  l i b e r a l  sad  s o c i a l i s t  movements* In  1903,
P. A. Soya was appointed  0ovornor-G-«*ieral o f  F in land and th e  q u estio n  
o f th e  u l t im a te  p o s i t io n  o f F in la n d  in- th e  " n p ire  was a g a in  r a i s e d .
Under S*yii, R u ss ia n -b o rn  s u b je c t s  w ere once mo* * ©ade equal, t o  th e  
F in n s  in  F in la n d , R u ss ia n  m s  t o  be  ta u g h t  in  a l l  s c h o o ls ,  and a l l  
laws' p a sse d  by  th e  F in n is h  d i e t  had t o  be approved  by  th e  gang and th e  
R ussian S ta t e  C ouncil*  T hese m e a su re s 'm e t w ith  s p i r i t e d  r e s i s t a n c e  
from  F in n is h  l e g i s l a t o r s  an,., ju d g e s .  The R u ss ian  answ er was to  d e p o r t  
to  S ib e r i a  th o se  who o p p o se  th e  ch an g es . But n e i th e r  re p e a te d  d is s o lu t io n
16Finland m s  th e  f i r s t  n a tio n  i a  Europe to  en fra n ch ise  
women, and the second in  th e  w orld a f t e r  Mew Z ealand.
©f th e  D ie t  nor th e  d ep o r ta tio n  o f  l e g i s l a t o r s ,  newspaper e t i t o r s ,  
sod  o th e r s ,  se rv ed  to  -mxrto th e  m ounting  re se n tm e n t o f  th e  F in n is h  
p e o p le .
S e v e ra l  y ^ a re  w ere t o  " la p s e  b e fo re  th e  b re a k in g  p o in t  was 
re a c h e d . T h is  was ©e easier* ed by th e  F i r s t  World war w hich  b ro u g h t 
u n p re c ed e n te d  econom ic p r o s p e r i t y  t c  F in lan d  a s  she fe d  th e  i n s a t i a b l e  
a p p e t i t e  o f  th e  R ussian, wax m ach in e . Or. th e  s u r f a c e  th e  s i t u a t i o n  
ap p eared  cairn and s e r e n e ,  b u t  b e n e a th  th e  s u r f a c e  th e r e  was a  c e e p -  
s e a te d  u n r e s t  an '' f e e l in g  o f  d i s a f f e c t i o n  t h a t  o n ly  a w a ite d  th e  
p ro p e r  moment t o  m a n ifest I t s e l f .  T h a t .moment a r r iv e d  in  M arch, 1917, 
when A lex an d e r K erensky and H is f o l lo w e r s  to p p le d  th e  C a a r i s t  regim e 
and e s t a b l i s h e d  & new s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r .  A lthough  concerned  
w ith  the. m u ltitu d e  o f q u e s t io n s  connected  w ith  th e  co n d u ct o f  th e  w a r. 
S e tt le m e n t ©f th e  a g e -o ld  p ro b lem  o f  la n d  re fo rm s , ana th e  imm ediate 
p ro b lem s o f  e s t a b l i s h in g  th e  new governm ent, one o f  th e  f i r s t  th in g s  
th e  p r o v i s io n a l  government d id  w as t o  r e s t o r e  t o  Finland h e r  c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n  and to  r e p e a l  th e  o p p re s s iv e  law s o f th e  p re c e d in g  d e ca d e . A c ts  
o f  p o l i t i c a l ,  amnesty brought back  many o f  th e  F in n is h  e x i l e s ,  who 
a id e d  th e  c au se  o f  F in la n d  during th e  tr y in g  months ah ead .
The p r o v is io n a l governm ent r e g a r d le s s  o f  i t s  good i n t e n t i o n s  
and to e  f r i e n d l y  a t t i t u d e  o f  K ercnaki, v a s c l la te d  m  th e  i s s u e  a s  to  
w here th e  v a n ish e d  power o f  th e  crown sh o u ld  r e s id e .  F in n is h  s t a t e s ­
men p ressed  f o r  &n answer to  t h i s  q u e s t io n  and, when none was f o r t h -  
co o in g , th e y  s i t  re d  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  in  J u ly , i v l 7 t and d ec la red  t o s t  
h e n c e fo r th  th e  power o f  th e  crown in  F in land r e s id e d  in  to e  F in n ish  
d ie t*  They f u r t h e r  -icc J a re d  that a i l  m a tte r s  p e r ta in in g  to  F inland  
w ould be d ecid ed  by to e  d i e t  in  keep ing w ith  th e  concept o f  n a t io n a l
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s e l f - d e te r m in a t io n ,  a lth o u g h  m i l i t a r y  n a t t e r s  and fo r e ig n  p o l i c y  
were? l e f t  in  th e  hands o f th e  R u ss ian  p r o v is io n a l  governm ent* T h is  
amounted to  a  v i r t u a l  d e c la r a t io n  o f  F in n is h  in d ep en d en ce  and h a s  
s in c e  come to  be  known a s  th e  Independence  S i l l . 2-?
Independence and C i v i l  War
The d e c is io n  o f th e  D ie t to  d e c la r e  F in la n d  in d e p en d e n t -x c e p t  
fo r  c o n tr o l  o f th e  army and fo r e ig n  a f f a i r s  was f l a t l y  r e j e c t e d  by th e  
p r o v i s io n a l  governm ent. K erensky o rd e re d  th e  d i s s o lu t io n  o f  th e  D ie t 
and c a l le d  f o r  new e l e c t io n s  to  be h e ld  in  O ctober to  d e te rm in e  th e  
a t t i  tu d e  o f  th e  n a t io n .  At th e  t i n e  th o  S o c ia l  Dem ocrat P a r ty  had 
a  c le a r  m a jo r i ty  in  th e  D ie t ,  h o ld in g  103 o f  th e  200 s e a t s ,  and con­
t r o l l e d  th e  governm en t. I t  was t h e i r  d e s i r e  to  m a in ta in  a l i n k  w ith  
R u ss ia n  t h a t  had le d  to  th e  c la u s e  le a v in g  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  army and 
fo r e ig n  a f f a i r s  to  th e  R u ss ian  governm ent. When th e  e l e c t io n  r e s u l t s  
be-raise known, th e  S o c ia l  'dem ocrats had l o s t  e le v e n  s e a t s ,  re d u c in g  
t h e i r  number to  92, w hich p o rte n d e d  i l l  t o r  th e  f u tu r e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
betw een F in la n d  and R u ss ia .
The e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  r e f l e c t e d  th e  u n e a s in e s s  o f  th e  more 
c o n s e rv a t iv e  e lem en ts  In  th e  n a t io n  over th e  a la rm in g  number o f  s t r i k e s  
M il eh had been  c a lle ,,, by th e  r a d i c a l s  and th e  ten d en cy  tow ard v io le n c e  
th ro u g h o u t th e  summer and autum n. As th e y  had cam paigned on a p la t fo rm  
o f autonomy w ith in  th e  R u ss ia n  s t a t e ,  th e  S o c ia l  D em ocrats w ere  com pro-
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im o n n e n , i s  ffixflcrn P . 219 .
18Ja c k so n , qq pp* 85-67 .
n is e d  by th e  B o vcrber R e v o lu tio n  .in R u ss ia  and t h r  a d v en t o f  t h e  
B o lsh - 'v ilts . N a t i o n a l i s t  a s p i r a t i o n s  in  F in lan d  w ere advanced by t h i s  
e v en t and b o u rg e o is  p a r t i e s  w asted  no t i n ip in  s e t t i n g  th e  t A t e l s  o f  
th o  in  n o t io n .  On November 15, th e  D ie t p ro c la im e d  t h a t  by  virtue
o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  o f  .1772. suprem e power r e s id e d  w ith  i t .  Then in  
k e ep in g  w ith  th e  F in n ish  •'■‘h a r a e t e r i s t i e  o f  w a it in g  and w a tc h in g , a  
co u p le  o f  u e e k s  e la p se d  a s  • 'th e  D ie t Members and th e  p e o p le  o f  F in la n d  
w a ited  w ith  f e a r  and an& ety f o r  th e  h eav en s  to  f a l l .  When th e  s k ie s  
c ^ n tin i i■■'•* to  r**natn in  ttae i.r insaKtaorial p la c e  and no t h r e a t  o f  re trib tfc*  
t i o n  .:aae from  S t .  P e te r s b u rg ,  th o  !>i*t took  th o  momentous s t e p  on 
■''.cosher 6, 1917, and Draftee a Declaration of in*? spend*nc« which 
fo rm a lly  p rocla im ed . F in la n d  to  b e  a so v e re ig n  s ta te .* * 2-9 R e c o g n itio n  
by th e  S o v ie t  governm ent was acco rded  on J a n u a ry  4 , 19IS , and m ost 
o f  th e  o u ts id e  w orld  fo llo w e d  s u i t  in  s h o r t  o r d e r .
T h a t R u ss ia  a cc o rd e d  r e c o g n i t io n  was clue to  p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i t y .  
She was to o  weak, to  oppose th e  F irm s and i n t e r n a l  p rob lem * p re o c c u p ie d  
th e  S o v ie t  l e a d e r s .  The B o lsh e v ik s  had hoped th a t  a  r e v o lu t io n  in  
F in la n ;  le d  by th e  S o c ia l  d e m o c ra te s , m igh t u l t im a te ly  have c re a te d  
a  reg im e in  th e  fo rm er S r r n l  buehy f r i e n d ly  t o  th e  S o v ie ts  and r e c o g n i-  
t i o n  d id  n o t  mean th a t  B enin  and T ro tsk y  hub g iv e n  up hope f o r  * 
p r o l e t a r i a n  r e v o l t  in  F in la n d . As Masour so  s u c c in c t ly  s t a t e s :
S o v ie t  .re c o g n itio n  was g ra n te d  in  p r i n c i p l e ;  t h a t  i s ,  i t  s t a t e d  
t h a t  F in la n d ’s  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  in d ep en d en ce  was l a  c o n fo rm ity  w ith  
th e  p r in c ip le  o f th e  r i g h t  o f  s e l f W e te r m ln a t io n  d e c la re d  by th e  
B o lsh ev ik * }  i t  d id  n o t  im ply  a p p ro v a l o f th e  “ b o u rg e o is  governm ent’1
^ H in sh a w , &&. &UU, p .  37.
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qos co u iu  i t  t>* i n t e r p r e t e r  &» a  p led g e  to  honor su ch  a  governm ent 
a s  ’’b o u rg e o is  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  la*f* p r e s c r i b e s .  At mx o p p o rtu n e  moment
r e v o lu t io n  B ig h t co»c as . llxc b o lsh c v iic s  ivoui,ii f e e l  t  s ce to  ectonc  
a  h e lp in g  band t o  th e  r i g h t f u l  c la im a n t t o  pow er.
In  k eep in g  w ith  t h e i r  h o p es  o f  a r e v o lu t io n  in  F in la n d , th e  R u ss ia n s  made 
l i t t l :  o r no e f f o r t  t o  w ith d raw  t h e i r  tro o p s  from  F in n is h  t e r r i t o r y  a s  
th e y  had a g re e .t to  do e a r l i e r .  T h is  l e f t  a c o n t in g e n t  o f  ab o u t 4 0 ,0 0 0  
u n d is c ip l* ««'•! and r e v o lu t io n a r y  in flam ed  tro o p s  in  th e  c o u n try  who w ore 
to  ho a  s o u rc e  o f  tre m b le  in  th e  m onths to  fo l lo w .
M eanw hile, th e  te n s io n s  a lr e a d y  ear la t e n t  betw een  th e  s o c i a l i s t  
and m id d le - c la s s  e lem en ts  in  F in la n d  w ere  h e ig h t to e d  by th e  p re s e n c e  o f  
armed g ro u p s known a s  th e  Red G uard and w h ite  G uard . The $ h i t e  Guard 
had been  o rg a n is e d  a s  a  C iv i l  d e fe n s e  c o rp s  d u r in g  t h -  summer o f  1917 
to  m a in ta in  o r ie r  in  H e ls in k i  and t o  r e s t r a i n  th e  R u ss ia n  t r o o p s ,  
k lsew tie re  in thr n a t io n  th e  W hite  G uards were o rg a n is e d  u n d e r th e  g u is e  
o f  f i r e  b r ig a d e s  and s p o r t s  c lu b s .  S u s p ic io u s  o f th e  m o tiv e s  b eh in d  
th e s e  g ro u p s and s u s p e c t in g  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  a f f i l i a t i o n s  b e ca u se  o f  t h e i r  
m idd le**class and p e a s a n t  c o m p o s itio n , th e  S o c ia l  d em o cra ts  o rg a n is e d  a  
c o u u te r - o r g a n ia a t io n  among, th e  l a b o r in g - c l a s s ,  w ith  th e  f i r s t  u n i t s  
formed in  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  c i t y  o f T a t^ e r e .  S im ita r  g ro u p s w ere soon 
form ed th ro u g h o u t th e  n a t io n  w ith  th e  avowed aim o f  p r o t e c t in g  th e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  w o rk in g - c la s s  and d e fe n d in g  them  a g a in s t  a t t a c k s  from  
th * i r  S o c ia l  f o e s .  By Dec ember th e  Red Guard had expanded i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  
and came t o  be header' by a sm a ll  r e v o lu t io n a r y  com m ittee  on mxefi th e  
same o rd e r  a s  t h a t  in  c o n t r o l  in  P e tro g r a d .
w ith  th e  p a s s a g e  o f  tim e  i t  became c le a r  t h a t  th e  Red Guard
20
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was bent on r e v o lu t io n  o f  th e  S o v ie t  ty p e  w ith  th e  a id  o f  th e  S o v ie t  
governm en t. F or t h e i r  p o r t ,  th e  middle** c la s s  p a r t i e s  hoped to  m a in ta in  
th e  s t a t u s  quo w ith  th e  a id  o f th e  8h.it e G uard , an d , i f  n e c e s s a r y ,  w ith  
th e  h e lp  o f  Germany. To p u t  an end to  th e  im p a sse , Svinhufvud, th e  
P r e s id e n t  o f th e  S e n a te , d e c id e d  t o  open n e g o t i a t io n s  w ith  Germany and 
t o  e n a c t  a c o n s c r ip t  law  f o r  th e  c o u n try .  As a  f i r s t  s t e p ,  he i n i t i a t e d  
n e g o t ia t io n s  to  have th e  2 7 th  J % e r  B a t t a l i o n ,  a  g roup  o f  a b o u t 2 ,0 0 0  
H e ls in k i  U n iv e r s ity  s tu d e n t s  who bad h e m  c l a n d e s t in e ly  s e n t  t o  Germany 
fo r  m i l i t a r y  t r a i n i n g  betw een 1914 and 1916, r e tu r n e d  to  .F inland to  
s e r v e  a s  th e  c o re  o f  th e  new c o n s c r ip t  army.
The s ta g e  was now s e t  f o r  a  d e c i s iv e  s t r u g g le .  Chi 28 J a n u a ry , 
1918, th e  Red# S tru c k , s e i s in g  th e  g&v&cimmt b u i ld in g s  in  H e ls in k i  
and o rd e r in g  th e  l o c a l  Red Guard u n i t s  in  o th e r  c i t i e s  to  ta k e  s i m i l a r  
a c t i o n .  The coup a cc o m p lish e d , F in la n d  was p ro c la im e d  a
S o c i a l i s t  W orkers* R e p u b lic  d i f f © r in g  in  o n ly  one r e s p e c t  from  th a t  o f  
R u s s ia :  in  F in la n d  th e  p a r l ia m e n ta r y  f o m  of government was r e t a in e d .
In s te a d  ©£ c r e a t in g  a  w orkers*  r e p u b l i c ,  how ever, th e  S o c ia l  
D em ocrats had p lu n g ed  th e  n a t io n  i n t o  & c i v i l  war which l a t e r  became 
known a s  th e  War o f  L ib e r a t io n .  M arshal E a r l  6 .  M anaerheim  in  h i s  
M emoirs d e fe n d s  th e  u s e  o f  th e  te rm  War o f  L ib e r a t io n  when be s t a t e s :
The a c t io n  w hich I  s t a r t e d  was d i r e c te d  a g a in s t  th e  R u ss ia n  t ro o p s  
t h a t  had  r e m it te d  in  F in la n d  d e s p i t e  th e  reco g n itio n -, o f th e  S o v ie t  
G overnttsat. Th* open w a r fa re  now begun w as, t h e r e f o r e ,  a  war o f  
l i b e r a t i o n .  The f a c t  t h a t  subsequent o p e r a t io n s  w ere d i r e c te d  a g a in s t  
R u ss ia n s  a s  w e l l  a s  a g a in s t  o u r own r e b e l s  [ s ic j  d id  n o t a l t e r  t h i s  
f a c t ,  f o r  w hich n e i th e r  th e  l e g i t im a te  governm ent n o r i t s  army was 
r e s p o n s ib le . The g u i l t  r e s t e d  s o l e l y  on th e  l e a d e r s  o f th e  r e b e l s . 2 *
21K a r l G u s ta f  Manner helm , M em oirs, t r a n .  B r ie  I,ew enhaupt,
(London: C a s s e l l  and Company, L t d . , 19531 F . 141.
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Bvent® moved q u ic k ly  a s  th e  government headed  by Sviahufvuci 
f l e d  t o  Vaasa to  p re p a re  fo r  th e  coming s tru g g le *  L u c k ily , th e y  had 
th e  s e r v ic e s  o f G e n e ra l Mannerhain around w hich th e  C iv i l  Guard could  
r a l l y  and t o  g iv e  t h e i r  army th e  l e a d e r s h ip  r e q u i s i t e  to  - a r t y  i t  t o  
v ic to ry *  The f i r s t  th in g  t h a t  needed  t o  be unaertaken  was th e  e x p u ls io n  
o f  th e  R ussian  t r o o p s  tro w  S o u th e rn  O s tro o o th a ia  (F e b ru a ry , IV1 7 ) , m&c 
th e  White governm ent f e a re d  would j o i n  up w ith  th e  in s u r g e n ts  and su p p ly  
them w ith  t h e  arm s and equipm ent th e y  n eed ed , M annerheua d e c id e d  to  
S t r i k e  q u ic k ly ,  a lth o u g h  h e  was s e r io u s ly  handicapped by th e  la c k  o f 
arm s and tra in e e -  o f f i c e r s .  Moving s w i f t l y ,  th e  W hites  d isarm ed  th e  
R u ss ia n s  in  th e  S o u th e rn  O s tro b o th n ia  i n  fo u r  d a y s  and th e n  proceed® 6 
to. s e c u re  th e  gain® th e y  had s tae e .22
Armed w ith  th e  c ap tu red  w eapons o f  th e  R u ss ia n s  and r e in f o r c e d  
by th e  end o f  F eb ru a ry  w ith  th e  r e tu r n e d  Jttger B a t t a l i o n  p lu s  th e  t im e ly  
a r r i v a l  o f a  c o n tin g e n t  o f Sw edish, b a n is h , ana N orw egian v o lu n te e r s  a s  
w e ll  a s  84 o f f i c e r s  o f  th e  Swedish army, Manner!* dus p re p a re d  to  a t t a c k  
Tam pere, th e  c e n te r  o f th e  Red r e s i s t a n c e .  23 On A p r i l  3, th e  a t t a c k  
was begun and a f t e r  th r e e  d ay s o f f u r io u s  f i g h t in g ,  d u rin g  w hich th e  
Red f o r c e s  p u t  up a  v a l i a n t  e f f o r t ,  Tampere f e l l  and th e  way was opened 
f o r  th e  co n q u es t o f  th e  r e s t  of F in la n d .24
in  th e  m eantim e, much to  M anner!*eim 's d i s p l e a s u r e ,2^ th e  
F in n ish  governm ent had e n l i s t e d  th e  a id  o f  th e  Germ ans, who ag reed  to
21 I b i d . ,  p p . 147*152.
23I b id . .  p . 155.
22 I b i d . ,  p p . 141—143
2 .I b id . , p p . 162—170.
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Send ait e x p e d i t io n a ry  f o r c e  to  h e lp  in  th e  l i b e r a t io n *  The f i r s t  
German f o r c e s  lan d ed  a t  Hank* under th e  le a d e r s h ip  e f  M ajor G e n e ra l 
R ttd iger W i  d e r  C o l ts  and p ro ceed ed  to  inarch on H e ls in k i  from, th e  
so u th w es t w h ile  th e  F in n is h  f o r c e s  sieved in  from  th e  n o r th .  At th e  
r e p o r t  o f  th e  ap p ro a ch in g  f o r c e s  th e  U*-\i governm ent f l e d  th e  c a p i t a l  
w hich f e l l  w ith  h a rd ly  any r e s i s t a n c e .  A few d ay s  a f t e r  th e  a r r i v a l  
o f  von d e r  G o l ts ,  a  second  German fo r c e  landed a t  L o v isa  and advanced  
in la n d  anti a id ed  in  c u t t i n g  o f f  th e  Red army in  th e  c a s t ,  h’i t h i n  a 
s h o r t  t im e  a l l  o f F in la n d  was in  tin 31 hands o f  th e  W hite f o r c e s ,  th e
Red governm ent h av in g  f l e d  to  R u s s i a . 26
The war o v e r , th e  governm ent now faced  p rob lem s o f o rgan  issa tsn  
and a  b a s ic  de.-J.sion re g a rd in g  th e  form  o f  governm ent t o  he  e s t a b l i s h e d .
I t  was S v inhu fvud*s d e s i r e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a m onarchy in  F in lan d  cm th e  
Sw edish  m odel. To f a c i l i t a t e  th e s e  p la n s ,  th e  F in n is h  governm ent 
nam e1 S v inhufvud  r e g e n t* a t  t h e  same tim e  r e v e s t i n g  K a is e r  W illiam  
to  name one o f  h i s  so n s  King o f  F in la n d , The K a is e r  d e c l in e d  th e  o f f e r  
f o r  h i s  so n s  h o t  g r a c io u s ly  su g g e s te d  h i s  brother**in**law, P r in c e  F r ie d r ic h  
K a rl o f  H esse , f o r  th e  honor* The D ie t e le c te d  hi®  and th e  P r in c e  a c c e p te d ,
b u t when th e  German cau se  w as l o s t  in  th e  f a l l  o f 1918, he v e ry  d ip lo ­
m a t ic a l ly  asked  to  be  r e l i e v e d  o f  th e  h o n o r. T h ese  e v e n ts  le d  to  th e  
f a l l  o f  SvlnlmCvud a s  r e g e n t  and th e  summoning o f  N annerheim  t o  f i l l  
th e  p o s i t i o n .
From th e  beginn ing  Maatierheim r e a l i s e d  th e n e c e s s i t y  o f connect­
ing  the F in n is h  ca u se  w ith  th e  v i c t o r i o u s  A ll ie d  pow ers and proceeded.
26I b i d . .  p p .  171-176 .
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to  • t e e r  F in la n d  to w ard s  re p u b lic a n ism  ana on 1? J u n e , 191, th e  D ie t 
p ro c la im ed  th e  s t a t e  th e  R ep u b lic  o f  F in la n d . During t h e  su cceed in g  
m onths th e  government was fa c e d  by a  c o n g e r ie s  of pro b lem s, d om estic  
and fo r e ig n  t h a t  ap p ea red  a lm o s t insurm ountab le, The economy was 
p r o s t r a t e ,  th e  p rob lem  o f  th e  p r i s o n e r s  ta k en  d u r in g  th e  war rem ained  
to  be t r ie d ,  food was. in  g r e a t  sh o r ta g e , W hile th e r e  was th e  p rob lem  o f 
K a r e l ia  and th e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  b o rd e r  problem s w ith  R u ss ia , The f i r s t  
problem  th e  government had to  g ra p p le  w ith  was o f  th e  food s u p p ly . T h is  
was m et by th e  sh ipm en t o f  g r a in  from  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  An am nesty  
b i l l  re le a sed  some 4 3 ,0 0 0  in te r n e d  p r i s o n e r s  from  th e  in te rn m e n t camps 
in  December, 1919, b u t i t  was s e v e r a l  y e a r s  b e f o r e  a l l  o f them f i n a l l y  
w ere re lea sed *  B efo re  th e  f i n a l  g ro u p s  w ere s e t  f r e e  seme 135 w ere  
p u t  t o  d e a th  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t  in  th e  C i v i l  W ar.^7
f o r e ig n  p ro b le m s , e s p e c ia l ly  th e  f u t u r e  o f K a r e l ia ,  p lag u ed  
th e  new governm ent. I t  had been  th e  hope o f Manuerheim and o th e r  F innsh  
n a t i o n a l i s t s  t h a t  th e  la n d  o f  th e  l a l e v a l a  would u l t im a te ly  be r e s to r e d  
t o  F in la n d . A h a l f - h e a r t e d  w a r- tim e  e f f o r t  cm th e  p a r t  o f th e  B r i t i s h  
to  u t i l i s e  t h i s  d e s i r e  a s  a  means o f  s to p p in g  German p e n e t r a t i o n  i n t o  
F in la n d , a s  w e l l  a s  to  keep  R u ss ia  in  t h e  w ar th ro u g h  th e  q u a sh in g  o f  
th e  B o lsh e v ik  g o v ern m en t,h ad  y ie ld e d  no  f i n a l  r e s u l t .  A f te r  s e v e r a l  
fu rth er  d e s u l to r y  a t te m p ts ,  a l l  was g iv e n  up and i n  1920 th e  F in n s  ami 
R u ss ia n s  s a t  a own t o  n e g o t ia te  a t r e a t y  to  d e l im i t  th e  b o u n d a r ie s  be­
tw een th e  two c o u n t r i e s .  The n e g o t i a to r s  met a t  T a r tu  <d o rp a t)  in  th e  
f a l l  o f 1920 and th e r e  i t  was determ ined t h a t  E a s te rn  K a r e l ia  should  
b e long  t o  th e  S o v ie t  governm ent, a l th o u g h  i t s  autonomy was to  be resp ected *
37 Jack son , gp« g 4 |a . p p . 101-102 .
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For h e r  p a r t ,  Finland r e c e iv e d  W estern K a r e lia , e x cep t to r  th e  
f r o n t i e r  p ro v in ces  o f ftepoia and F ora jh rv i which were g iv e n  to  th e  
S o v ie t  Union l a  o rd e r  to  a s s u r e  th e  m il i ta r y  d e fe n se  o f L e n in g ra d ,
In t d i  north , th e  F inns r e c e iv e d  th e i c e - f r e e  A r c t ic  O cean .p ort o f 
Jretsaa© (F f ih e a g a )  HFor ev e r to  be o w ie i by Fin land  w ith  f u l l  r ig h t s  
o f so v e r e ig n ty , and R u ssia  renounces in  favor o f  F in land a l l  her r ig h ts  
and t i t l e  over m e  t e r r i t o r y  th u s - 13dat*"23 i t  -was fa r th er  agreed, th a t  
the islanUB belonging  t o  F in land in  th e  G ulf o f F in land  shou ld  be 
n e u tr a lise d *  Ssraerx, M arvi, Feninsaasri, la v a a s a a r i , Suur T ytftaaari, 
F lo a t T y th rsa a r i, and hodsIc3?l
The T re a ty  o f Tartu was to  p ro v e  o f g r e a t  l e g a l  v a lu e  to  
Faaiaau when the Krem lin prea.-atsU  i t s  demands fo r  c o n c e s s io n s  in  th e  
Chili o f  F in la n d  and th e  K a r e l ia n  Is th m u s in  1939* i t  p ro v id e d  th e  b a s i s  
fo r  m a y  o f  th e  F in n is h  r e j e c t i o n s  o f  th e  S o v ie t  demands fo r  c o n c e s s io n s  
arc. l a t e r  se rv e d  a s  a  b a s i s  fo r  th e  F in n is h  n e g o t i a to r s  d u r in g  viu: 
a r m is t ic e  t a l k s  in  M arch, 1940. {See A ppendix A, p .  15^ *
A p art from  th e s e  boundary p ro b lem s w ith  h e r  e a s te r n  n e ig h b o r , 
th e  F in n is h  governm ent was in v o lv ed  w ith  Sweden in  d isp u te  o v er th e  
A aiand I s l a n d s .  I t  bau been  Sweden*® d e s i r e  t o  in co rp o ra te  th e  
a rc h ip e la g o  in to  Sweden on th e  g ro u n d s  th a t th e  p o p u la tio n  was a lm o s t 
e n t i r e l y  Sw edish s p e a k in g  and d e s i r e d  union w ith  Sweden r a t h e r  th a n  t o  
rem ain a p a r t  o f F in la n d . However, s in c e  1609 th e  is la n d s  had, been  an 
a lo in i  3 t r a t i v e  u n i t  w i th in  F in lan d  auo a f t e r  d e c la r in g  hex indepO Tdence,
"^ZSSSSZ SI Tartu rep r in ted  in  f u l l ,  Appendix I ,  Mazour, 
bp. c i f t . , p . 214 .
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Stic inzlu-'-cc th e  A&iaao Is la n d s  as p a r t  of F in land . T h is was of ra th e r  
g re a t concern fo r  Sweden, as the  is la n d s  in  u a i i ie a a ly  hands posed a 
th re a t  to  her s e c u r i ty .  A fte r the  Crimean tfar th e  is la n d s  hau bean 
c c m ilita r is e n  im t# ^nring  the f i r s t  l o r  Id War, R ussia  had gained th e  
assen t of  the  A l l ie s  to  f o r t i f y  them* A bwe^ish m il i ta ry  exped ition  
was d is p a t  cacu to  the  is la n d s  in  February, 191$, fo r the o s te n s ib le  
purpose of p rese rv in g  or^or sad  saving l iv e s .  F inn ish  chagrin  ould 
no t change th?  s itu a tio n *  but the  l a t e r  a r r i v a l  of German tro o p s in  
May did* and t in  Swedes were forced  to  evaluate*
bncii th e  war crUe.':. th e  q u e s t io n  was s t i l l  u n s e t t l e d .  The 
is la n d e rs  sen t a  dag u ta tio n  to  the P a r is  Peace Conference to  req u est 
th a t ta sy  dc allowed to  d*.„iv.o th a i r  own p o l i t i c a l  fu tu re  by p le b i s c i t e .  
Too many n a t t e r s  o f g re a te r  im portan t, fa c e r  the  d e le g a te s  a t  the  Peace 
Conference to  allow  them to  take up the  q u e s tio n . I t  was promised th a t  
th e  m atter would he given c a re fu l c o n s id e ra tio n , but nothing was bone.
P in  lan d  s icasc! th e  i n i t i a t i v e  in  May, by enacting  a
d e c r e e  g r a n t in g  t h e  i s l a n d e r s  a <i-v.gr o r  o f  autonom y. T h i s  was n o t  
enough fo r  th e  l o c a l  p o p u la t io n  and a  d e p u ta t io n  was s e n t  to  S to  -kholm 
to  u rg e  t h a t  Sweden anaes: th e  A rc h ip e la g o . The F in n is h  governm ent 
r e p l ie d  by sen d in g  an armed o c c u p a tio n  f o r c e  i n to  th e  i s  1 anils am! 
sir r e s  te d  th e  d e le g a t io n  when i t  re tu rn e d  fro ci S tockholm . For a  tim e  
i t  appeared as  though  th e  m a tte r  would le a d  to  war b e t w e e n  ?\*nden 
and F in la n d , b u t th ly  i i i t^ r v u t t t io n  o f th e  B r i t i s h  Govurnraent re *
su ite d , id  tlic m a t te r  b e in g  r e f e r r e d  to  th e  Council o f th e  Lea#vc o f 
N ations in  l a t e  summer* 1>19,
A e o n n ittc c  was a n o in te d  f© in v e s tig a te  th e  s i tu a t io n  and i t  
was decided  th a t  i t  was w ith in  th e  competence o f th e  League to  adjudicate
Mth e  n a f f e r ,  M jm ife  so v e r e ig n ty  w m  r eco g n ised  tm i th e p r o v iso  m s  
in s e r te d  th a t the is la n d s  he s s s t ir fe  an autonomous s t a t u s  in  th e  
PiaaiSti M cpiblic*  Sweden, m s  fo r th e *  p a c i f i e d  in  th e  f a l l  of Ifcai*
»h*» th e d e m il i ta r is a t io n  of the. a r c h ip e la g o  m s  c o n s id e re d , O rest 
B r i t a in ,  Sw& im , I ta ly *  France, L a tv ia , E sto n ia , N U s l ,  and PiaiMkti 
a l l  s ig n ed  a  C onvention t o  guar ant ae such s t a t u s ,  a lth ou gh  R ussia* a  
v i t a l l y  in t e r c a f f e  p a r ty  in  th e  Aalaad q u e s t io n , m s  a& ithsr .m v iied  
to  th e  Co«f c r e a s e , *tko£ ta r  an o p in io n , or  invite,,: to  bectw e a sigxt*»  
t a r /  to  the C onvention , 11ms, a  p o t e n t ia l  th rea t to  $we.-.an m s  o b v ia te d , 
autonomy mid. c u ltu r a l freedom m s  assu red  the in lan d er  a an::. & p o s s ib le  
Nor th-'fe w  a v e r ted .
Gu the .lamest ic  sccn.5- ,atri»g tit® tm m itxm  many at the problems 
that vejusb the nation fcef'ox® independence s t i l l  ro ttiaeu , On® of til® 
most important of thcse m s the emu i t  ion of the- peasant papulation 
largely coastsitug of tenant farmers wife snail homing* wsose csratence 
m s  at tde *aer&y of the ijm.dh»lU«xa, 2* ssfev land holuxngs aore equity  
able, the governsieai passed fee ^a illo , xn i "££&» to i&pama the basis 
of Isrsc vw a snip, i t  pxoviate: for gover&Mit purchase oi Ism* tro* 
the larger hi©ifeofe.ets. ana it® reMuc to the peasants uouer iong»t«m 
s a le s  ..gtrcr*c i s ,
Another ioneaiate problem  io r  th e  government m s  th e  ra p id  
r e v iv a l  a* the PuMiisii coatmsn l s t  p a r ty  a l t e r  x t s  b e* ea t xa i ^ l o ,  an 
i^ ao fe e  gcmaruwint w* j gran ted  le g a l  r i:..,op ixtioa  to  th e  p a r ty  by a l l* * *  
in g  i t  t o  Uofe a c o n s t itu e n t  m eeting ua^er th e  name of 1 in lan d *a  s o c i a l i s t  
barker** l a s t y ,  in  -fee e le c t io n  of i t # ! ,  fe e  ccssaKxutts r e t a s s e l  h a s t y *  
seven  r c p * e s c a ta f iv e #  t o  fe e  t? iet, m ost of who© n e t s  e le c te d  a t  f e e  esp ou se
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o f  th e  S o c ia l Democrat**30 Throughout th e  f i r s t  p o st-w a r  decade th e  
Communists kept up t h e ir  p o l i t i c a l  a g i t a t io n ,  propaganda, and t e r r o r i s t  
t a c t i c s ,  i n f i l t r a t i n g  th e  la b o r  u n ion s and in  g e n e ra l a ttem p tin g  t o  u p se t  
th e  e s ta b lis h e d  s o c i a l  o r d e r . With th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  en co u n tered /in  
th e l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  th e  period because o f  th e  world w ide economic d epres­
s io n ,  a  r e a c tio n  s e t  in  and th e  u s u a lly  le v e l-h e a d e d  F inns became 
increasin g ly  v io le n t  in  th e ir  o p p o s it io n  to  th e  Communists.
In crea sin g  d is c o n te n t  auu in d ig n a t io n  a t  th e  paralysing p a r ty  
p a r r e l s ,  but m ost o f  a i l  a t  th e  barefaced trea ch ery  o f  Communist 
a g i t a t io n ,  w ith  i t s  terro r ism  and h o o lig a n ism  among th e  workers 
had p r ^ a r e d  th e  ground fo r  a  reaction  which grew l i t t l e  by l i t t l e  
u n t i l  i t  became an overwhelm ing pop ular movement, known under th e  
name o f  th e  lap u a  Movement. A C om m unist-engineered d istu rb a n ce  in  
Lapua a t  th e  end o f  November 1929 p rovided  th e  s ig n a l  fo r  a l o c a l  
m anifestation o f  popular an ger, which was fo llo w ed  by numerous 
lo c a l  m eetin gs and expressions o f  o p in io n  a l l  over th e  cou n try . The 
f e a r s  anti w ish e s  exp ressed  a t  th e se  were la id  b e fo r e  th e  government 
and R iksdag, which s t i l l ,  however, cou ld  n ot b r in g  th em selves to  
a l t e r  the co u rse  on which th ey  were s e t . 32
Led by clergymen and p e a sa n ts , and ta k in g  on a F a c is t  to n e , 
th e  movement s lo w ly  gained  momentum and became more v io le n t  and te r r o r ­
i s t i c .  Communist newspaper p la n ts  w ere invaded, th e  p r e s s e s  wrecked 
and th e  ed ito rs and s t a f f s  rough ly  h an d led . Prominent Communist le a d e r s  
were o f te n  kidnapped and d r iven  to  th e  R ussian b ord ers and thrown 
a c ro ss  th e  boundary in t o  the S o v ie t  O nion, In J u ly , 1930 conservative  
p ea sa n ts  marched on th e  c a p i t a l  and fo rced  the government t o  succumb to  
th e ir  anti-com m unist dem ands.33 As a consequence, th e  government p ro -
30lfugh Shearman, F lnlapti— 1 441^1  tO Tff g£  §  I f feM  pW e£ 
(New Yorkj Frederick A. Praeger, I n c . ,  1 9 5 0 ), p . 80 .
3 IMannerheim, c i t . ,  pp . 2 4 2 -2 4 3 . 32J k isU , p . 243 .
33Mazour, o$>, c i t . » pp . 8 5 -8 6 .
28
h ib it e a  th e  p u b lic a t io n  o f  Communist newspapers and Svinhufvud formed 
a n m  government which was amenable t o  th e  Lapuan demands.
Svinhufvud began by p la c in g  th e  tw en ty -th ree  Communist members 
o f  th e  D ie t  under a r r e s t .  He th en  turned to  th e  b u s in e ss  o f  l e g i s l a ­
t iv e  reform . Included in  h i s  program was th e  su p p ressio n  o f  th e  
Communist p a r ty , th e  gaggin g  o f  i t s  p r e s s ,  and th e  p a ssa g e  o f  en ab ling  
a c ts  to  a llo w  r u le  by s p e c ia l  emergency o rd in a n ces . S in ce  th e s e  were  
in  th e  n a tu re  o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  amendments, a  tw o -th ir d s  m a jo r ity  o f  
th e  d ie t  would be n e c e ssa r y  fo r  p a ssa g e , p lu s  new e le c t io n s  and p a ssa g e  
in  th e  nan D ie t by a  s im ila r  tw o -th ir d s  m a jo r ity . Knowing th a t he 
could n o t g e t  th e  n e c essa ry  su p p ort fo r  such a c t io n , Svinhufvud u t i l i s e d  
another form o f  p arliam en tary  s t r a t e g y ,  i . e .  he requested th e  D iet to
adopt th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  a s  an emergency a c t ,  ra th er  than a c o n s t i t u t io n a l  
amendment. T h is req u ired  a f i v e - s i x t h s  m a jo r ity , but d id  n o t n e c e s s i t a t e  
th e  h o ld in g  o f  an e le c t io n *  However, when t h i s  attem pt f a i l e d ,  th ere  
was n o th in g  l e f t  to  do but d i s s o lv e  th e  D iet and c a l l  fo r  an e l e c t i o n .34
In a  s t a t e  o f  h igh  excitem ent and h y s t e r ia ,  pu nctuated  by 
a c t s  o f  v io le n c e ,  a b d u c tio n s , and i l l e g a l  a d m in is tr a t iv e  p r o c ee d in g s , 
th e  e le c t io n  campaign o f  October 1930, took p la c e .  F o llow in g  th e  
e le c t io n s  th e  S o c ia l  Democrats lack ed  by one v o te  th e  n ecessa ry  s tr e n g th  
to  b lock  Svinhufvud*s l e g i s l a t i o n .  In November th e  program was pushed 
through th e  new D ie t and th e  Communist P arty  was outlaw ed , l e f t i s t
34 I b i d . , p . 8 6 .
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lab or u n ion s were suspended, and th e  freedom  o f  th e  Communist p r e s s
d en ied .
Unappeased by th e s e  tritu^phs, th e  Lapua movement prepared  
to  carry  t h e ir  program t o  u lt im a te  g o a ls .  L ei by General W allenius, 
the movement undertook a program t o  r e s tr a in  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  i n s t i t u ­
t io n s  and r e p la c e  them by a P a p i s t i c  government*35 P lans were la id  
fo r  a £ojig S $ S l th e  e a r ly  sp r in g  o f  1932, in  support o f  w hich, 
th e  la p o a  le a d e r s  sought to  e n l i s t  th e  a id  o f  th e  C i v i l  Guard, When 
W allen in s  ordered a march on H e ls in k i in  March, Svinhufvud d ecid ed  
th a t  th e  developm ents made n ecessa ry  a r e f u s a l  to  bow to  th e  demands 
o f  th e  movement and re fu sed  t o  tak e a d d it io n a l s t e p s  to  e r r a d ic a te  
communism by fu r th e r  l im it in g  th e  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  r ig h t s  o f  th e  n a t io n .
N e g o t ia t io n s  fo llo w ed  th e  s tro n g er  stan d  o f  th e  government 
and, a f t e r  some p e r su a s io n , th e  Lapuans were induced to  la y  down th e ir  
arms and resume th e ir  normal l i f e .  W allen iu s surrendered a  week la t e r  
and th e  attem pted r e v o lu t io n  ended. Some o f  th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  were 
t r ie d  and sen ten ced , b u t p r iso n  term s were l i g h t  and most p a r t ic ip a n ts  
escaped any punishm ent w h atsoever*  th e  fo llo w in g  March, however, 
l e g i s l a t i o n  was p assed  which banned a l l  iapua o r g a n is a t io n s ,
k  su c c e sso r  to  th e  Lapua movement, known a s  th e  .^f»iw>fa l 44*|^| 
Kansan 1 4 l f e  or IEX (N a tio n a l P a t r io t ic  L eague), was organ ised  and 
took p a r t  in  th e g e n e r a l e le c t io n s  o f  1933 but had o n ly  sm a ll success*
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Shearman, op . c i t , ,  p . 8 2 .
In th e  e le c t io n s  o f  1936 th e  1KL won o n ly  fo u rteen  s e a t s ,  in d ic a t in g  
th a t  F in land  had reg a in ed  her p o l i t i c a l  eq u ilib r iu m  and th a t  th e  t r i a l  
by te r r o r  o f  th e  tapuans was over*
In surmi.-d; up t h i s  movement Hugh Shearman has s a id «
th e  most s ig n i f i c a n t  th in g  about th a t  ex tr em ist movement, w ith  
i t s  f a c ia t  c h a r a c t e r is t ic s ,  i s  n o t t h a t  i t  aro se  but th a t th e  F inns  
r e je c te d  i t ,  a resp o n se  which was u n happ ily  a l l  to o  rare  among 
European n a tio n s  a t  th a t  p e r io d  o f  h is to r y  faced  w ith  s im ila r  tem pta­
t io n s  t o  unbalance* The e x tr em ist te n d e n c ie s  took t h e ir  r i s e  and 
re a c h e d  th e ir  g r e a t e s t  s tr e n g th  during th e  p er io d  in  «fcich F in land  
was s u f fe r in g  most from th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  World-Wide economic 
d ep ress io n * 36
Tinas, a f t e r  le a n in g  both tow ards th e  l e f t  and th e  r ig h t ,  and 
alm ost f a l l in g  in t o  a  F a c is t  d ic ta t o r s h ip , th e  F in n ish  government was 
s ta b il is e d  about th e  m iddle o f  th e  t h i r t i e s  along m oderate l in e s *  
T h e r e a fte r , p o l i t i c a l  o r ie n ta t io n  was tow ards n e u t r a l i t y  and a s s o c ia ­
t io n  w ith  th e  S andanavian co u n tr ies*  In th e  y ea rs  im m ediately p r io r  
to  1939, th e  government pursued a  p o l ic y  n e ith e r  o v e r t ly  pro-German 
nor a n t i-R u ss ia n , but one w hich i f  hoped would p r e se r v e  F in n ish  
independence.
CHAPTER I I
RACING T E 3T0RM
Vtien Svinhufvud was elected president in  1931 with the aid 
of the Lapua agitators, i t  had appeared as though Finland were heading 
down the road leading to a fa sc is t dictatorship. This was not to be, 
however, for though Svinjufvud agreed with many of the tenets of the 
movement, he was too temperate to allow such a course to be pursued 
to i t s  ultimate end. This became clear in h is actions to suppress 
the uprising projected by Wallenius and the fact that upon his e lec­
tion he asked Mannerheira to  become Commander-in-chief of the Finnish 
armed forces. Mannerheim declined th is  post but agreed to become 
Chairman of the Defense Council and to  assume the role of Commander-
*iin -ch ief in the event of war.
At the time of the worst agitation on the part of the Lapuans
when th e  Communist P arty  was outlaw ed and i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  c u r t a i le d ,
there was great d issatisfaction  expressed in Soviet c ir c le s . So much
had t h i s  a c t io n  d is tu rb ed  R ussia  th a t  a t  th e  tim e o f  th e  b ig  Lapua
demonstration in Helsinki in 1930# the Soviet Union had prepared for 
2war.
F o r tu n a te ly , n o th in g  r e s u lt e d  from t h i s  and once th e  Lapuan 
th r e a t  was removed in  1935 by the Supreme C ourt, F inland was approached
^Marmerheim, op. c i t . , p. 265*
^Wuorinne, ed ., Finland and World War I I , 1939-1914*, p. 38.
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by Russia on the matter of a non-aggression pact. Hie Russian pro­
posal was in essence the proposal with which Finland had broached 
Russia in 1927# only -o have i t  refused because the Finns had desired
to  include a clause requiring arbitration in case of disputes*3 tta 
January 21# 1932, the treaty was concluded and was ra tified  on
August 9# 1932.
the treaty guaranteed the then existent boundaries between 
Finland and the Soviet Union as determined by the Peace of Tartu in 
1920, which was to  ”• • * . remain the firm foundation of their 
relations • • • *w^  It was further agreed that neither party would 
in  any way undertake aggressive action directed towards the other or 
enter into agreeraents or trea ties  with a third party which would be 
openly h o stile  to the other contracting party *£ It was the f ifth  
a r tic le , especia lly , upon which the Finns based their fa ith  that Russia 
would not attack after negotiations broke down in November 1939# and 
i t  is  o f interest to  quote i t  here in order that an understanding of 
Finnish attitude might be reached*
The High Contracting Parties declare that they w ill  always 
endeavor to se tt le  in a sp ir it of justice any disputes of whatever 
nature or origin which may arise between them, and w ill resort 
exclusively to pacific means of such disputes* For th is purpose# 
the High Contracting Parties undertake to submit any disputes 
which may arise between them . . . .  to a procedure of conciliation  
before a jo in t conciliation committee * • • • l,°
Besides the non-aggression pact in April# the Finns agreed to
^Mannerheia, op* c it* , p. 279# and Wuorinen# Finland and World 
tar II# p. 39*
^Treaty of Non-Aggression, and Pacific Settlement of Disputes 
between the U*b*S*K*n# reprinted in fu ll  in dasour# op* cit*# p* 227 ff*
^Xbid.# p. 228. 6Ibid.
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a convention of conciliation  as part of the same treaty* Under
th is  convention the two contracting parties agreed to "submit to a
Conciliation Commission for atsicable settieiaent • • - • a l l  disputes
of whatsoever nature which may arise between thorn on account of
circumstances occurring after the signature of the Treaty of Uon-
Aggresaion and Pacific Settlement of Disputes * * * • In 193k
the non-aggression pact was renewed u n til 19it!>, although the pnct
of 1932 was not due to expire for almost another year*
Yet signing an agreement such as th is with the Soviet Union
was to have l i t t l e  or no ‘.value in the ensuing years. Russia was by
1933 su ffic ien tly  strong to begin to  look about her to see  whom
she might consume as the im perialistic urge began to grew. The
Commissar for Foreign Affair®, early in that year, proclaimed that
the independence and neutrality of the Baltic nations and Finland
waa to the advantage of the soviet Union and stated the! the U.B.b.Ii.
was also concerned le s t  the internal p o lic ies of those governments
should obviate their independence. In Uovaiabar 1936, a farther
pronounceujsnt in th is same connection waa made by the Commissar of
Leningrad, A« A* Zhdanovs
We people of Leningrad s i t  at our windows looking out at the 
world. Right around us l i e  small countries who dream of great 
adventures or permit great adventurers to scheme within their  
borders. he are not afraid of these small nations. But i f  they 
are not sa tisfied  to  mind only their  own business, we may fe e l  
forced to open our windows a bit wider, and they w ill find i t  
disagreeable i f  we have to c a ll upon our Rod Army to defend our 
country*^
7WC vention of Conciliation between Finland and the U.B.B.R.1 reprinted in fu l l  in Basiour, op. c i t . .  p. 230.
^Quoted in Wuorinen, Finland and World ■^ar II , p. 39*
AStatements lik e  these were not conducive to  the efface?<ient d
Finnish doubts concerning the designs of Soviet foreign policy* To
meet the contingency of implementation of these statements, Finland
undertook to look to her defenses under the guidance of Mannerhoim*
During the f ir s t  decade of Independence l i t t l e  had been done to
bolster the defensive position of the nations, the la s t  fu l l  scale
maneuvers having taken place in 192?. Most of the eqnipeatn ?©s of
World Mr I vintage and hence obsolete and virtually  worn out.^
The f ir s t  task in Mannerheim*a view was to  g et the necessary
appropiations to  purchase the requisite anas and equipment to  modern­
is e  the m ilitary machine* For th is  purpose the Diet approved alloca­
tion of TOO million marks to be used over a s ix  year period; or th is  
75 a l l l ion  marks were earmarked for 1931-32  when i t  was estimated 
that the naval f le e t  should be completed. After that 125 M illio n  
marks per year were to  be spent for indlspensible replace «mbs in 
the a ray and air force*^° In the following year (1932) when the 
budget was again debated and passed, the resu lt was a ten per cent 
reduction in defense expenditures?, mainly for capital appropriations 
for material replacements* This reduced the share of defense in the 
to ta l national budget from nineteen to seventeen per cent, ostensibly
9Marmerheiffi, op* cit*  > p* 26?*
10Mtunnarheio, og. c iU ,  p. 269 ££} and Julh Muikkanen, falvlsodan 
Puolustuaa&nisteri Kortoo (Porvoo• Finland! Werner Soderatroa
1551)7
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because of th© non-aggression treaty with th© Soviet Itoion and the 
idea of co llective  security provided by the League of Nations
For such com er-cutting tactics  by the Parliament Marmerheim 
had very l i t t l e  sympathy. Looking back as he wrote h i s  Memoirs he 
said that, n'tfe could do without many things in the program of other 
M inistries, but w© could not afford to  compromise our security*
As a resu lt of the economy-minded Parliament’s fa ilure to appropriate 
su ffic ien t funds to the armed forces only limited maneuvers were 
conducted in 1932* This waa regarded in m ilita r y  circ les as a great 
lo s s , as n* . * * only an expert could estimate i t s  f u l l  implications* 
Nothing except extensive maneuvers can prepare the troops for the 
many demands of war • . • • large maneuvers are of extreme importance
money used for that purpose i s  never wasted. ”13
But with what resources were available Finnish military leader® 
began to prepare for what they recognised as inevitable* Modest 
preparations were begun on th© Karelian Isthmus to block any aggres­
sion from that approach. The so-called  Marmerheim Line consisting  
of concrete-fortified  machine gun nests and trenches were constructed 
as well as anti-tank traps composed of stones and concrete* In order 
to  accomplish th is work as cheaply as possib le, the government u tilized  
some 100,000 unemployed*^ It is  interesting to not© her© that Mannerheim
^Mannevheiut, op* c it* , pp. 271, 275-276*
12Ib id .,  p. 271. 13Ibid.
—Marmorheiia, op. c i t . .  p . 272} and Miukkanan, op. c i t . . p . 26.
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was d issa tisfied  with th© fact that only a part of th© appropria­
tions for coribating unemployment war© allocated for th is  purpose 
while Miukkanan seemed to  feo l that they were almost sufficient#
To support h is stand he gives a table of figures to show how th© 
money was a llo tted  for the three categories the Defense Council 
had established according to urgency#
Total for fo rtifica tio n s 360,Qo0»
Total for work on 11 roads 6»6hO»OOOt
For repairing 7 piers 1,5>IiQ,QQQs
For reconditioning of 5 d r ill  grounds lj f 2 a000t
T o ta l y ,1 1 2 ,0 0 0 i___&
With theso modest beginnings,  Finnish dofonsea to tho east were grad­
ually made more secure,  although even when war broke out their adequacy 
was questionable#
The next problem which necessitated attention was the matter 
of army organization. Since the War of Independence the array had 
been organized on a cadre system and neither mobilization nor deploy­
ment could be carried out with th© safety and speed requisite for 
effective  defense* Mobilisation was reliant on a few garrisons which, 
because of the overflow of m n , equipment, horses, carta, and other 
material, made good targets for air raids# Perhaps th© most disquiet­
ing fact about the whole matter waa that only a small port5,on of th© 
peace time army was ready for mobilization and deployment# To counter 
th is  precarious situation th© Defense Council decided to reorganize 
the whole military on a terr ito r ia l basis which would permit creation
^Miukkanen, op# c it* , p# 27* The figures quoted are in  
Finnish marks#
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of a larger H eld  army than could th© cadre system* Instead of 
incorporating called-up reserves, under th© new plan, divisions could 
march as units on a war footing from their own territories* It was 
f e l t  that in th is way a fu ller  u tilisa tio n  of the nationt resources 
could be made in a more suitable and quicker way*^
During the following years a more r e a lis t ic  attitude on the 
part of the government towards defense expenditures was evident, 
©specially, after the ©lection® of 1936* At the end of 1937 a review 
of th© armed forces of the nation was made, upon which a l l  future 
recommendations for appropriations were based* for practical reasons 
th© suggested program was divided into two parts i (1) concerning 
armements and equipment, and (2) industrial products, machines, raw 
materials, semi-manufactures, buildings, fo rtifica tio n s, stocks of 
war requirements, and fuel* Th© to ta l amount asked for to implement 
th is  program was se t  at 2,910 million marks but, whon the Diet had 
finished with i t  in February 1931, 200 million marks were pared o ff ,  
reducing th© suit to  2,710 million marks* It was also determined that 
th© program should be carried out over a period of seven years, l*e* 
through 19h$* Defense appropriations in 193d were twenty-three per 
cent of th© to ta l national budget as against only sixteen per cent in  
1937 and in 1939 the proportion for defense rose to th ir ty  per cent of 
the to ta l * ^  The important thing to be noted from these figures is  
that there was a d efin ite  change in attitude on th© part of th© Diet
^Mannerheim, op* c it* , pp* 273- 14i Miukkanen, op* c it* , p* 16 ff*
^Mannerheim, op* c it* , pp* 289-291*
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members* ©specially those of the Left, who had always been averse 
to  defense appropriations• They gradually caae to  realize with 
Mennerheim and th© Defense Council that the needs >>f defense could 
no longer be ignored.
This change of atmosphere in government c irc les can be traced 
back to the early part of the decade preceding the outbreak of war. 
At the beginning of the th ir tie s  th© world-wide economic depression 
h it Finland hard and her * x w a s  hard put to maintain i t s e l f .
Wien independence from Kueela was declared, the nation had almost 
a century of experience in conducting her domes t ic  a ffa irs as an 
autonomous Grand Duchy, whereas no such experience had been gained 
in th© areas pertaining to external a ffa ir s . Matters had been 
further complicated by the -roubles with Sweden surrounding the 
Aaland Islands question which had only served to  widen th© gulf be­
tween th© two nations. Moreover, the ideal of co llective  security  
had been dealt another serious blow in th© Twenties by the German- 
Russian agreements of 1926*
Following th© War of Liberation, the young nation based her 
hopes for remaining outside my future con flict upon th© co llective  
system of the League of hations. When the League abdicated i t s  
responsibility  for protecting small nations against aggression by 
fa ilin g  to halt th© Japanese invasion of Manchuria and did nothing 
about Mussolini*a invasion of Ethiopia, Finnish fa ith  in the League 
began to fa lte r . Finland began to seek around her for other taeans of 
security and to  th is  and she turned to Sweden, when th© la tter  began
39
to draw up a now schema of defense in th© face o f th© League’s failure* 
Sweden * a preparations were regarded in Finland as a sign of a tourer  
defensive policy *&;ich might open the way for defensive alliance  
between Finland and bweden*^ In keeping with th is hope Prim©
Minister Civiafiki on Decotaber 5* 1935 , m<te the following declara­
tion of foreign policy to the Finnish Diets
According to Finnish opinion, of a l l  her neighbors* the 
Scandinavian com tries* especia lly  Sweden, run th© lea st risk of 
being drawn into war or into war-lik© and dangerous p o lit ic a l  
development* They, in consequence, enjoy the best p o ss ib ilit ie s  
of preserving their neutrality* As i t  is  also in Finland’s in t­
erest above a l l  to preserve her neutrality, i t  i s  natural that 
Finnish orientation suet bo towards bcandanavia, to which our 
country i s  bound closely  by geographical, h isto r ica l, economic, 
and cultural bonds* Finland fee ls  bound to maintain a defensive 
system as far as her economic means permit in order to protect 
her neutrality, her terr ito r ia l in tegrity , and her sovereignty 
from any danger from wherever i t  m y  threaten, thus contributing 
to th© comm defense of neutrality for a l l  Nordic countries*3-9
The declaration was unanimously accepted by the Diet, me© again show­
ing the world that Finland desired to remain outside of a l l  con flicts  
between the Great Powers*
As had been stated in th® declaration, i t  was the hope of Finland 
that Sweden would accept the proffered hand and set about strengthen­
ing tho defenses of the North in collaboration with Finland* These 
hopes found barren ground in Sweden, however, for in 1936 Sweden’s 
representatives to the League of Nations declared that th© Swedish 
government was disinclined to enter into any commitments outside those
18Mennerheim, op* c it* , p* 285*
^Quoted in Mannerhoira, op* c it* , p* 235*
ho
stipulated by th© League, even i f  th® coiaraitiaonts war© regional in 
nature*20 On her part Russia did not regard Finland*8 Scandinavian 
orientation as posing a threat to  Soviet in terests in peace tiiae but 
she expressed the opinion that war conditions sight change this* In
the ©vent o f war, there was a danger that another Great Power mig^ ht
P Iattack Russia through Finland without her consent or that of bcandanavis* 
Finland sought to  secure her neutrality through closer colla­
boration with the Northern Countries by coordinating her defense with 
th e irs , ©specially with Sweden* To th is  end the Finnish government 
undertook with th© other Scandanavian sta te s , to  free i t s e l f  from 
th© obligation of sanctions declared by the League of Rations* On 
July 1, 1936, i t  was declared on behalf of the Finnish government 
that as a result of the manner in which th© sanctions had boon applied 
to  Ita ly , Finland would reserve her position* Then on May 29,  1933, 
Finland, concurrently with Sweden and H or way, declared that henceforth 
every eas® where sanctions w©r® advocated by th© League would be 
decided on Its  own raerits with Finland reserving judgment as to  whether 
she would abide by the sanctions ordered* The reason given for th is  
action by the Finnish representative to  the League was the anxiety 
and desire of Finland to increase her collaboration with th© Northern 
Countries for th© strength®! .ng of coarsen neutrality*22
20Ibid*, p. 2 >6$ and Herbert Tingsten, The Debate on the Foreign 
Policy of Sweden-1913-1939, tran* Joan Bulaan Tendon i Qjcforcf tJniversity
hi ■    ittiiif  1 ............ wiwi| iiiii u 1 -«i nFim 1  ^ v
Press, T?1j9} !>• 2 2 0 f .
2^4Jannorhoio, op« c i t . , p. 2136.
22;ianrierhein, op. c i t . • pp. 291-292} Tingston, op. c i t . , pp. 19$, 
210-211} and fiuorinonTTlnla^d in World War IX, p. Ul.
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J%at Flrin.©«-0©r*aafi relations during th© early part of th©
Thirties when the Lapua Movement was at i t s  peak war© vary cordial 
was In part due to th© aid rendered by th© Dorsums in th© War of 
Independence and th© cultural a ffin ity  existent between th© two 
nations* German was ccamonly used aaong tlie educated c la sses , both 
in  speaking and writing, while many students studied in German schools 
and universities* The fact that a considerable nunbor of the cook 
missioned o fficers in the Finnish arsqy ware trained in th© German 
forces and that many o f the Finnish military concepts imru copied 
from those of Germany also helped coraent good relations between th© 
two nations because of the President1® ©iron*: pro-German nentitaants* 
but with the Mas! system and i t s  excesses Finland slowly began 
to  withdraw from close German relations in keeping with the Finnish 
policy of neutrality and collaboration with the Northern States* By 
193? Finnish relations with Germany were becoming d efin ite ly  cool, i f  
an© i s  to 'believe the German ambassador, &lficher*8 dispatch to Berlin 
on October 15 of that year* In that dispatch Blticher suggests a 
nuofoer of things which might bn spoken of on. Finnish foreign Minister 
Holts!*s v is i t  to Berlin* Among thoaowsr© H oltsi's  trips to  Josoow, 
Stockholm, Copenhagen, London, Paris, Geneva, arid Hsval, and Hi© 
attendant efforts to normalise relations with ttusala, to place relations 
with owedon,Denmark, and Borway on a basis o f constant cooperation, to 
cu ltivate good relations with Britain and .ranee, to form th© closest  
t ie s  to the League o f Nation®, and to deepen re la tt ns with Estonia*
At Hie sum® tine  Finn -^Germon relatione were neglected, v#iieh was 
surprising to  Blticher since Finland was a Baltic power and had to
h2
consider both the Grant Powers in the area* i*e* Germany and the
1I*S * G • li* ^
Further reading of th is  m m  dispatch indicates that Germany 
was concerned about ©conog&c relations with Finland for mention was 
made of the eoncession granted for English nickel agin in# in the 
Petaama region when t he Germans were refused consent to  build a 
fish-meal factory in th© saaa area* Ihe Germans war in the nain 
sa tis f ied  with other economic matters but disliked th© purchase of 
Air Force materials from Britain and were hopeful that better treat*  
tasnt eight be expected in th© future*^
Ijpon th© arrival of Holtsl in Berlin and th is subsequent 
conversations with the German Foreign Minister Konstantin von 
Maura th* th© former was assured of Germany fs beet wishes for Finland* 
Heurath stated that Germany hud only one in terest .in Finland a "that 
Finland's independence be preserved, m  well as her a b ility  to maintain 
neutrality under any circumstances that might arise* "35 He went on 
to  say that Finnish foreign policy was determined by her geopolitical 
position , 1*#* rtusaia as a neighbor in the east and th© Baltic on the 
other side ithere Germany occupied a dominant position* therefore, 
Finland must reckon with ‘two factors and Russia posed the greater 
threat to her security and independence than did Germany* "Bo i t  would 
be to  Finland’s own best interest to cu ltiva’-e good relations with th© 
country that not only was well disposed toward hor but that also had
^Documents on German Foreign Policy* 1913-19ii£. Herlea D,
VTo l. V <wggnUiT^ggft s— 1 9 5 3 ) , p* 533* (H ere­
a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  IXIFP)
^ I b ld .,  p. $Jii. 25Ibid .. p. 537-
i*3
a certain in terest in the maintenance of her independence, namely 
Germany*tt^
Germany’s concern over Finnish coolness was w ell founded for 
the Nazi system came in for acute criticism  in Finland* Partly in 
consequence of that criticism , the position of the German language 
in Finnish culture came to  bo considered too prominent* bo much so 
that just before the outbreak o f war in 1939* Prism kinistor Cajander, 
who had assumed that o ffice  after the 1936 election s, delivered several 
speeches in which he stated that too much time was devoted to the 
study of the language and that i t  occupied a disproportionate posi­
tion in Finnish cultural l i f e * 2?
For a l l  her aHedgedly good intentions and expressions of 
consideration for Finland’s p o lit ic a l well-being, Nazi Germany was 
not th® example nhich Finland chose to follow* hhen in th© spring 
of 1939» Germany proposed a mutual non-aggression -met to the 
bcandanavian countries including Finland, the Finns in conjunction 
with Sweden and Norway rejected the proposal* At f ir s t  the Finns 
stated that they agreed in principle to the non-aggression treaty, 
but after further study the Finnish envoy to Berlin, A* Wuoriaaa, 
waa instructed to issue a written communique to th© Berlin government 
stating that the Finnish government declined to enter into such an 
agreement with anyone* t;ted  as the reason behind th is  was that 
Finland didn’t wish to bocosae a pawn in t © p o litics  of Great Power 
combinations and therefore she did not desire to change the then
— 2?huorinen, Finland in World War XI, p. 12.
bh
existent treaty system*^
I t  m e the Itvmte fear of Russia that caused the Finnish 
government to seek a middle course during the la s t  years before the 
war and to  avoid too close a relationship with Germany-* The Finnish 
desire to  foe accepted in  the Scandinavian bloc also influenced her 
attitude t ©ward Russia and Germany* In a summary report to Secretary 
of Stp-te, Hull, on September 1* 1937* the it. S* envoy to Russia,
Joseph Pavies, stated that!
In a l l  these states Scand&navia and Finland the great 
concern of foreign policy Is to maintain a balance m  between 
Russia and Germany. I t  i s  sign ificant that Finland was not 
accepted in  the Scandinavian bloc until Sweden was assured that 
the relations between Russia and Finland were p acific  and friend*
3y. I t  i s  their constant effort tc maintain s tr ic t ly  correct 
and formal relations with both countries#^
With th is  in  mind Foreign Minister Holt e l had travelled to  
Moscow in  February, 1937® in  an effort to eount€awhel&nce the 
criticism s to the effect that the Finnish government was pro-German*30 
While there i t  became evident that there was a peculiar!/' deep-seated 
distrust of Finland in the Kremlin*
Above @11 they suspected that Finland m s in cooperation with 
Germany, and that Germany1© objective was to attack Russia through 
Finland* I t  war claimed, for instance, that the Germans had 
established poison gas factories in  Finland and were building a ir­
ports in  Finland for military purposes* I t  was naturally Impossible 
to ascertain whether these claims wore due 4 o the stupidity of 
Russian sgiea, or whether they were arguments invented for the 
occasion*&
28rc-FP, Series T>#, Vcl* FI, p* U08, $131 and Vftin0 Tanner, The 
Winter War (Stanford, Calif* s Stanford University Press, 19$?), p7~T6.
29Joseph K* Davies, Mission to Moscow (Garden City, ft# I* * 
Garden City Publishing Co, ,  "Trie#7 19C3 ) ,  pp* 133-13U*
 ^ P# ■^ ’Wuorinen, Finland and World M r I I , p. bO.
us
On her part, Finland gave every indication and assurance th&. 
she was not pro-German but was rather determined upon neutrality  
©long with the other nations of the Scandinavian bloc* I t  was de­
clared that Finland would view any encroachment on hur territory as 
an unfriendly act, especially  i f  i t  should cause Finland to become the 
battleground between Great Powers* On the whole, H oltsi*s v is i t  
produced, l i t t l e  of value as no major issues were discussed, and i t  i s  
doubtful i f  the Soviet leaders understood that Finland indeed deter­
mined to follow a course of neutrality* One positive resu lt was that 
the Seandanavlan bloc became convinced of Finland*© desire to  remain 
neutral and maintain amicable relations with her Great Neighbor*32
While trying to s tab!U se relations with her neighbors, the 
increasing tenseness of the world situation  called  Finnish attention  
to the vulnerability of the demilitarised island Islands in  the Gulf 
of “Bothnia* Should the islands f a l l  into the hands of a Great power 
.Finland1 s neutral position would he Jeopardised and wo-Id probably 
become untenable* Mannerheira realised the p eril to  Finland and Sweden
by the defenseless situation  on the islands when he stated*
Unfortified and defenseless, the archipelago obviously offered
a temptation to the Great Powers on the Baltic* And A aland in the
hands of a Great F&tier carried with i t  the r isk , both for Finland, 
and Sweden, that their strategic position would be rolled  up from 
insidc.33
Recognising their mutual danger, negotiations were begun In the 
spring of 1933 between Finland and Sweden concerning the fo rtifica tio n  
of the islands* From the beginning the negotiator® realised that they
32Ibta. 3%annerheim, op* c it* , p* 2 9*
1*
would haw to obtain permission from the signatories of th© A&lend 
Convention* and that Russian must also be consulted as an interested  
party, although she was not a signatory* They decided, however, to  
come to an agreement f ir s t  and then broach the question to the other 
nations concerned afterwards* % the t  la© the Munich c r is is  came in  
September the F1nno-3w©dish discussions had advanced to the point 
where co-ordinat ion of military defense of Aaland was decided on*
The plan in  the main was concerned with the dispatch of troops to the 
islands in the vent of overt action on the part of any Great Power* 
At the time the Russian Baltic f le e t  had teen sighted off the coast 
of Finland from Hanteo, probably as a warning to Oomany* Development 
of M s  situation could have required the manning of the islands in  
keeping with the Aalarsd Convention, i . e .  in  the event of surprise 
attack, Finland could undertake t© defend: the archipelago.^*
Sweden agreed to an even broader plan of defense for t he i s ­
lands inOetoher, namely that Finland b© permitted to make military 
preparations on a number of islands in the Aaland group* These 
islands lay south of a lin e  corresponding approximately t© 60 
degrees north latitude upon which the inhabitants in  the future would 
be lia b le  for military service on the islands. Finland also reserved 
the right t© request Swedish aid in  event of* an emergency*3$ About 
the same tim e, i t  became known in  diplomatic c irc les  that Sweden's 
reason for consenting to the fo r tifica tio n  of the Aaland..; was the
*^ DGFP, Series T, Vol. V, pp* ®>9h, 596* end Mannerheim, op* 
c lt* , pp. 295-296*
^%GFP, Series M, Vol. V, pp. 600j and Mannarheim, op* c l t . , 
pp. 293*299*
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fear that Dermamight  attack her, rather than fear' of such an act 
on part of Ru8sia*3&
Early In 1939 the Finns and Suedes submitted their proposed 
amendment s to the Aaland Convention to be known as the Jtockholm Flan, 
to  the other signatory pothers end Russia with a request for their  
concurrence* tihenthe signatories and Russia had assented, the matter 
was then to be referred to the League of Nations for fin a l approval.
The sa in  points of the fin a l proposal was that neutrality of the islands 
w- s to be maintained but dem ilitarisation was to be considerably 
curtailed. On the southern islands ’"inland was to have a free. hand 
to in stitu te  defensive measures while on the northern sone she was 
to have the right to take defensive measures for a period of ten 
years# The la tter  proposal called  for military training fo r  island  
population, s taliening troops from other areas of the country, artIX* 
ler? in sta lla tion s on the southern islands, and anti-a ircraft positions  
on the mainland.3?
Concurrence w s  rendered bv a l l  the signatories to the f in ish --  
S/edish demarche without any objections. I t  was the Soviet Onion, 
however, that voiced objections and ultimately defeated the Stockholm 
Plan. Russia’s negative response resulted from her declared fear  that 
some third power mlg$it s lcse  the islands and thus gain the advantage 
in  the B altic . The Russian goverment also hinted that though she had 
no objections to the fo r tif ic a tio n  of the islands she had a greater
3&DOFP. Series T, Vol. V ., p. 601.
 ^ BGFP, Series Ts, Vol. VI, pp. 150~3j and Mannerheim, op. c it .»
p . 29B.
in terest in  them thm  did Sweden* So Russia f e l t  that she should be 
kept m  fu lly  informed on the work of fo rtifica tio n s as Sweden* In 
July* 1939* Molotov at la s t  c la r ified  the Soviet * b wishes regarding 
the A&land Island question* Th© Soviet government at t  hat time formal­
ly  claimed equal right® with Swedenf i*e* th© right to give active  
assistance in  their defense should Finland request i t *3$
As the Soviet objections being of paramount consideration for  
th© Swedish government* Sweden becked out of the Stockholm Flan* Th© 
Finns for their part refused Molotov* s demands and began preparing th© 
defenses of the islands without the aid of Sweden* Thus with Russian 
opposition th© f ir s t  concrete move for action of th© Scandanawian 
neutrality policy f e l l  through*
3%GF?f Series B* fol* ?T* pp* ? 27* Slilj Manner helm* op* eit*»
P* 299* and Wuorlnen, Finland in  World War II* pp* lil«4i2*
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CHAPTER I I I
WAR CIDUX'3 GATHER
Turing the period o f  conversations concerning the Stockholm 
Flan for the fo r tifica tio n  and defense of the Aal&nd Archipelago the 
inner c irc le  of the Finnish government wcs engaged in  © secret negotia** 
tions with the Soviet Union® Those discussions which began with © 
strange phono c a ll to  Foreign M in is te r  Holtsi from a second s e c r e ta r y  
of th® Sovier legation, Boris Y a r tse v , urgently requesting an opperw 
tu n ity  to speak to him# Unusual and as clearly a vio lation  of accept­
ed protocol as the request m s, Holts! agreed to an appointm ent for  
A p r il l i t ,  1 9 3 8 .1
Yartsev was quite well-known in  Helsinki and acquired margr 
friends among extrem e l e f t i s t s  in  the F in n ish  capital* A story was 
commonly circulated that he represented th© G#P#U# (Soviet State 
Police) in  the Legation# ^  Whatever his function, Y a rtsev  called at 
the Foreign Mnistxy and asked for the privilege of discussing some 
h ig h ly  confidential, matters with Holt si# He stated t h a t ,  some week® 
before when he had been in  Moscow* the Soviet government had delegated 
to him exceptionally broad powers to discuss the means of improving 
relations between Finland and th© U#S#S#R#, and requested that a l l  
such discussion® be kept entirely secret, even from the Soviet envoy, 
V ladim ir Terevyanski#3
^Tanner, o£# c it* , p* 3 , 
2IMd. i t  b id ,, p. I).
$0
Upon Holt s i ’s b id d in g  him speak, Yartsev launched upon a 
r ev ie w  of the European scene in  general and th© fu tu r e  position of 
Finland, in  particular. He then proceeded to assure Holt s i  th a t  the 
Russian, government wished to respect the independence of Finland 
am! her terr ito r ia l in t e g r i t y  but that Moscow f im ly  believed that 
Germany had e x te n s iv e  schemes for aggrandizem ent a t  the expense of 
Russia* To fa c il i ta te  th e s e  plans would involve the landing of the 
extreme north wing of a German attacking force in Finland, prior to  
an allout invasion of Russia. What would the Finnish at itu d o  be i f  
such a contingency should arise? I f  the Finns were to remain p a s s iv e  
and allow th© German armies a free hand, Russia would not remain on 
the 'border a w a itin g  th e  ct- ack but would enter Fin land from 1-ajajoki 
to do b ottle . But i f  Finland were to  offer resistance, Russia would 
gladly render ©11 the economic and m ilita r y  assistance p o s s ib le ,  
binding herself t o  withdraw her forces when the wa ended . f a  Yartsev 
then went on to observe that the F.S.S.R. was prepared to  of fer * in*, 
land economic concessions of a lm ost any magnitude since Russia, had 
virtually  insatiable capacity to  purchase Firv ish  industrial pro­
ducts, especially  c e l l u lo s e  and agricultural pro acts. Yartsev 
fu r th e r  stated t h a t  Moscow was aware of German plans to a ss ist  
F in n ish  racists in a coup d’etat i f  the present Finnish government 
refused to co o p e ra te .^
II/lannerheln, op. c i t . , p. 293; Tanner, op. c i t . ,  pp. 
and Wuorinen, Finland amflTprld ^  I I , pp. Ui-p.
farm er, op. c i t * ,  p . $ .
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In  co n c lu d in g  h is  ta lk , l a r t mvr mkml H o lts t  i i  ho would bo 
saen&hle t o  d is c u s s in g  those mattes*® with him a lo n e , as tereyyanskt, 
S o v ie t  Minister t o  Finland, and Austria, the other l e g a t io n  secretary, 
hr/ m  mmm mast knew what was transpiring* On th is  point a F lr n le h  
constitutional problem arose?  as Boltsi pointed out, i t  was incumbent 
on him t o  r e c e iv e  and c o n s id e r  any lnfortHati.cn o r  proposal that m ight 
com to  h is a t t e n t io n  bat in  th e  f i n a l  analysis, the President of th e  
H epatitic deteradned th e  nation’s f o r e ig n  policy i n i t #  e n t ir e ty *  So 
without th© President*s authorisation, irregular discussions soeh  m  
thee® sttggosted  e o / ld  not be en tered  in to *  C o ita l  also em phasised  
■ r'.;:, nlam?1 s p o lio . • of Scan d in avian  e o ep cv c tlo ft , the ml® pompom of 
which was t o  p r eserv e  peace a s  f a r  a s  F in land  was eoncem ad# Be 
further stressed the firm p o lit ic a l position of th© novm mneat of 
which he m® a part by referring to  th e  fa c t  of i t  a support hy three* 
fo u r th s  of th® r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  in  th© Diet and s ta tio n : that th e  popu­
lace would .follow the reg im e1 a pacific p o l ic y
Holts! nest queried Y artaev  regarding' the n atu re o f  'Soviet aid , 
1*©# would i t  include sale of © m s to F in lan d ? T© t h i s  Yartsev gave an  
a f f ir m a t iv e  reply with condition attached, namely th a t  th e  aid would  
include th is , along with o th e r  form s of economic s>.?pp©rt, i f  Finland 
guaranteed t o  the Russians th a t  Qmtmr%? would m t  be a s s i s t e d  in  war 
against the h*S*S*H* t o  H olts!*©  n a tu ra l question ©f what was meant 
by guarantees, Yartsev very  easily  r e p lie d  that th a t  could wait u ntil 
there should be a ssu ra n ces  tlmt F in la n d  sincerely desired t o  stay out
^Tanner, ©£* cit** p* 5*
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of Great Power con flicts and would re s is t  a German iim sioru  On th is  
note the f ir s t  of many in t e r e s t in g  meetings betw een H oltsi, and other 
government o f f ic ia ls ,  and Y a rtsev  ended,?
From th is  rather unorthodox approach to n e g o t ia t io n s  and the 
se c r e c y  that surrounded them, i t  i s  apparent- that the S o v ie t  Union 
anticipated war and was seeking to secure her frontiers in  collabora­
tion  with Finland, I t  also appears that the Russians had l i t t l e  fa ith  
in  Finland's repeated declarations of neutrality or in their own non- 
aggression pact with Finland, Apparently they f e l t  th a t  F in land  was 
Incapable of resisting  an attack without outside aid and they wanted 
to be sure that help came from the right direction, namely from Russia, 
!!o more discussions took place until after fart s©v returned 
from a v is i t  to  Moscow, from where he proceeded to Stockholm 'before 
r e tu r n in g  to  h is duties in  Helsinki* In the in te r im , however, he spoke  
to  a number of private individuals. To such persons as th e  Prime 
M inister's secretary, Arvo In k ils, General Aarne Slhve, and Mrs,
Hells Wuolijoki, he spoke more frankly than he had to Holt s i*  I t  
was especially  with Inkila that the Russian w&s most open, Through 
him Martsev managed to g e t  an interview with Fri®® Minister Calender 
in  June w h ile  Holts! was absent in  Geneva* Of that f ir s t  m eeting  
betw een the Prime Minister and Soviet r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  nothing i s  
recorded as the conversation was of a general nature,9
^Hsnnsrhsim, op, c i t , , p* 2931 &md Tanner, of>« c i t , , p* 5, 
%ano@r, op, c it ,. , p* 6 ,
53
A second meeting between Caj&nder and Kartsev took place on 
July 11, when the discussion again centered on possible Gorman aggres­
sion against the U.S.3.R* When Yartsev suggested that Finland might 
be occupied as a base of German m ilitary operat■ons, Cajander said that 
that would be impossible as i t  would vio late Finnish neutrality and 
jeopardize Finnish terr ito r ia l in tegrity , neither o which Finland 
would permit* How Finland m s to  defend her neutrality e ffec tiv e ly  
against such © superior force as th© German aray Cajandor could not 
m y  as the exigencies of war are such that i t  i s  impossible to guar­
antee the outcome* But in  the v-vent, Finland would do her best* 
Cajander added that he hoped thi t  even as Finland made every possible 
effort to avoid becoming a pawn of a Great Power, so toe would the 
Soviet irdcn respect the in v io la b ility  of Finnish territory* Kartsev*s 
reply to th is  was much the same as he had given to Holt s i ,  i*e* i f  
Finland would furnish guarantees that Germaoy would get no bases in  
Finland, Russia would undertake to insure Finnish in v io lab ility*5 
Later in  the conversation Ca lander Introduced the subject of 
trade as an important facet of Finao-Russian relations and mentioned 
the repeated fa ilu res of numerous earlier negotiations of th is  kind* 
Apparently Russian diplomacy had more than one way of enticing ''in­
land into her ceap, for Kartsev said that f ir s t  a p o lit ic a l basis of 
agreement would have t  o be reached before trade © grceracnts could be 
considered. Yartsev seemed to be angling for a treaty between t  he
W ,  p . 6
two nations, the content of which he was not then prepared to disclose*  
On th is  not© the conversation cam© to an end, but not before Kartsev 
once more impressed on Cajander the need for utmost secrecy*^
It  was at th is  juncture that FJ.iier.tce Minister ?&lad leaner
was fo r  the f i r s t  tits© inform ed of what ves taking place* lajander 
was mystified as to th© ex ac t demands th a t  the S ov ie t government was 
making and th e re fo re ,  requested t h a t  fanner see k  to  draw Yartsev o a t 
on the  p o lit ic a l matter* The f ir s t  meeting between fanner and X&rtsev 
occurred o n  July 30, but noth ing  of any gr<ab value came of i t*  As 
no progress stained to  bo nabo, Tanner suggested th a t  Yartsev draw up 
a meeuoz’andun stating Hoscdtr'a proposa ls  and the guarantee© desired*  
Yartsev* promised to  d r a f t  th© p roposals but when the two r*et again  
on August 5* the promised memorandum was not presented *31
For lack of proposals about which to orient the discussion  
Tanner brought up the matter of Russian border v io la tion s, th© closing  
of the Hova River to Finnish shipping contrary to the Treaty of Tartu, 
and the detention of the steamship AirIsto & short time previous*^
In 'view of the anonomous author of the Wuorinen book, in retrospect 
the above Soviet actions and th© tenor of th© Yartsev conversations 
indicated a clear preparation for war on the part of Russia*^
Yartsev promised to report th© matter to tfosoow and try to e ffec t an 
amelioration of these actions*
10Xbld. ^ -Iblri., p. 7.
“ Tanner, cp. c i t . . p. 71 a::- V-’uorinen, Finland and rforld Way..XI.;
P* hk»
^Wuorinen, Finland and World War IX, p* uiu
As always, the Finns wished to improve their commercial and 
trade relations with the Soviet* Tanner expressed the hope that the 
Russians would take a raor- understanding attitude in the matter* Once 
more* as he had to Holt s i ,  the Russian declared that improved trade 
rela lens would have to be precede• bv a p o lit ica l agreement as p o li­
t ic s  were also involved* To speed up the negotiations and bring about 
an amicable settlement he suggests- that i t  would perhaps be better i f  
th© discussions were to  take place in  Moscow* Tanner objected to th is , 
on the grounds that i f  the negotiations were held in  Moscow, the secret 
would be- out, and with th© distance involved, the Finns would be handi­
capped by not being in  close enough contact withtheir government* 
Yartsev promisee to see what could be done about the matter of the 
border v iolations and closing of the Neva and also to sound out Moscow 
on the fe a s ib ility  of holding the negotiations in Helsinki.^*
nothing more took place for five days, and when at their meeting 
on August 10, Yartsev proposed nothing, new, Tenner reported the i  act 
to Cajander* The la tter  joined down the following proposal for  
a treaty draft to be read to Yartsev the next days
fJhile always adhering to the neutral policy of the northern 
countries, the government of Finland w ill at the same time permit 
no vio lation  of Finnish terr ito r ia l in tegrity  nor consequently 
the acquisition b/ any gr^at power of a foothold in  Finland for 
an attack against the Soviet Maion*
The government of the Union of Soviet S ocia list Republics, while 
undertaking to respect th© terr ito r ia l in tegrity  of Finland at 
every point, w ill on the other hand not oppose Finland*a proceed­
ing even in time of peace to undertake in  the Aalane Islands such 
military measures as the most perfect possible safeguarding of the
Tanner, op* c it* , p. 7.
%Integrity o f Finnish territory/ and the neutrality of the A&lend 
Islands ussy require #13
fipon hearing the above proposal Yartsev merely repeated the suggestion 
that the negotiators woarfc In Moscow*
From the to tier of the Finnish proposal I t  i s  obvious tUct the 
^ovosmaent was desirous of securing Soviet consent to  the fo rtifica tio n  
of the Aaland Archipelago* Ilseussiciis w ith Swadan concerning it® 
fo r tifica tio n  had been in  progress since early In the year which 
reinforces the statement made above (see page U5 3 that Sweden applied 
pressure on Finland to  secure the consent of the !.'#S*S#R« to the altera­
tion  of the status of'the island s, and mad© continued negotiations 
contingent on Soviet consent#
Mot u n til th eir f if th  raeeting (August IS) did Yartaev present 
d efin ite  proposal® and a statement of the guarantees that he tad so 
long been vague about# The Russian proposal began by holding out the 
bait of a ■'rede agreement in  return for certain p o lit ic a l concessions# 
In essence th© demand® stated th a t i f  in la n d  f e l t  herself unable to  
enter into a secret m ilitary agreement, Russia w ild  be sa tisfied , m th  
a w ritten understanding on "inland1 a part whereby ah© agreed to  r e s is t  
any Goman attack and to c a ll on Russia for aid i f  she were uneblo to  
do so successfully# Hussion aid meant not so much the stationing of 
Soviet forces in Fii&end but rather Finnish procurement o f Soviet 
arms and protection of the m& fron tiers#^  Regarding the fo r tif ic a ­
tion  of th© Aaland lulands* the Russian® indicated they would welcome
p# 31 c f • Msnn©rh©i% op# cit## p# 293#
^Termer, op# cit## p# 8#
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being p erm itted  to a s s is t  in arming th an  fey supplying arsis, stationing  
a secret observer to survey and help supervise the work, and fey havin g  
a part i n  the control o i the in sta lls- ions* A ll that m& desired in  
r e tu r n  for th is favor was Finnish assent to the construction by the 
Soviet Union of a fo r tified  a ir  and .naval base on Su ursaari I aland 
(Hogland) in  order to protect the approaches to Kronstadt and 
Leningrad. The u.s.S.R. was prepared in  th a t  event to s ig n  a treaty  
guaranteeing Finnish terr ito r ia l in tegrity  and sovereignty and to 
conclude a. trade agreement most advantageous and fa v o r a b le  to ' inland.2*?
These proposals were then brought before the Finnish governraent 
in  a secret session* The gravity of the situ a tion  could not help but 
impress i t s e l f  on the F in n ish  statesmen as the rapid change in  the 
international scene brought the imminence of war* Finnish fears of 
war had not been alleviated  ty th® Austro-German a nachlusa of th© 
previous March and th© e x p a n s io n is t  p o lic ies of th© Great Powers 
(especially  Germany) had even induced the L e ftists  In the Diet to  
support a more ©actensiv© program for military preparedness a s  m entioned  
above (page 3? ) . Yet with the characteristic am bivalence shown by 
most pre-war governments, many Finns in  responsible positions continued 
to regard Germany as the only possible a l l y  in  the event of a Russian 
attack, although th© o f f ic ia l  government policy under Holts! was on© 
of coolness toward Germany. I t  m s not e a sily  .forgotten in  Finnish
Mannerheim, op* c i t . ,  p. 29h$ and wuorinen, Finland and World 
War I I , pp. hU f f *
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eirr les that an earlier  R ussian  envoy, Assmus, had once declared to  
Brim© Minister KivimaM. that, ?RXn case of war, R u ssia  could not avoid 
occu pying Finnish t e r r i t o r y * Though divided in  opinion as to whether 
Germany or Russia, presented the greater threat the F in n s were s t i l l  
determ ined on a neutral policy oriented towards peaceful Seandsnavia*
The upshot of the governm ental session was a negative attitude  
toward the Russian proposals* Prime Hinlster Cajander stated i t  as 
followss "The p ro p o sa l tends to vio late F in la n d 's  sovereignty and i s  
in  con flict with the policy of neutrality which Finland follows i n  
common w ith  th e  nations of Scandanavia* This reply, which was a  
long way from being what la r t s e v  m s  instructed to obtain, was tendered 
to the Russian; on August 29*
Shortly after the Finnish reply was received, the Soviet p r e ss  
began a campaign of aaii«*F iah ieh  propaganda which was eetmonjy assumed 
to be a r e s u l t  of th e  attitude of th© Finns* lartsev  lo a o e l f  did not 
l e t  matters rest e i t h e r ;  he entered into further c o n v e rsa tio n s  with 
Tanner in September demanding a c la r i f i e d  and more d e ta i le d  answer th an  
that received in  August* Tanner explained, that the Finnish sfcai ament 
e n t a i le d  a ref usal to  per i t  Russian bases on S u u rsaari and that no 
h e lp  was needed In preparing d e fe n s e s  on th e  Aalands* As for the* arms 
needed, Finland was reacty and w illing to purchase them from Russia i f
TO
Quoted in  Alvin f* Anderson, "Origins of the Winter Warj A 
Study of Russo-Fimlsh Pirlomacy, n World P o lit ic s , Vol* T t, Mo* 2*
(January 19510, P* 171*
19Tanner, op* c i t . ,  p* 10*
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th e  price and quality were right# With th is  f i s t  refusal, and no 
counter-proposal, which Yartsev had asked for, being made, Tanner's 
part ,-n the negotiations ©ndcr' for the moment .20'
During October Yartsev had further conversations with H o lt s i ,  
in  a fu r th e r  attempt to b r in g  th© matter t© © head# numerous meetings 
were held, w ith  th© talks fo l lo w in g  a w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  cycle# Both 
sides r e i t e r a t in g  earlier proposals and neither was w illing  to give 
ground. Toward oldUO etober holts! handed Yartsev a le n g th y  written  
statement c o n ta in in g  an a n a ly t ic a l  report of h is governm ent's attitude  
in  th© matter* While in  Geneva he and Swedish foreign M in is te r , Rickard 
Sandler had together seen Russian Foreign Commissar Litvinov and 
related to him how plans were progressing for t hi..- Joint defense of 
the Aaland A rch ipelago# With th is  i n  mind Holtei su g g ested  th a t  I t  
would perhaps be better i f  decisions on th© Russian proposal waited 
u ntil after th© diplomatic demarches with regard to the A alan d s, which 
were t o  be p resen ted  i n  a few months to the signatories of th© Aaland 
C onvention and the tI.S*5#R.^
At a la ter  meeting, Yartsev disavowed h is a b i l i t ie s  as a 
diplomat and requested the privilege of speaking in ordinary language# 
He then proceeded to  c la r ify  what Russia desired, f.»e» a m ilitary  
alliance and the tu rn in g  over of Suursaari to Russia to defend in  
event of war# I f  F in land  co u ld  undertake 1.0 do so in  collaboration
°^ I b i d . ,  p .  1 1 .  
21XWLd.
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with Russia and 1f ,  in  case of war, Finland eould not defend them* 
the r e sponsibility  for their d e fe n se  w ould  be assumed fey Russia*
Once more the Finns declined on the same grounds as before**^
This la te s t  Russian proposal was probably due in  great part 
to  the 0see h o s lo v a k ia n  c r is is  which had just preceded It# With th e  
Germans taking o v er  the SudetehXand, and with the resultant weakening  
of C h ech oslovak ia , th e  ‘J.S*3#R* had lo s t  an ally* V&th the cooler a t t i­
tude of Fngland and France toward her and their seeming reluctance to 
oppose Germans, the Soviet Union f e l t  isolated  and s u s p ic io u s  of the 
Hist# Finland too was su sp e c t because of her a c t iv it ie s  in th© A&l&nds 
and, in  th© R u ssian  view, fear pro-German attitude* The Russian b elief 
th a t  Finland was pro-German want back t o  the e a r ly  1920*s# The R ussian  
view had p e r s is t e d  despite @11 Finnish assurances and action s t o  th© 
contrary, e»g# the n o n -a g g ress io n  pact, trad© negotiations, H o lt s ! fs  
v is i t  to  Moscow, and Finnish d e c la r a t io n s  of neutrality#
negotiations took a mu t w is t  when Holts! r es ig n e d  in  November, 
1938 and M ini ?oicnmaa became interim Foreign m in ister #  The tenor of 
th© discussions rem ained much th© same as they wore to  do throughout 
the ■’•ear, but not# they d e lib e r a te d  on means of b e s t  c a rr y in g  the d is ­
c u s s io n s  to fructification* From the Tartsev-Foicmaa c o n v e r sa tio n s  
on Hovember 21* i t  was determ ined that a trade delegation should he 
sent to Moscow and that two p o lit ic a l negotiators should ©company It*
I t  was ultimately decided that the negotiators should go ostensibly to
^KsnnerheiiB9 op* e lt* , ftp* 29h~29$| and Tanner, op* c it# ,
pp* 11-12*
attend the dedication of th© new Finnish Legation Building cm 
fteomriber ?f 1938* ^
Discussions in Moscow were headed by the F in n ish  envoy in  
Moscow, Tr.jo-Koskinen, and th© acting bureau ch iefs Urho Toivola and 
Aaro P ak aa lah ti*  When the delegates appeared for their a u d ien ce , they 
found th a t  Coramieear for foreign Trade, Anastas Kifcoyan, was to receive 
them* At th is  Yrjo-Koskinen decided th a t  his position as diplomat 
did not permit him to take part as the C om m issariat for Foreign Affair® 
was not aware of th e  p o lit ica l discussions# Hence, only* Toivola and 
Pakaslaiiti were present for th© f ir s t  session, which they began by 
b roach in g  the subject of trad® improvement between Fin land and Russia, 
as was a pertinent subject for d is c u s s io n s  between a trade delegation  
and Commissar for Foreign frnde* This, how ever, was not quite what 
Mikoy&n desired, sod said i t  was n ic e  to  talk to Finnish trade repre­
sentatives but there were certain prerequisites to arriving at a 
satisfactory commercial treaty* M ilitary problems were involved, and
the question of leasing Suursaari and providing for the defense of
2kLeningrad must be considered* Hikoyan noted with some satisfaction  
the Scandinavian orientation of Finland's foreign trad© policy but 
stated that frankly that th is  was not an adequate guarantee that 
the nation would be able to ward o ff  a violation of her neutrality*
When the Finns emphasised that there was no spot as weak in  
Finnish defenses as the AaXand Islands and that i t  was hoped, t  ore- 
fore, th a t  Russia would agree t o  the Finns building fo rtifica tio n s
23Tanner, op* p i t * ,  p .  1 2 ; and Wuorinen, F in land  and World War 
I I ,  p . h h .
^Tanner, op. e l t . .  p. 12.
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on the islands, Mlkoyan changed the subject and asked i f  Finland 
could not c ©d© Suursaari t o Russia* The Finns declared that 
S u u rsaari remained u n f o r t i f ie d  in  accordance w ith  the provisions
of the dorpst Treaty of 1920, feat i f  the conditions of the treaty  
w© c  to fee chan., ed, Finland could erect th® fortifica tion s
h erself*25
After about two hours of conversation in  th is vein, Hikoyan 
retu rn ed  to what the audience was o s te n s ib ly  concerned with* trade*
It was a; reed that a number of representatives of Finnish commerce 
and in d u str y  should  meet with him that evening to  d iscuss what the 
Firm® hoped for in  improved commercial relations* He emphasised th© 
fact that p o lit ic s  would not enter into the conversations, since in  
his view, the time to bring up p o litica l questions would come when 
the necessary foundations for encouraging trad© had been la id , dis­
cussions o f  border q u e s t io n s  had been in it ia te d , and. other Items of 
immediate practical concern had been taken care o f*26
Th© ev en in g  discussions were a tten d e d , also , by Minister 
Y rjd-K oskinen and th e  F in n ish  M in is te r  o f  Communications, W ind  
Salovsara* Hikcyan i n  these ta lks merely r e i t e r a t e d  what he had 
said e a r l i e r ,  em p h asisin g  the- im portance of p o lit ic a l r e la t io n s h ip s  
as a precondition to c ^ s n e r e ia l  discussion* Upon those matters no 
decisions war© reached*2?
This meeting can be considered as the end-point in  th© f ir s t  
phase of Flnno-R uaslan negotiations* I t  i s  n o t ic e a b le  that throughout 
th© conversations covering most of 1938, the R u ssia n s would not consider
^fuorinen, Finland and World War I I , p* 1*6*
26"Tanner, op. c it* , pp* 12-13*
^ Ib id .
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any aspect of Plrmo-Eussian trade r e la t io n s  w ith ou t f i r s t  arriving a t  
d efin ite  politics®! am! m il i ta r y  errangawaafca# U sing tra d e  as a lever, 
th e  B uaaians p o l ic y  so w e d  d esign ed  to fo r c e  the F itm s in t o  agreem ents  
th a t  would, i s  the F in n ish  view, have violated t h e ir  n e u t r a l i t y ,  
te rr ito r ia l I n t e g r i t y  and independence# I t  aay  he orgaed th a t  had th e  
Finnish governm ent, at th is  s ta g e  of t h e  n e g o t ia t io n s  seen  f i t  to  
compromise while th e  H essia n  demands were s t i l l  at a minimum, war 
raight have been ©voided* Bat i n  v iew  of what a fterw a rd s  b a tten ed  t o  
th e  other B a lt ic  sta tes , I t  i s  d iff ic u lt  t o  argue that th e  F in n ish  
p o l ic y  was in c o r r e c t#
For the next few months Fiano-Hssaian diplomatic estchsnges 
were rather routine, while Finland continued negotiations with Sweden 
for the joint defense of the Aalands# However, os March !>, 193?# 
Idtvinov handed trjd^Koski»ma eeiamftndun cotscorning trade relations  
and the fo r tifica tio n  of the Aalonds* I s  order to create a favorable 
atmosphere for the reaching o t  an agreement, the U#S«S#R# now pro* 
posed that Finland lease her Sutsraoarl, Lsvonsaart Island (hovskar), 
the two lytdsaari Islands {Tytor Skerries), and Soiskari Islam!
Oksit skar) in  the Golf of Fir,land for a period of th irty  years (sec 
map facing page 19 )# It was not Hustle*a purpose to fo r t ify  the 
islands, the m m rm vtlim  stated, bat to uss them as observation posts 
to influence the security of the? Leningrad Passage# I f  those demands 
were met, the Soviet Union would guarantee batter relations between 
the t  m  countries, a most favorable, for Finland, trade agreement, 
and the solution of tne Aalsnrls problem in  a sstisfoetexy
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manner#
The Soviet Union received the Finnish rerly on March 8# It 
was written by Eljas Erkko, the Finnish Foreign Minister since Dec­
ember 8, 1938. Erkko made i t  plain that the Russian demands exceeded 
what Finland considered i t  safe for her to grant in  position as a 
neutral. Therefore, Finland could, not consider leasing to a foreign  
power the islands referred to because they were an integral part of 
Finland, a sovereign territory which the Soviet Union had confirmed 
and acknowledged in  the Treaty of Tartu, He pointed out that the 
islands had been neutralized at that time on Soviet in sistence, and 
stated that no defense preparation had been in itia ted  on ary of them# 29
Litvinov was d issa tisfied  and disappointed with the Finnish 
reply since in  the Russian view, leasing the islands would not be 
a violation  of Finnish neutrality, more especia lly  since the Soviet 
Union did not propose to  fo r tify  them# But Litvinov had been pre­
pared for just such a reply and he proposed thrt rather than lease 
the islands, they might be exchanged outright for compensation in  
^astern'1 Karelia north of Lake Ladoga, Once again the Finnish reply 
of March 1 3 ,was in  the negative, Litvinov, however, refused to  
consider th is  as a f in a l decision and in  Russian eyes the matter 
was not closed.
2%annerheim, op. c it# , p. 299; Tanner, op. c i t . , pp. 13-Hi 
and Wuorinen, Finland and World War XI, p. 1*6.
29 »Mannerheim, op. c i t #, pp. 299; Tanner, op# c i t . , p. Hi; and
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%&mn the Firmlah reply ©f Karsh 13 mm  given to T itvim v, 
he rmmrken$ that the fo iw r  Soviet envoy to Finland, Bori® -^tei n, 
then scoredlied to  Home, would bo ssnt to Helsinki to press the 
Russian m m *  h& early as March 11* Stein had contacted :'.:..irfefco and 
presented essen tia lly  the eaae plan as Idtvtnov* He amplified i t  
to Include a lease a®re*,iaetifc, for a stated period o f  t  ir e , ^  which 
Finland would have received extensive exploitation rights to forest 
area® in Rtsssia Karelia.31
S t e in  argued that F in la n d 1® n e u t r a l i ty  would t e s t  toe s  enured 
te  the cession ©f the islands to R o ss is  and th a t  the area B uitsia  was 
prepared to cede to Eastern K a re lia  (183 square k i le t a c t s r s )  was g r e a te r  
ilia n  the oceitoiTied arena of t t e  ia lam ein  q u estio n #  bhren a written 
s t e t s n e n t ,  he said, by Fiat®ad that she would res ist  any attempt 
a t  v io la t io n  of h er  n e u t r a l i t y  w as w o r th le s s  i n  R u ssian  a y es  u n le s s  
backed up t r  p r a c t ic a l  m ea su res .32 Rrkfcc** reply w  t h a t ,  unrior 
the c o n s t itu t io n *  Finnish territory?’ m s in a l ie n a b le  am? such an 
exchange w rs not d is c u s s a b le .  Me en p h f.sised  i h?*t Finland fe a r ed
ihr*t i f  a p reced en t for ee^ in g  t e r r i t o r y  was e s t a b l is h e d ,  Gsrniafly too
edgh* rank© s im ila r  demands* t o  such F in land  would never  a s s e n t #33 
Stein e x p ressed  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  tilth th e  finriisb resp on se  and 
requested th a t  the F in n ish  ^ ovsrtissiit study t h s  p r o p o sa ls  f w ih a r *
3*Tannsr, oft* c i t « ,  p* lb *
^ ^ tetinerhsis*  ej>* e l t - .* p#. 300*
^Tanner# op* c i t * ,  p* I k i  end tfuorine!*, Finland and OorfLd *-fer
I I ,  p* !*?♦ ~
After cm&i&mMMan# tlie OototsmsiMo saauer to® doliverod to  
X&iv&xftrte# in  © mmmm$x%m txwmttltotadl ly TrjS^sl& ijm  m  i-tecti RO*
»Hfc*M rtlnjiiK **.*!* itf^ iihi' iMif iMIHh Jki t  rasa a® leubXMsi
The Fi®®dA gororrom^ aaggptdttto ragarding a »ib&or
which iii m w  or another i moStmm th® m m im  of part® o f  
the tev rttefy  of th® otote to  amolter power* ttdo m ^sM m  reply  
1® not to  to© TOdorotool in  the m nm  H ist the Feretga Kl&totar 
w ild  be t r i l l i n g  to  eootiare sn «ehai^ o of r%mm w&fM. ttoo 
p& pom  of m m M m  & ao lu tlm  to  tbe questions rsiped by ttoo 
Soviet tMon TOgMw&iig gasflMMafcee# to  it®  #m m itgr#3**
Si© S o v ie t tJhloiit# rosea te'! danooiSo o f Fis&juvl «m  ta tleo ilT O
o f tho foiXoBco o f the Rusidssi lo s to fs  to  Qqdorstwvf the ifotldb.^ ® of
o o en a tltu tlo n a il doaoearaey* Or* i f  th ey  understood m b  TOtter%
ttoeir lo o le t e m  %&wm that they to ts  so a^TOtoosd to  cjwa&tngt with
s minimum of f^pular epgsioltion Hist they fottod to  realise that in  «
free nation to TO«?tO!$Iy disgrepsri pmtoiio opinion too to court po litical
oaidblo* Finnish {pmraTOxEb* esp ecia lly  a t i t  enjcyed a © tear m jer ity
in  the F4®t# too not ustHlng to  vrntestik®  action  tirnt wosQUS hmw r a h
diro o<»mqqono«9 «nd ia«faanpod to p m m  tise .sotnrls^vtes. oriantation,
dch;itrOHtyjs end pacific poSUoioo in  ftorolgn 'imlnHkw*
tltvlm r^o yoaotftm too w  of wsgrot* &  dedarai. that i t  too.
not u§5 to  BUtftond to propose ©©ncrot© enggpsettauu Easels had: taetfe
hart when sh© had mqa#sted the MXbmSb in  the M f  of Fti&aad* M to
to® told that new Ftnflteatf sra t eposfe* toot too s t i l l  y«®itsod etoedfaet in
h ie defense of the Finnish p oalita i*  Be tiw iod the m w w  a draft of a not#
that too to  to® delivered to  the Soviet fjerowwent In ohlcfi. FitAisif m m
AQuotoO in  fmmmr$ ©g# e lt* ,  pp* Ub*45
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more r c i i s r a i s d  her d s t e r a la e t lo n  t o  defend her n eitoa llty  under 
arjy and a l l  eSreuiastan©©© end against any and a w ; /  aggressor*-^
B efore le a v in g  H e ls in k i on A p r il f ,  S te in  fr o a k ly  I n s is t e d  
th a t  th e  dtaenaslcm  shodd not be co n sid ered  a t  an tnd* The 3 o v la t  
" n len  m s  not prepared f o r  e f t  n i l  r e p ly  t o  l i e  dsmrtd© a s  th®
I s l a n d s  r e q u e s t e d  ware o f  s t r a t e g i c  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  S o v i e t  sriC'irity*3& 
This* however, ended the la st phase o f  the preliolnaxy negotiations, 
which had ojrtandcd over a year, eo«irnifig  Finnish guarantees of 
R u s s ia 's  s e c u r ity *
Much criticism  m s subsequently directed at th e  Finnish state#* 
sisn for their InflasdhiH ty in  meeting th# Russian dono&h to  1m m  
the islands in  the Calf cf Finland* KaratutiL ftaitfia*toaiai, for aaca^pla, 
.felt that no claaagt to  Finnish 1 (wSspenderiea ©r a©v*rol|jnty would 
have been involved had the- Finn® met th© demand©# In h is Hemolra* 
the Marshal statess
X m o  o f  th® d e f in i t e  o p in io n  th a t  u s m m  bo and to  meet th e  
R u ssia n s in acme way i f  t h ia  m s l i k e l y  t o  lead to  improved r e la ­
tion ®  w ith  our m ighty neigh b or * * * * I s a id  th a t  i  c i s la n d s  
were o f  no us© t o  th© couiifcsy and th a t  wo had no u at o f  dafend~  
in g  them* a s  thi* war© n e u tr a lise d *  Or* th e  o ilie r  han 9 th e  
i s la n d s  wore o f  r e a l  im portance t o  th© R u ssia n s , a s  t*tcy ©emended  
th© en tra n ce  t o  t h e i r  n a v a l baa© a t  tr&c Bay o f  L ogs, and ty  lo o s in g  
them we sh ou ld  draw adventsc©  frs«s one o f  th© few  tru a p s  wo hold*
But X fast w ith  m  understanding* I t  m s  p o in ted  o u t to  me th a t  
a  government which dared to  propose scy th in g  o f t  m  s o r t  would 
imM&ataly f a l l ,  and that no p o litic ian  would agree to challenge 
public opinion in th is  manner# T© th is  1 replied that i f  there 
ware really  no one m io m s  w illing  to risk  h is popularity in  a
3*>^ fanner# op* c i t * ,  p# 15$ and *torlm m « F in lan d  and ' t o l d
r  * apmwiwtii » » » mwnwiio^ *• *  w  v*mmu'MgjMwwswirii  ^ mBUM* m m *
I I , p . L?.
36Tenner, eg* c it* , p* 15? and Wuorinen, Finland m d  t o ld  
II , p . Is?.
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matter 00 v ita l to the country, X was prepared to  place ayoelf 
at the disposal of the government, convinced as X was that v& 
honest opinion would be understood. But X vent s t i l l  further 
and expressed the opinion that I t  would be to  Finland's advan* 
tags to o ffer  to move the fron tier nearest to  Leningrad westward 
by fiv e  or s ix  m iles, against a reasonable compensation*??
On the other hand fanner defends the p o licy  o f the government 
on the grounds that i f  the Russian demands were met then, la te r  on 
more demands might a r ise . In h is book he sta tes that*
These negotiations showed that the Soviet Uhion tena­
ciously  sought to  have Finland assent to  certain  lim itation s  
on i t s  right to  make os* of i t s  territory  and that Finland 
with equal tenacity opposed the suggestions put forward, 
Subsequently-^when Finland was obliged, on the basis of 
peace trea tie s  made a fter  the wars in  which i t  was engaged, 
to  cede much larger areas—criticism  was directed against 
Finland’s negative position  at the tim e, Xet under the 
circumstances of that period a d ifferen t approach to the 
case would hardly have been p ossib le. There s t i l l  existed  
tru st in  International law and In the binding character of 
signed and sealed tr e a tie s . I t  was not considered possib le  
that a great power would seek by force to  assume possession  
of terr ito r ie s  which i t  had I t s e lf  ceded to Finland through 
an express trea ty , Under no circumstances would the D iet 
have been disposed to  approve proposals of th is  sort i f  the 
government had presented them for consideration. Moreover, 
i t  i s  uncertain whether concessions made at that stage would 
have prevented the presentation of fresh  demands. Indeed, I t  
i s  conspicuous that while the negotiations were under way tiie 
Soviet demands tended to  increase and did not by any means 
come closer to  the Finnish position  as might properly have 
been expected.38
Whatever criticism s are leveled  at the Flimlah government, the 
fa c t remains that at the tim e, i t  was f e l t  that no such concessions 
could be made. I t  might have been a fa r  better th ing, had the n e t  
been informed of the negotiations. Throughout, the Finnish government
37kann0rfcei», op,  c l t , ,  pp, 300- 301,  
3%azmsr, op, c l t , ,  pp, l£ « l6 .
respected the Soviet desire that they he kept secret# In any case, 
i f  the I le t  had been iafoxraod of the conversations, the nation might 
have been better prepared to meet the c r is is  that was to come* I t  
i s  useless, however, to speculate on such matters •
The breakdown in  the conversations resulted in  a discontinu­
ance of trade negotiations and the refusal o f Russia to assent to  
the revision of the AaXaud Convention proposed by Finland and Sweden# 
Thereafter, the Swedes became increasingly hesitant concerning the  
Stockholm Flan and when on Hay 31 Molotov announced that Russia had 
as much to  say, or mor% on the Aaland question as any other country, 
Sweden withdrew the question from before the Riksdag# That the pro­
posal was to  be debated at an extraordinary session of that body was 
the reason given# Bat by June, the matter was dropped alt©c©th©r#3F
In the meantime, Finland had been approached by Germany on the 
matter of a non-agression pact# Finland declined to accept the offer  
as impinging on her neutrality and Scandinavian orientation. Russia 
was d issa tis f ied  with Finnish c-declarations of neutrality* To 
Mannerheia, neutrality only mad© Finland fs position  more untenable 
as i t  only served to  lim it Finland1® freedom of action that much more 
end Finland was not in  a position  to  antagonise the two great Baltic  
powers#^0
The Soviet Onion had not even been consulted on the matter of 
the Munich agreements In the preceding September which had aroused
3$aannerheim, o£# c l t ** p* 3O0L# 
fcOlbld., pp. 302-303.
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m fee lia g  of in. Russia iosfiirds the tfsst* When Gemajy
seised the mmt  of C sechodXovakia in  March 1939$ Ruselati apprehei** 
dona and suqplaloae deepened# H&mer$ m  ike throat of m r  increased, 
Russia wm recognised bf the Qre&t Powers as a ad litarr
factor to b© reckoned with# Hems both and the A llie s  began
t© iso© aertoual^ the 3#S#S*R# and to  mol: Russian aid in  tbB event of  
an armed conflict* In March the British end French in it ia led  Joint 
rogetlettona aimed at & * v i c o X X e b o r s t i i N t i  against Genaaiy* 
Russia demanded, as a to  &w s«®h accord, that the resbl*
tant treaty would guarantee the B ailie states (Latvia, Retonla and 
Zdthoania) and Finland add in  the contingency o f thair being attacked* 
T© be Included in  the agreement was ^indirect aggression*, t*e#» the 
ansts^tion of a pro^Qertaan attitude on the part of the gowennwts to  
b§ guaranteed* Thus Russia, under the guise of benevolent guardian* 
ship o f their independence, would have obtained the right to interfere  
in  the Internal a ffa ir s  of those nations, even to  the point o f provi* 
ding ad litaxy aid , without th e ir  f i r s t  requesting
At f ir s t  the British and. Frenah mmmd inclined to  accept the 
Russian conditions, which sent a (M R  of apprehension through the 
sa b er s  of the flm&dki government* In coneequenee, strong Fimifili 
demarche* supf^rtad the Swedish gcnmrnemt were nede In London and 
Koeoow, The r e s u l t  wm th a t  th e  SfcitUh and French goronwents
XWP# Series B, ?ol# FI, p 
Wuorlm1SwT l^ tei in w<s&d viar II*
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declared that they would not accept ary Russian proposals which 
included JAntand*^
As astute diplomats# the Russians also allowed Gesmangr to  
court them* Discussion began in  May* 1939# but i t  was not u n til 
August that serious conversations w e  in itiated* On the Russian 
side the m m  was engineered to  counterbalance the Anglo-French 
negotiation© and to  get the most advantageous o ffer  fro© both 
sides# then to accept that which would best &taem Russian interest® *^  
After the breakdown of Anglo~Preneh»Rusaian c onvcrsations# discussions 
between Geraary and Russia rapidly reached a conclusion in  the 
Kolotov-Hibbentrop non-aggression pact on August 23* Both parties 
to the pact vociferously denied that the Baltic sta tes had hem. 
divided into spheres of in flu en ce ,^  but the evacuation of Baltic  
Gexm&n* in  September and October o f 1939 seemed to indicate other­
w ise*^  In 19lilj Rlbhentrop admitted that i t  was agreed in  the August 
pact that Finland should be relegated to the Soviet sphere of Influ* 
enee*^ After the war the secret protocol pertaining to  the spheres 
of influence was published* I t  stated that*
On the occasion of the signature of the iionaggression Pact 
between the German Belch and the U.S.S.R., the undersigned
’■'■gpQFP, Series E ., V ol. VI, pp. 58, 727,810., and Tanner, 0£ . c l t . .
P* 18*
k3Kannerheim# op* c l t ** p* 30$.
%BFP. Series B, Vol. VII, pp. 33% U91.
**5wuorinen, Finland and World War IX. p . 51. k^Ibid.
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l^jsnl^potentiariaa* « * discussed in  s tr ic te r  confidential conrar-* 
n t i m  tbs q u e s t io n  o f  the bm»iA«qr of th e ir  m apeetim  spheres 
of ia f lt ie m  in- Sw tem  lump©. 'Those conversation© M  to the 
■ftajiiwiiHg conclusions t
1# in  the event of a to ir lto r la l and -political rc£^anceeont 
in  the area© belonging t© the Baltic States (Finland, Kstoni&,
Latvia, 34thoaftilft)# the northern boundta r^ o f Lithuania i^ saXX 
rspresent the bcKsndonr of the sphere© of inflaefic© o f ftovnsHGr 
and the S .S .S .R . .
Within a seek i t  beeaao d e a r  shat the f o i l  inport of th© pant
i t  opened th e  f o r  th e  Q m n n  l i m s i o i i  o f  ^nXend on  Septem ber 1
and th e  E o ss la n  dod& refcion  o f  war a g a in s t  th e  d e fe a te d  n a t io n  on
September 17.
i t  f ir s t  the poet m s received with a im  ©Mscwnt in  
Finn©»Seiaidia*-*tho tee  sw m  enanieo mhraeing one another m  
s3 M m $ ^  Tot in  Finland them  m e l i t t l e  r o d  concern at f ir s t  ever 
the Grnwmm Soviet t r e a t s  in  fa c t , i t  m e thought to  be s sk illfu l 
ceunterMfaove to  the p olicy  o f the tfeatm i Pemere*^ Fcrdgn Minister 
Brito to ld  the German envcy to  Finland, Wipert von Hl&tor, that for  
the mooent i t  appeared t© give advantage to  Finland in  that the Baltic  
Sea asm  would be ©sceltsded from h o s t ilit ie s  since the two Great Powers 
wore now a llie d , thus* ho ©aid, the danger of Finland hocceati^ in v o lv e  
in  war m s lessened hot, nevertheless, he did express doubts about the 
future, veiet struck: Brito wm that the t mem of the ftuseo^atrtt&n Pact 
differed from those that Ctansetip had proposed to  Finland a short time
^Docunents on International A ffstre. W39&$k&» Vol. I .  Koral 
In stitu tT W 'lH E irm lB S I^ rF iS S s TLomlbns ^Efor^OElversity Press, 
1951), p* 1*09.
^ T a n e r , og# d t . 9 p . 18.
MjPQF?, Berios B, Vol. VII, p . TO.
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before. They also differed from any that Russia had concluded with 
other nations* For Rr&ko th is  portended something unusual, but at
Former Finnish Foreign Minister Aottl Hackaell oppressed the 
thought that Russia in  the Fall of 1939 did m t  present ary danger 
to  Finland but conceded that th is  situation  could change i f  Russia 
were to be b u ilt up by Germany* lie thought that Russia might stand
aside from the war and await the exhaustion of the warring powers and
enter at the moment most advantageous to her* The consequences from 
such an event would be grave for Finland for she would be the f ir s t
to f e e l  the e ffec ts  of an expending Russia*
The Holetov-lUbberrbrop agreement was the starting signal for  
iferld War II* Within a week of the signing of the pact, the Reich 
declared war on Poland* Immediately on receiving the report of the 
German action the Finnish government, singly and in  conjunction with 
the Scandanavian countries, declared her intention to remain entirely  
neutral and is^ artia l in  the conflict#^* In th is  manner the Fima 
expressed their aim of abstaining from any involvement in  the in ter­
national conflict#
Germany, on the day of her attack on Poland, declared that, In 
accordance with the existing  friendly relations between herself and
the moment he was not exactly sure what.k?
^ I b ld . ,  p. 3l»3*
5°Ib id .t p . 3liU.
^■Tanner, op. c t t . .  p . 19; PGFP,
_ - . -J t  ....   "IT** ' H   -•* . * r t ____ ** ^  III 111 I i g f
5 F F> Series I ,  7ol* F i l l ,  p . 12$ 
■Id War 1S» p* 52#
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llerway* Sweden and Fib!end, she would in  no n ise injure the inviolabi­
l i t y  of the three and would at a l l  times observe a respectful attitude  
fo r  their terr ito r ia l integrity# the same token Germany suspected 
a policy of s tr ic t  neutrality towards her* and would take an ©specially 
adverse view of breaches of th eir  neutrality by iiiird parties*?^
Russia gave at le a s t  l ip  service to the idea of neutrality  
throughout the f ir s t  h alf of September* As la te  as u&d-Sept amber* the 
press chief of the Comlssarlat for Foreign A ffairs declared that the 
hed Aray would not be led by aiy excuse, e* g* a revolt in  Poland* into  
crossing the Russo-Polish boxder#£3 le t  on September 17* the Bed Array 
did invade an already badly defeated Poland and took part in  the d iv i­
sion of sp o ils . Upon entering the aeraam-Polish fray* the Soviet Onion 
issued a declaration of neutrality to ©11 nations* including Finland 
and her  neighbors in  .^eaiiDanavia*^1 The Russian proclamation served 
to  strengthen the confidence of government c irc les  in  Helsinki that 
the  Finnish nation would be able to  maintain i t s  position oi neutrality.
For a time yet Finland was to  maintain her position of neutrality* 
but not for  long. Soviet alms* guaranteed by the HolotovwRibbenfcrop 
Pact* were soon to  become apparent* At th is  point* however* i t  would
FP, Series D, V'ol# VII* p . £02* I t  was probably meant by 
third party intervention any action by Britain and France in Finno-Scandia.
®Wuorlnen* Finland and World War XX* p . £2.
^^©imerheia* op* cdt** p* 307j and Wuorlnen* Finland and World XX*
P* £2*
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s© m  td .se t o  rev iew  ev en t o t o  s e e  i f  F in la n d  co u ld  have don© more 
th an  she d id  t o  a ssu re  h er  w e H -b e in g  a s  a  sm a ll ind ep en dent s t a t e  
caught betw een am b itio n s G reat Pmmm* th e  anonymous author o f  
Wuortnen1© volum© argu es th a t !
I t  i s  p o s s ib le  tod ay  t o  a rg u e , w ith  th e  a id  o f  h in d s ig h t ,  
th a t  a  more f a r - s ig h t e d  p o l ic y  on F in land*a p e r t  would have 
p reven ted  F in lan d  from b ©coming th e  su b je c t  o f  th e  M olotov*  
R ibbentrop agreem en ts. T h is  soem s, how ever, v e ry  u n lik e ly *
I f  e i t h e r  Power had. c o n s id e re d  i t  t o  bo i n  h e r  own i n t e r e s t s  
t o  p r o te c t  F in land  i n  th e s e  n e g o t ia t io n s ,  F in lan d  would a lrea ^ r  
have had to  fee—-by A u gu st, 19$$w"*«~the v a s s a l  o f  th e  Power 
" p r o te c tin g » h e r . That i s  t o  m p 9 she would a lrea d y  have had 
t o  be i n  th e  p o s i t io n  t o  w hich th e  n e g o t ia to r s  sought t o  a s s ig n  
h e r . The S o v ie t  Union o b v io u s ly  had a  c le a r - c u t  program which  
i t  was c a r r y in g  o u t w ith o u t b o th er in g  about th e  sm a ll o b s t a c le s  
i n  i t s  p a th . The Germans l a t e r  argued th a t  i f  F in lan d  had not  
r e j e c te d  th e  n©n**&ggression p a c t proposed by G erasry i n  May,
193%  she would not have- f a l l e n  In to  th e  Bueai&m sp here o f  
in f lu e n c e .  At th e  t im e , how ever, n o th in g  was s a id  o f  wtuxt 
F in la n d ’ s  p o s i t io n  w ould th e n  tm m  becom e, o r  o f  how th e  non* 
a g g r e s s io n  p a c t would have stren g th en ed  F in la n d ’ s  p o s i t i o n .
L a ter , whoa i t  was s e e n  how l i t t l e  a  n o n -a g g ro sa lo n  p a c t s a fe ­
guarded Denmark a g a in s t  th e  a t ta c k  by G enaai^ . such argum ents 
were no la r g e r  p r e se n te d , even  to  th© Finns*hb
To say  th a t  F in lan d  m ight have avoided th e  d i s a s t e r  by 
rea ch in g  an agreem ent w ith  H a ss le  d u rin g  th® p reced in g  April, has  
boon d e a lt  w ith  above* I t  i s ,  how ever, w e l l  t o  r e f l e c t  th a t  had. 
F in lan d  surrendered  h er  n e u t r a l i t y  a t  t h c t  p o in t ,  perhaps she would  
not have been a b le  t o  m a in ta in  h e r s e l f ,  as she d id ,  on. th e  p er ip h ery  
o f  th e  G reat Powers1 s tr u g g le *  Had she been a l l i e d  w ith  R u ss ia , a s  
prop osed , th e r e  i s  g r e a t  l ik e l ih o o d  th a t  she would tmve been, dr mm 
in t o  th e  f u l l  m aelstrom  o f  th e  s tr u g g le  betw een B ast and w e s t .  In  
th e  en d , th e  n a t io n  would undoubtedly have been occu p ied  tgr R u ssia ,
^ ^ u a r in s n , F in lan d  and -forld War H ,  p p . $1-52#
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without a chance of protect, and suffered ultimately the same 
consequences a© other nations bordering on Russ!%!*©• the loss  
of her independence# Just as debatable i s  the argument that the 
islands demanded should hare been ceded. Regardless of the sitna­
tion , the Diet undoubtedly would have balked, and nothing would hare 
been accomplished. Furthermore, as the author of the Vuorinen book 
states in  th is  connection, "It must he kept In mind that at the 
time a to ta l war had net yet lowered international p o lit ic a l morals 
to the present lev e l where Qrect Powers but not the small ones have 
the right to defend themselves.
Thus, did Finland stand at the threshold of an entirely new 
experience in foreign a ffa ir s , adamantly maintaining a policy of 
neutrality and assuming that there was s t i l l  extant in the world 
a concept of justice for a ll*  i%en in  the ensuing months, Moscow*s 
demands became evermore pressing, Finland was to stand in need of 
a l l  the sisqffi her people possessed*
Ib id ., pp. U7-18.
S lau  i s  e  terra con n o tin g  i n t e g r i t y ,  i n t e s t i n a l  f o r t i t u d e ,
determination, vigor, v ita l ity , courage, an unwillingness to give up 
despite a l l  oddsj in  the vernacular sense, i t  might be defined as 
"nuts” combined with sheer determination*
CHAPTER Vf
THE MDSCOW NEGOTIATIONS
Upon th e  s u c c e s s f u l  p a r t i t io n  o f  P oland, R u ssia  tu rn ed  h er  
a t t e n t io n  t o  th e  l e s s e r  B a lt ic  s t a t e s  o f  E s to n ia , L a tv ia , and 
L ithuania* The F o re ign  M in is te r s  o f  th e s e  c o u n tr ie s  w ere summoned 
to  Moscow t o  d is c u s s  th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  t r e a t i e s  o f f r ie n d s h ip  and 
r e c ip r o c a l  a id  w ith  th e  S o v ie t  U nion. Under p ressu re  o f  R u ssian  
m ilita r y  a c t io n s  on h er  b o r d e r s , E sto n ia  g ran ted  n a v a l and a ir  
b a se s  t o  R u ssia  on September 28} on October 5 L a tv ia  con clu d ed  
a t r e a t y  o f  th e  same gen re; and on O ctober 11 L ith u an ia  com pleted  
n e g o t ia t io n s  th a t  r e s u lt e d  in  her reg a in in g  ? i ln a ,  which R u ssia  
had j u s t  w rested  from P oland, in  r e tu r n  fo r  m il i t a r y  b a se s  g iv en  
th e  S o v ie t  Union*^
H e ls in k i was s e r io u s ly  d i s t r e s s e d  by th e S o v ie t  demands 
on the B a lt ic  S ta te s  and r e a l iz e d  th a t  sim ilar c o n c e ss io n s  would 
probab ly  be demanded o f  her* The F in n ish  governm ent, however, 
was determ ined t o  r e s i s t  such p r e ss u r e s , come what might *^
The F in n ish  e x p e c ta t io n s  w ere confirm ed on October 5 ,  when S o v ie t  
le a d e r s  were reach in g  a  s u c c e s s fu l  c o n c lu s io n  in  n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  
th e  B a lt ic  S ta tes*  M olotov r eq u ested  th e  F in n ish  M in is te r  t o  
Moscow t o  v i s i t  th e  Kremlin* There he was inform ed t h a t ,  in  v iew
^Winston S . C h u r c h ill ,  The G athering Storm (B ostons  
Houghton M if f l in  Co*, 191*8), p« 1*8$; Marinerheim* QP* c i t . ,  pp* 
307-308; and Tanner, jog. c l t ** p . 21*
2 CGFP, S e r ie s  D, V o l. V III , p . 11*8
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of the war situation* the Soviet 'Jrd.cn now wished to exchange views 
with Finland regarding -'’certain concrete questions of a p o lit ic a l  
natisre”#-* Bolotov further suggested that the Finnish Foreign 
Minister Journey to Moscow for the conversations* or that another 
plenipotentiary be appointed* When pressed for elucidation on 
the nature of the proposed conversations* Holotov refused to go 
into details* He did, however, express the hope that discussions 
might be in itia ted  as soon as possible and requested an answer 
within a few d ays/1
in  Helsinki, Molotov*s indefin ite reply and invitation  
caused anxiety* It was clear, though, that no alternative to 
acceptance was given* Scant attention, however, was paid to the 
urgent request for speed* On October 8 Cerevyanskl called on 
Erkko to inform him that Moscow was irritated  because the Finnish 
reply was delayed, that Finland was not treating the matter as 
the other Baltic States had, and that th is  might be detrimental 
to course of affairs#- Erkko retorted, WX have m  knowledge as 
to how the Baltic States were Invited to Moscow j Finland has 
dealt with the matter as a normal a ffa ir  and in the normal course* "6
Erkko was loath to go to Moscow as he f e l t  that h is place 
was with the government* It was, therefore, decided that J* K* 
Paasikivi, Finnish Minister to Stockholm, should be sent as
3The Finnish Elue Book; The revelopraent of Yiraifsh-Soviet 
Relations during the Aututan of 1939 9hereafter cited as FBfe’) YfieS 
Tories J* EU’'Xipponcott ' o^'*,”19118)7 P« ^2*
^Tanner, 0£* c lt* , p. 21* %BB, pp. Ii3*4iiu
Ib id . ,  p . Mu
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F in la n d 's  c h ie f  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  a t  the Moeeov d is c u s s io n s*  G eneral 
in s tr u c t io n s  were d ra fted  d ir e c t in g  th e  F in n ish  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  t o  
p o in t  o a t th a t F in la n d 's  re la tion s?  w ith  th e  S o v ie t  Union s e r e  
r e g u la te d  by th e  T artu Peace T reaty  and th e  T reaty  o f  N o n -a g ressio n  
arid t o  r e i t e r a t e  F in la n d 's  d e c ls io n f in  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  th e  o th er  
N orthern Powers to  ren a ln  n e u tr a l and a t  p e a c e . Any p r o p o sa ls  th a t  
m i# it  In fr in g e  on th e  n e u tr a l p o l ic y  and fr e e  p o l i t i c a l  s t a t u s  o f  
F in lan d  were to  be r e j e c t e d .  F in la n d 's  e l s e  w as to  be em phasised  
a s  a fo o t e r  p rev en tin g  h e r  from a g g r e ss iv e  a c t io n  tow ard any n a tio n * ?  
In w itn e s s  o f  h er  w i l l  t o  rem ain a t  peace and n e u tr a l F in lan d  
n o t i f i e d  th e  w orld  o f  h er  d e c is io n  t o  defend h e r  p o s i t io n  even  to  
th e  p o in t o f  tak in g  up arms* M oreover, F in land  w ish ed  i t  known 
th a t  she would n o t a llo w  anyone to u se  t o r  a g a in s t  anybody* In  
a d d it io n , i f  p r o p o sa ls  a f f e c t in g  F in n ish  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n v i o l a b i l i t y  
or  s o v e r e ig n ty  were advanced by th e  K rem lin, th e  d e le g a te s  were 
t o  d e c la r e  th a t  none o f  them were a u th o r ise d  t o  prom ise a n yth in g  
t h a t  v io la t e d  th e  F in n ish  C o n stitu tio n *  Any such c e s s io n s  would 
n e c e s s i t a t e  ap proval by t h e  government and P iet*®
More s p e c i f i c  in s t r u c t io n s  forb ad e th e  n e g o t ia t o r s  t o  d is c u s s  
th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  S o v ie t  m i l i t a r y  b a se s  on th e  F in n ish  m ainland  
or in  th e  Aaland I s la n d s !  th e  same s t ip u la t io n s  a p p lie d  t o  boundary 
ad ju stm en ts on the K a relian  Isthm us and t o  the opening o f  F in n ish  
p o r ts  t o  S o v ie t  fo r c e s*  Only on c e r ta in  I s la n d s  i n  th e  G u lf o f  
F in la n d — S e ls k a r l ,  L a v a n sa a rl, T y t fr s a a r l— e x c e p t S u u rsaarl
? I b id ** pp* U6-U7* 
ft lb id ,*  p . 1*7*
sc
( s e e  map fa d in g  page h9) were th ey  empowered to  make c o n c e ss io n s  
and th en  o n ly  under extrem e p r e ssu r e , D isc u ss io n  o f th e s e  c o n c e s s io n s  
was p erm itted  on c o n d it io n  th a t  any c e s s io n s  be r e c ip r o c a l and t h a t  
th e  com pensation  g iv e n  F in lan d  appear rea so n a b le  In  th e  e y e s  o f  th e  
w o r ld .9
I f  th e  R u ssian s su g g ested  th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  a  m utual a s s is t a n c e  
tr e a ty *  th e  n e g o t ia to r s  w ere I n s tr u c te d  t o  p o in t  ou t th a t  t h i s  would  
be in com p atib le  w ith  F in la n d 's  n e u t r a l i t y  p o l ic y  a s  th e  H e ls in k i  
government fe a r ed  such  arrangem ents w ould in v o lv e  h er  in  war. In  
t h i s  regard* i t  was p o in ted  out th a t th e  S o v ie t  governm ent had 
alreac$r sap re seed  s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  p o l i c y  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  pursued  
by F in land  and* th e r e fo r e *  i t  sh ou ld  be su g g e ste d  th a t  a  m utual 
a id  t r e a ty  was unnecessary**®
E vidence o f  F in la n d 's  a im e r s  d e s ir e  to  rem ain n e u tr a l  
and on good te r n s  w ith  th e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w orld  i s  t o  be found in  
th e  m easures th a t  were undertaken d u r in g  d u ly  and A u gu st. The 
budget fo r  th e  en su in g  y e a r  w as drawn up in  August in  th e u su a l  
fashion**- and d e s p it e  th e  imminence o f  war th e  fo r e ig n  d ebt was 
reduced**^ Another in d ic a t io n  o f  th e  F in n ish  b e l i e f  t h a t  con tin u ed  
peace was p o s s ib le  i s  t o  be found ca rx y in g  on o f  p lan s fo r  th e  
Olympic games sch ed u led  f o r  H e ls in k i in  1 $ |0 « * 3  But when P o l is h  war 
broke ou t and th e  W estern Powers d ec la red  war on Germany in  
September* F in lan d  a l s o  assumed a r e a l i s t i c  a t t i t u d e  toward th e
^ Ib ld .  * p . Ul • *®Xbld* .  p . ii8*
H ?anner* c £ .  c l t . .  pp. 19*20*
*^Wuorinen* F in lan d  and World War XX. p . h2*
*3lbld*
a lt e r e d  c ircu m stan ces by r e c a l l in g  some r e s e r v i s t s  t o  th e  c o lo r s *
At th e  end o f  September o f f i c e r s  and non-com m issioned o f f i c e r s  on 
le a v e -o f-a b se n c e  s in c e  1938 were c a l l e d  up fo r  r e fr e s h e r  c o u r se s  
and on O ctober 6 th e  advance tr o o p s  were m o b ilis e d  and d isp a tch ed  
t o  th e  K arelian  Isthm us t o  g iv e  m il i t a r y  support to  th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  
in  Moscow* At th e  same tim e c i v i l i a n s  were evacu ated  from th e  
f r o n t ie r  a rea s  o f  th e  Isthmus.*®* These a c t io n s  amounted t o  v i r t u a l  
m o b iliz a t io n  and on O ctober 19 th e  German M in ister  t o  H e ls in k i  
r ep o rted  t o  h i s  government th a t  F in n ish  m o b iliz a t io n  was com plete**^
On October 9 P a a s ik iv i*  accom panied by Johan ffykopp, a 
departm ent head in  th e  F o re ig n  M in is tr y  and C o lon el A ladar Paasonen, 
d ep arted  fo r  Moscow. The p a r ty  a r r iv e d  th e r e  on th e  e le v e n th  and 
began th e  f i r s t  round o f  t a lk s  on th e t w e l f t h .  R ep resen tin g  th e  
Kremlin were S ta lin *  M olotov* V. P. Potemkin* and D erevyanski*
An o r a l s ta tem en t o f  th e  S o v ie t  demands was made r e fe r r in g  t o  th e  
g en era l s i t u a t io n  in  Europe and s t r e s s in g  th e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  c lo s in g  
the G ulf o f  F in land  t o  any enemy who proposed t o  a t ta c k  Leningrad  
and th e  S o v ie t  Onion* On th e  so u th  shore th e  G .S .S .R . was sa id  t o  
be secu re  by th e  b a se s  i n  the B a lt ic  S t a te s  b u t no such s e c u r ity  
e x is t e d  on th e  n orth  sh ore  c o n tr o l le d  by F in la n d . I t  was th e r e fo r e  
su g g ested  t h a t  F in lan d  con clu de a t r e a t y  o f  mutual a id  r e la t in g  t o  
th e  s e c u r ity  o f  th e  G ulf o f  F in la n d . M ention was a l s o  made o f th e
^M am erheim , op.  c i t . ,  p* 309} and Niukkanen* op.  c i t . ,
pp . 98-101*
lgpGFP. S e r ie s  D ., V o l. V III , p . 3 1 *
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need for a military base cm the mainland of Finland* with Hanko 
Cape mentioned as a desirable location. In Petsamo the Finns 
were asked to cede the western part of Kalastajasaarento 
(Fisherman's Peninsula)* For the security of Leningrad the 
Kremlin suggested that the border between the two nations should 
be moved to the Kholemanjlrvi-Kyyr8l8-Muolaa-Lipola lin e  (see 
map facing page 82)• 2n the Gulf of Finland the Finns were called  
upon to cede some small Islands including Koivisto and Suursaari*
At the same time the Soviet government declared i t s e l f  prepared 
to compensate Finland be cedirg territory in the Eastern Karelia 
many times the size of the areas requested from the Finns* In 
conclusion the Russians stated that they did not want to  discuss 
the Aaland problem in Hi is  connection in order to avoid d if f ic u lt ie s .16 
Dismayed by the Russian demands, Paasikivl replied that a 
mutual aid treaty was impossible because of the Finnish policy of 
neutrality and stated that Finland could not renounce her terr i­
to r ia l inv io lab ilty  by agreeing to  the geographical demands. Upon 
th is  note the f ir s t  meeting adjourned with Paasikivl premising to  
secure further instructions from h is government*^
Hew directives were immediately issued from Helsinki* The 
Finnish delegates were instructed neither to  assent to  any mutual 
aid treaty nor to agree to  the granting of territory for m ilitary  
purposes. Kalastajasaarento was Important to Finland and i t  was
^Mamerhelm* op. c l t . ,  pp. 310-312} and Tanner* op. 
c i t . ,  p. 25*
I?Tanner, lo c . c i t .  f c f . Wuorinen, Finland and World War 
I I , pp. $$-S6 »
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F in la n d ’s  aim to  m k  f o r  ffciaeta’ a h a l f  o f  th e  peninsula. a*  
eotapensatlon f o r  concession®  elsew h ere*  Beg&rding Su ursaari*  th e
d e leg a te©  ware 'to c o n s id e r  i t  «© a se p a r a te  q u e s t io n  to  be d isc u sso d  
a f t e r  th e  outcsosa o f  0 0  w o r s e  t i e r s  on th e  o u te r  is la n d s*  As fo r  th e  
to u r  o f  Sm^rmnpSS on iB s lr ls to  I s la n d , i t  mm  n o t to  he •H seuased* m
^ r e  **:# i s la n d s  o f  .^pssero ursd *%rvi. both o f  w hich  had been in c lu d ed  in ^ i
th e  B osn ian danitnde* Hie proposed boundary r a © tif le # t ie m  on th e  
Isthm us we# Im p o ssib le  in  th e  F in n ish  elev  a s  F in land th en  would  
be p ieced - in  Jeopardy by suoh a  m m io n  of t e r r i t o r y # ^
On the fourteenth the next round o f nmm&.onm m m m ttm d  with 
Ba&sikivi reeding a  memorandum d r a fte d  by Colonel ftaaaonen which 
endeavored to p rove  th a t no danger th rea ten ed  the security o f  
Leningrad* According to th e  th e  Finns deemed i t
p o s s ib le  to  cede the island of l s v » n s a a r l9 S e ia k s r i t and fenla  
s e e r i # which could be integrated into th e  S o v ie t  defense system in  
re tu r n  for adequate comps rm&* • ion. ^  The Kremlin d e c la re d  theaa 
©one s s a io n s  too  t r i f l i n g  to be- worthy ©f consideration*
Concession* wars d esired , on th e  Iethmi»9 especia lly  mm the 
frontier there was lo c a te d  t'-o near Leningrad (32 tap*) and the 
fsoviet srmieo already possessed cannons capable o f  f  Irlng 
50-60 Jg* I t  was argued that Finland might secure sim ilar ones 
end th en  Xsidngred would be d i r e c t ly  threatened. The R ussian  
demands u lt im a te ly  aimed at th e  restoration o f  th e  boundaries 
o f  Feter the Oro«t, to  seeure the !?.% $.& • a g a in s t  attack*^*'
l £  1 0Jm m m , o&. £&£•* pp* 25^36* IMsU * P* 26
?CD»td.
msss©s*t®Q that on gxosniis tQj&w$ the
Umst&m c to m s m m  bat -taXAa r^tortad that the
ttUliscsp ck>@s not th&nlc Am to n s  of ote&ln thsu
p&iM&d o*at that the po.^ lbAlA.%’ of an attack frew «ltho^ the 
iiXlies or Qmmxxf cattaod her to mite iheao d®»ntl% eopeeisiDy 
f-fio? iiolnl^d baaesi* I f  X^oft&ad teas afraid to groat Hadteo a 
boa$ bucao??e it  ma on tfcn M&laiidf 3tii5JUi prepared to dig
e oiiimL dsm n fiarta M ;  to w i*  the Capi iron $ihl£sxU 
She delngpKfeas axguod cm jsaridieaX grosmde ani in
aompdaaoe wttn their taxi to m mmKU2^
At am point -%m Iho SteX&n noted the partia l
rot&lieBiion of f% m& m £m m m  and pototod not that RomAb too 
M l trocgw to its© Isthnu** Sadi a otcwlMl eitaeiloG*
in  his view* eeuftd not long o-btsdn ulthoot r&tsfc. of nnr* Xu 
rmmnUag t&is port of the oaroorofttlMet fanner pedMa mat 
thot tho fu ll nip^lfiwaee of th is  etattittent was not realised 
in i r t l i  i t  woe too late ,22
tlpm m&Xaaftwi ©f the fm M M M  mmmmom M s
fteeislen to rettwn to ItaXainki for further iMstrnstions end 
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delivered .^  I t  read in parti
In the negotiations with Finland the Soviet Union la  
mainly concerned with the settlement of two questional
(a) Securing the safety of Leningrad;
(b) Becoming sa tisfied  that Finland w ill maintain firm, 
friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
Both points are essen tia l for the purpose of preserving 
against external h ostile  agression the integrity of the Soviet 
Union coast of the Gulf of Finland and also of the coast of 
Estonia, whose independence the Soviet Union had undertaken to  
deffend.
In order to carcy out th is  undertaking, the memorandum 
stressed the importance of Russian bases on the north sid e  of 
the Gulf of Finland, which, in conjunction with those in Estonia, 
would close the Gulf. To achieve th is , Hanko Cape and surrounding 
territory  were to be leased to  the Soviet Union for a th irty  year 
period for the establishment of a naval base provided with 
a rtille ry  supplementing the coastal a r t ille r y  at Baltischport 
(Paldiski), to  defend the base the Russians proposed to garrison 
i t  with one infantry regiment, two anti-a ircraft battery groups, 
two a ir  force regiments, and on® battalion of armored cars, with 
a tota l of not more than 5,000 men. Finland was also to grant 
Lappohja Bay (Lapvik) as an anchorage for the Soviet f le e t .  The 
islands o f  Suursaari, Seiakari, Lavansaarl, Tytlrsaarl, and Koivisto, 
were demanded together with part of the Karelian Isthmus from Llpola 
to  the southern border of the town of Koivisto (see map facing page 
8 2 )• In exchange for th is  terr itory , the Russians agreed to  cede
2 3I b i d .  gljFBB. p .  1*9.
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tli® communes o f  R epola  and F o ra ja rv l ( s e e  map fa c in g  page k?)*  In  
Pets&mo, th e  we s te m  p a rt o f  K a la sta ja sa a ren to  was t o  be a l s o  ced ed . ^  
A ll  F in n ish  c e s s io n s  would have amounted t o  2 ,7 6 1  s q . ]o§* f o r  
w hich th ey  would have r e c e iv e d  5,529  sq* km* of un developed  t e r r i t o r y  
l a  exchange* th e  demand f o r  a  r e c ip r o c a l  a id  t r e a t y  was dropped in  
fa v o r  o f  s tr en g th e n in g  th e  e x i s t e n t  n o n -a g r ess io n  p a c t by in o lu d in g  
a  paragraph whereby n e ith e r  p a r ty  would J o in  any a l l ia n c e  h o s t i l e  
t o  th e  other* F in a l ly ,  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s  on both s id e s  o f  th e  K arelian  
f r o n t ie r  were t o  be d estroyed *  In  retu rn  R u ssia  would n o t have any 
o b je c t io n s  i f  F in lan d  a lo n e  f o r t i f i e d  th e  Aaland I s la n d s .2^
V/hen th e  F in n ish  d e le g a t io n  read th e R ussian  memorandum, 
P a a s ik iv l  sa id  th e  c e s s io n s  would have t o  be approved by th e  
F in n ish  D ie t  and s in c e  the demands w ere o f  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  impor­
ta n c e , they would r eq u ir e  a 5 /6 *  s  m a jo r ity  f o r  approval* S t a l in  
ex p ressed  firm  b e l i e f  th a t  th e  p ro p o sa ls  would g e t  99 p er  c e n t  
su p p o r t .2? H is sta tem en t i s  a good in d ic a t io n  o f  th e  la c k  o f  
un derstan d in g  b y  d ic t a t o r s  o f  how rep u b lica n  forms o f  governm ent 
o p e r a te . P a a s ik iv i  a l s o  asked  how th e  R ussian  demands reco n ­
c i l e d  w ith S t a l i n 9s  famous s lo g a n s *We do n ot want a crumb o f  
fo r e ig n  t e r r i t o r y ,  b u t n e ith e r  do  we want t o  ced e an in ch  o f  
our own t e r r i t o iy  t o  anyone*®2 ® S ta lin * *  r e jo in d e r  was t o  th e  
e f f e c t  th a t  in  F in la n d 's  c a se  i t  would be a m a tter  o f  exchange*2^
2 * I b id . ,  p . 5 0 .  g6 I b id . , pp . 5 0 -5 1 .
g 'K »n nerh el* , op.  c i t .«  pp . 3 1 2 -3 1 3 , and Tanner, op.  c l t . .
P. 30.
g^ u o t« d  In  T a m e r , l o c .  d t .  g% b ld .
.Q?
The F in n ish  d e le g a t io n  ih e n  retu rn ed  to  H e ls in k i t o  c o n fe r  
w ith  th e  government and r e c e iv e  fu r th e r  in s tr u c t io n s*  In  H e ls in k i  
(O ctober 16 ) P a a s ik iv l  rep o rted  to  th e  C o u n cil o f  S ta te  which  
d isc u s se d  th e  R ussian  d cm a id s  in  some d e t a i l*  D iv e r s ity  o f  o p in io n  
was m a n ife s t  on m ost p o in t s ,  but a l l  were agreed  t h a t  Hanko c o u ld  
not be ceded *30 E s p e c ia l ly  regard in g  c e s s io n s  on th e  K arelian  
Isthm us th e r e  was a wide range o f  op in ion s*  M arshall Marmerheim 
urged th e  governm ent t o  compromise by ced in g  th e  c i t y  o f  In o , w hich  
he r e c o g n ise d  a s  havin g as g r e a t  a s t r a t e g ic  v a lu e  to  th e R u ssian s  
a s  Hanko* He th ou gh t th a t  perhaps in  t h i s  way th e  l a t t e r  m ight be 
saved* 31 Among th e  p o l i t i c a l  le a d e r s  th e r e  was an uncom promising 
a t t i t u d e  tow ards c e s s io n s  on th e  Isthm us which was t o  d e c i s i v e ly  
in f lu e n c e  th e  te n o r  o f  l a t e r  I n s tr u c t io n s  is s u e d  to  the n e g o t ia to r s # 32
H
On O ctober 20, P resid en t K yosti K a llio  and F o reign  M in is ter  
Erkko went t o  Stockholm  t o  a tten d  a m eetin g  o f  th e  h e a d s  o f  th e  
fo u r  H orthem  S ta te s*  The F in n ish  d e le g a te s  went w ith  th e  in t e n t io n  
o f  sounding out th e s e  s t a t e s  on t h e ir  a t t i t u d e  tow ards th e  R u sso-  
F in n ish  n e g o t ia t io n s *  Much had been  expe c te d  by F in land from th is  
m eetin g  but such w as n o t to  be the case* From th e  o u t s e t  i t  was 
p la in  th a t  th e s e  s t a t e s  cou ld  not be counted on to a id  F in land  
m i l i t a r i l y  in  th e  e v en t o f  war because o f  t h e ir  f e a r  o f  German 
in te r v e n tio n *  33
3° I b l d . ,  p . 3 1 .
3lM am erheim , op.  c l t . .  pp . 311*-3155 c f .  Niukkanen, op.  c i t . .  
pp* 90-91*
^ T a n n er , l o c * c i t * 33wuorinen, F in lan d  and World War II*  pp* 56-57*
Finland f e l t  t h a t  h e r  p o s i t io n  was s tren g th en ed  by a  
l e t t e r  from  th e  P r e s id e n t  of the U nited  S t a t e s ,  Franklin  B*
R o o sev e lt t o  P resid en t M ikhail I* K a lin in  o f  th e  U .S .S .R * , 
e x p r e s s in g  th e  hope th a t  f r ie n d ly  r e la t io n s  m ight p r e v a i l  between  
F in lan d  and the B*S*S#R* The Seandanavian M in is te r s  t o  Moscow 
had a ls o  endeavored t o  a id  F in lan d  d ip lo m a t ic a lly  by se e k in g  an 
a u d ien ce  w ith  M olotov t o  e x p r e ss  th e  sans sen tim en t a s  th e  
American P resid en t*  They were u n su c c e ss fu l a s  M olotov r e fu se d  
to  s e e  tbem*3U The im portance th e  Kremlin a tta ch ed  t o  R o o s e v e lt 's  
m essage may b e gauged by M o lo to v 's  sp eech  b e fo re  th e  Supreme S o v ie t  
on O ctober 31 lt ien  he a d v ised  th e  American P r e s id e n t t o  concern  
h im s e lf  w ith  th e  P h il ip p in e s  and Cuba r a th e r  t  ban w ith  F in la n d .3 5
On October 21 Erkko drafted new instructions fo r  the Finnish 
delegation calling  for a refusal to cede Hanko and Lappohja Bay*
Only th e  sou th ern  p a r t o f  S u u rsa a r l co u ld  be ced ed , a lth o u g h  i f  
necessary th e  whole o f  the I s la n d  m ight be surrendered  t o  keep  
Hanko out o f  jeop ard y . There was t o  b e  no y ie ld in g  on K a la sta ja sa a ren to  
and no r e c ip r o c a l  a id  t r e a t y  was t o  b e  en tered  in to *  A ccording t o  
th e  in s t r u c t io n s  th re e  a l t e r n a t iv e s  were c i t e d  f o r  a  r e c t i f i c a t i o n  
o f  th e  Isthm us f r o n t ie r !  (1 )  th e  Khokkala bend m if^ t  be s tr a ig h te n e d  
t o  p la c e  th e  f r o n t ie r  abou t 1*5 km* from Leningrad in s te a d  o f  32 km** 
th u s  e l im in a t in g  th e  th r e a t  o f  lo n g  range a r t i l l e r y )  (2) Ino co u ld
3b)fannerhelm, o£. c i t . ,  p* 313*
35James W. Ganterbeln, ed*, Documentary Background of World War 
II* 1931-19bl (hereafter cited  as PRJBJ' "(Mew iork* Columbia University 
W esi; M B t7 pp. 570-581*
be granted as an isolated fortress to ward off seaward danger)
(3) i f  the Soviet Union demanded tha t Ino be attached directly 
to her te rr ito ry , th is  might be accomplished by a connecting 
s tr ip  lying between the line Ino-7anmeljoki-Lintulanin$ki-Jappinen 
and the Gulf of Finland.3&
At the Cabinet meeting held that day the new instructions 
were presented fo r discussion but only on the three Isthmus 
alternatives was there contention. Because of opposition by 
some Cabinet members to  the la s t two alternatives, the instru­
ctions were redrafted to  empower the delegates to  eliminate only 
the Kuokkala bend. Before the Cabinet adjourned Faasikivi 
requested tha t someone in the Cabinet accompsny him to  Moscow, 
or he would not go. He then demanded that Finance Minister Vaino 
Tanner be the o n e * 37
That same day the Finnish delegation set out for Moscow and 
arrived theie on October 23. The f i r s t  round of discussions con­
vened that same evening with Faasikivi reading the Finnish memorandum 
in which Finland declared herself desirous of remaining on friendly 
terns with the U.S.S.R* To th is  end the Finnish government was 
prepared to cede the islands of Seiskari, Feninsaari, Lavansaari, 
and the two Tytarsaari islands, i f  given adequate compensation, and 
willing to discuss amicable arrangements regarding Suurs&ari in
36Tamer, o£. c i t . , p. 3bj cf. Niukkanen, o£. c i t . , p. 90*
37Tanner, op. c i t . ,  p. 3b*
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keeping with the in terests of both na tions* On the Karelian 
Isthmus, the Finns declared themselves prepared to straighten 
1he Khokkala bend by moving the fron tier to  a line running fro® 
Rajajokl, east of Haapala, straight to  the Gulf of Finland a t a
ftpoint east of fCellcmaki church (see map facing page Up )• The 
other Russian proposals were rejected as prejudicial to Finnish 
neu tra lity , except th a t the Finns were read^ to  redraft part of 
the non-agression pact of 1932 so that neither party would aid 
another state th a t attacked one of the contracting powers*3®
Stalin*s response was that the Finns were not conceding 
enough* He emphasised that his former demands were minimal and, 
hence, could not be reduced by bargaining* A long harangue 
followed, diring which he spoke of the war and the possibility  of 
an attack on Leningrad* For th is  reason, he claimed possession of 
Hanko Gape which was absolutely necessary to  the 0.3.S.R*, as were 
the Islands in the Gulf of Finland. He scornfully re a c te d  the 
offer to  efface the Kuokkala bend as to ta lly  insufficient and too 
confined should the Red aimles have to deploy in the area to  meet 
an enemy* In an e ffo r t  to enhance his offer, S talin drew a line 
on a s ta f f  map which would tens inate a t the village of Koivisto* 
Since no authority had been delegated to the Finnish representatives 
on th is matter they declined to discuss it* 3?
Suddenly in the middle of the discussion S talin pointed to 
Porajarvl and Repola and inquired what the Finns thcu$it of tie  
te rrito ry  offered in exchange by the D.S.S.R* The Finnish reply
3?tfiukkanen, og* c l t ** p* 91 j and Tamer og* c l t** pp. l*0*4il*
was that th is  was m m  thing to ha taken up a fte r i t  was seen i f  
agreement could ha reached regarding the reas demanded by Russia* 
When the Finns asked why the demands were made anyway* since the 
fron tier had been established as recently as 1920* i t  became c lea r 
that the Soviet government was thinking of the possibility  of war 
in the v icin ity  of the Gulf of Finland and along the ahorse of 
the Arctic Ocean* In th is connection Stalin f r e q u e n t l y  mentioned 
England and France* but he also alluded to Germany* From th is the 
Finns concluded that i t  was really  Germany th a t he feared*^
After several hours of fru itle ss  discuss!on* during Which 
the Fiims incessantly repeated their position on the basis of the 
Peace of Tartu and the non-agression pact of 1932 and 19A# the 
session was broken off* Before departing the Flims expressed th e ir 
regrets because of the fa ilu re  to  accomplish anything specific and 
then made th e ir  adieus* So mention was made of further meetings 
and Molotov seemed astonished a t the Finnish departure* According 
to  Tanner* Molotov asked* “Is i t  your intention to  provoke a con­
f l i c t  f** Paasikivl retorted, “We want no such thing* but yon seam 
to ."1*1
Back a t the Finnish Legation* the delegates decided that* as 
no further discussions seemed possible* to return to the Helsinki 
the next day* That evening, however* Molotov*s secretary arrived 
a t the Legation to request the Finns appearance for another parley 
that same night* Upon arriving a t  the Kremlin they were once more 
closeted with Molotov and Stalin* who resumed the conference as
^Tanner, op* cit** t>* bis and Wuorinen* Finland and World 
War H . pp. 57-5&T
^Tanner* og« cit** p* 1*2*
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though there had been no interruption#^ j n a written statement, 
Molotov stated that the Soviet Union would be w illing to  reduce 
the force she proposed to  station on Hanko Gape (from 5,000 to 
i*,000) and to reduce the te r r i to r ia l  demands on the Karelian Isthmus# 
He s t i l l ,  however, was adamant in demanding that the Russo-Finnish 
boundary should terminate a t Koivisto. At the same time he accepted 
the Finnish proposal for expansion of the Non-agression Pact#^3
At the conclusion of the conference the Finns informed th e ir 
hosts th a t the y would have to return to  Helsinki to  consult th e ir 
government and Diet# Before departing from Moscow, Tanner and 
Paasikivi decided that a le t te r  should be dispatched to Stockholm 
to  ascertain the Swedish attitude toward Finland in the event of 
war. Tanner undertook to  write the le tte r  to  the Swedish Prime 
Minister, Per Alb in Hansson, in which he inquired of Hansson how 
much material assistance and m ilitary aid Sweden was prepared to  
render Finland i f  negotiations broke down in Moscow# Hansson 
replied on October 27 that Finland diould not count on any d irec t 
Swedish intervention in case of war, although Sweden would be willing 
to continue supplying arms, munitions, and equipment as well as food 
to  Finland# Beyond th is  Sweden was unwilling to  make promises other 
than to give the Finns as fu lly  diplomatic support as possible in 
Moscow# Hansson Indicated that the Swedish attitude derived from 
the fear of German reprisals i f  Sweden violated her neutrality  by
**g Ibid. **3fbb, pp# 5U-56#
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giving Finland m ilitary a id*^
A Finnish Cabinet member, Karl-August Fagerholm, actually 
delivered Tanner1 s le t te r  to Hansson and at the same time discussed 
the Finno-Russian negotiations with the Swedish Cabinet* He fe lt  
that a difference of opinion existed in Sweden on the matter, with 
the left-wind parties supporting the policy of non-intervention and 
the right-wing parties supporting more favorable aid for Finland* 
Opponents of an intervention policy were more determined and 
articulated their views more lucidly than did the proponents of 
intervention* Part of the problem for the supporters of an in ter­
vention policy was th e ir  lack of information concerning the Russian 
demands, which had been kept secret by the Finnish government, and 
the fear of German invasion of Skane i f  Sweden leaped into a con- 
f l i c t  on Finland's behalf
Swedish fears of German reaction were well founded; Germany 
coveted Swedish iron ore and would have been severely affected by 
any interruption in ore shipments occasioned by Swedish action in 
Finland* Germany also feared that in aiding Finland, the Swedes 
migfct make concessions to  France and Great Britain for bases in 
Sweden from which they could control the B a l t i c 6 German views 
regarding Allied bases In the Baltic were possibly ju stified  as 
Hansson expressed to  Fagerholm the view th a t, i f  Norway could
manage to permit tra n s it  of Allied troops across her te rr ito ry  to
ii7Finland, so could Sweden* Such action, in  the German view, would
k k fa m e r , o £ . c i t . ,  pp. U$-1a8* Ibid. t pp# 1*9. 5 0 .
k^DGFP§ S e r ie s  D, Vol* F i l l ,  p . 252* ^ T a n n e r , l o c * c i t *
perm it th e  B r i t i s h  and French a fo o th o ld  in  Sc and ana v ia  t h a t  co u ld  
he used  a g a in s t  Germany*
In  F in la n d , f o r  the f i r s t  tim e th e  D ie t  was inform ed o f  the  
n e g o t ia t io n s  (O ctober 2 8 ) when th e  Speaker Vaino Hakkala, and th e  
chairm en o f  the v a r io u s  D ie t  p a r ty  groups were in v i t e d  t o  m eet in  
a j o in t  s e s s io n  w ith  th e  C ou n cil o f S ta te*  A fte r  bein g  b r ie fe d  
on the n e g o t ia t io n s  in  p r o g r e s s , th e  p a r ty  chairmen w ere r eq u e sted  
t o  c o n su lt  w ith  th e  p o l ic y  com m ittees o f  t h e ir  p a r t ie s  and t o  
reconvene la te r *  On O ctober 29 another s e s s io n  o f  th e  C ou n cil o f  
S ta te  convened at which th e  D ie t  p a r ty  group chairmen approved th e  
conduct o f  th e  n e g o t ia t io n s  t o  d ate  and ex p ressed  s a t i s f a c t io n  w ith  
th e  c o u n te r -p r o p o sa ls  o f  th e  governm ent. A l l  groups were adam antly  
opposed to  the c e s s io n  o f  Hanko Cape and t o  g iv in g  way on th e  
K arelian  Isth m us, bu t th ey  d id  e x p r ess  r e a d in e ss  t o  supp ort some 
compromise a c t io n  t o  p reserv e  peace**4®
In consequence o f th e a ssu red  supp ort in  th e  D ie t ,  a r e p ly  
was d ra fted  fo r  p r e se n ta t io n  t o  th e  K rem lin. F in lan d *s d e s ir e  t o  
p reserv e  h er  n a t io n a l in t e g r i t y  and n e u t r a l i t y  was once more r e i t e r a t e d  
and i t  was sa id  th a t  th e  c e s s io n  o f  Hanko Cape was im p o ssib le*  On 
th e  o th er  hand, F in land  agreed to  cede th e  is la n d s  o f  S e is k a r i ,  
P e n in sa a r i, L avansaari and b oth  T y ta rsa a r i I s la n d s , in  th e  G ulf o f  
F in land * Regarding S u u rsa a r l, F in land th ought th a t  an am icable  
arrangem ent co u ld  be a r r iv e d  a t  th a t  would tak e  in to  account th e  
s e c u r it y  o f  b o th  F inland and th e  c i t y  o f  L eningrad. As fo r  the
K o iv is to -L ip o la  l i n e  on th e  K arelian  Isthm us, t h a t  was c a l l e d  
im p o ssib le  a s  i t  p la ced  th e  S o v ie t  f r o n t ie r  to o  c lo s e  t o  V iip u r i ,  
F in la n d 1s main ex p o rt harbor* As an In d ic a t io n  o f  h er  g o o d w ill ,  
Fin land now o f f e r e d  t o  c e d e , in  re tu rn  fo r  commensurate com pensation  
e lse w h e r e , th e  t e r r i t o r y  south  o f  th e  F a m m eljo k i-L in tu la n jo k i-  
K aukjarvi l i n e ,  c o n s id e r a b ly  more than had been p r e v io u s ly  o ffered *  
In  th e  Petsamo r e g io n  F in land  e x p ressed  h e r  w i l l in g n e s s  t o  cede  
th e  w estern  p a rt o f  K alasta  jasearerrto  up t o  Pummanki F jord  in  
retu rn  fo r  reasonable com pensation , a lth o u g h  th e  on ly  rea so n  c i t e d  
fo r  th e  R ussian  demand had been th a t  th e  l i n e  was In c o n v e n ie n tly  
and a r t i f l c a l l y  drawn**4^  In  th e  in s t r u c t io n s  i t  was s t r e s s e d  th a t  
the area s  t o  be ceded were o f prim ary m il i ta r y  s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  a s  
had been r e p e a te d ly  em phasised by th e  S o v ie t  U nion, w hereas th e  
t e r r i t o r y  o ffe r e d  in  exchange was o f l i t t l e  s t r a t e g i c  im portance*  
M oreover, th e t e r r i t o r y  F in land  was t o  cede was d e n se ly  p op u la ted  
and would n e c e s s i t a t e  e x te n s iv e  f in a n c ia l  com pensation f o r  th e  
l o s s e s  s u ffe r e d  by F in n ish  c i t i z e n s . ^  F in lan d  cou ld  n o t agree  
to  th e  d e m o lit io n  o f  th e  f r o n t ie r  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s  on th e  K arelian  
Isthm us "as th e m easures w hich  th e  F in n ish  Government h as adopted  
on th e  f r o n t ie r  are s o l e l y  due t o  c o n s id e r a t io n s  o f  d e fe n se  and  
s e c u r ity  * * * * But she i s  a l s o  o b lig e d  to  p rov id e  fo r  th e  s a fe ty  
o f her f r o n t ie r s  by th e  s t r i c t  n e u t r a l i t y  on which th e  p o l ic y  o f  
h er Government i s  based*
**9rBB, pp . 61-63. S° I b ld . . p . 6U.
51Xbld. .  p . 6 5 .
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O ctober 31 , th e  day th a t  th e  F in n ish  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  departed  
on t h e i r  return  journey t o  Moscow, M olotov, i n  a g r o ss  breach o f  th e  
s e c r e c y  which u n t i l  th a t  tim e had been observed by b oth  s i d e s ,  
d e liv e r e d  a speech  t o  th e  Supreme C ou n cil o f th e  S o v ie t  Union  
ex p o sin g  a l l  th e  d e t a i l s  o f  th e  n e g o t ia t io n s .  In th e  co u rse  o f  
h i s  speech  M olotov em phasized th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  o b ta in in g  m il ita r y  
s e c u r ity  fo r  th e  S o v ie t  Union and e s p e c ia l ly  fo r  th e c i t y  o f  
Leningrad* He d e c la re d  th a t  th e  S o v ie t  Union had a r ig h t  to  make 
th e  demands of th e  Firms fo r  h e r  own s e c u r i t y  and th a t  ths S o v ie t  
Government "was e s p e c ia l ly  in t e r e s t e d  i n  th e G ulf o f F in la n d , th a t  
approach t o  Leningrad from th e  s e a ,  a s  w e l l  a s  in  the f r o n t ie r ,  
which was a t  a d is ta n c e  o f  on ly  32 km.  from L en in grad .® ^  In t h i s  
co n n ec tio n  he a l s o  m entioned th a t  th e  p o p u la tio n  o f  Leningrad alm ost 
e q u a lle d  t h a t  o f F in la n d , i . e .  about 3 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0  t o  F in la n d 's  3 ,6 5 0 ,0 0 0 .  
In  h is  o p in io n  th e  properulo  by ths S o v ie t  Union were m odest and 
co n fin ed  t o  th e  minimum fo r  R u s s ia 's  s e c u r i t y .  A fte r  d e s c r ib in g  
th e  S o v ie t  demands in  d e t a i l ,  M olotov d ec la red  t h a t  an attem pt t o  
p reven t th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  the proposed t r e a t y  would be harm ful t o  
F in la n d . He th e r e fo r e  ex p ressed  th e  hope th a t  no th ir d  p a r t ie s ,  
e . g .  B r i t a in ,  France or th e  U nited  S t a t e s ,  would p ressu re  F in lan d  
to  r e fu s e  th e  S o v ie t  p ro p o sa la .^ 3  He c r i t i c i z e d  P r e s id en t R o o sev e lt  
fo r  h i s  sta tem en t i n  F in la n d 's  b e h a lf  and, in  an endeavor t o  prove  
how m u n ific e n t was th e  R u ssian  a t t i t u d e  to  F in la n d , sa id s
52DBWW. p . 5 7 8 . 5 3 lb i d . .  PP‘ 5 7 8 -5 7 9 .
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Of i t s  own f r e e  w i l l  th e  S o v ie t  Union in su red  th e  sep a ra ted  
and independent ea& s te n c e  o f F in la n d . There can be no doubt 
t h a t  o n ly  th e  S o v ie t  Government,  which r e c o g n iz e s  th e  p r in c ip le  
o f  th e  fr e e  developm ent o f  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  cou ld  make such a step *
I t  must be s a id  th a t  none b u t th e  S o v ie t  Government cou ld  t o l e r ­
a te  th e  e x is t e n c e  o f  an independent F in lan d  a t  th e  very  g a te s  
o f  L eningrad.5u
C onstem at io n  p r e v a ile d  in  H e ls in k i a t  t h i s  breach o f  s e c r e c y ,  
e s p e c ia l ly  s in c e  th e  F in n ish  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  had j u s t  s e t  out fo r  
Moscow. In  a te leg ra m  d e liv e r e d  t o  th e  n e g o t ia t o r s  a t  V iip u r i ,
Erkko urged them t o  r e tu r n  t o  th e  c a p i t a l  fo r  new in s t r u c t io n s .
By th e  tim e th e  w ire was d e l iv e r e d , however, i t  was o b s o le te  and 
new in s tr u c t io n s  were is s u e d  by te le p h o n e . Over th e  phone Erkko 
e x p la in e d  th a t  th e C abinet had d ec id ed  t o  le a v e  up t o  Tanner and 
P a a s lk iv i  th e d e c is io n  a s  t o  w hether the t r i p  should b e  co n tin u ed  
or n o t .  At R a ja jo k i another phone c a l l  w&s aaade i n  w hich Tanner 
and P a a s ik iv i  inform ed th e  governm ent o f  t h e ir  in t e n t io n  t o  go
They d ec id ed  t o  co n tin u e  becau se  th e y  f e l t  th a t  "the purpose  
o f  th e speech was . . .  t o  make o f  th e  demands a f a i t  accom pli 
which we co u ld  no lo n g er  a v o id .*56 A nother c o n s id e r a t io n  was 
F in n ish  p u b lic  o p in io n  and world o p in io n ; not t o  have done so m ight 
have b een  taken a s  v a s c i l l a t i o n  a t  b e s t  and r e t r e a t  a t  worst*^?
That same d ay  th e  F in n is h  Foreign  M in istry  is s u e d  a communique 
r e f e r r in g  t o  th e  sp eech . I t  s t a t e d  th a t  th e  p u b lic a t io n  o f  th e  v iew s  
o f  the S o v ie t  Union a t  th a t  moment had c re a te d  a new s i t u a t io n  and 
jeo p a rd ized  the c o n t in u a t io n  off th e  c o n v e r s a t io n s . F in la n d , on h er  
p a r t , had " in  an independent and u n b iased  maimer, n o t being s u b je c t
^ I b i d . ,  p . 5 7 8 . ^ T a n n er , op. c i t . .  pp. 5 8 -6 0 .
56Ib ld ., p. 59. 57Ibid.
t o  th e  In flu e n c e  o f  any f o r e ig n  power, endeavored t o  f in d  a s o lu t io n  
to  the q u e s t io n s  subm itted  to  h e r , however d i f f i c u l t  th e y  m i# it  b e ,  
fo r  th e  sak e o f  the n e u tr a l p o l i c y  sh e  had adopted.**^ In  t h i s  manner 
F in lan d  sought t o  a ssu age  S o v ie t  f e a r s  o f  a tta c k  fro® the w est  
th ro u # i F in lan d  and t o  prove h er  w i l l in g n e s s  t o  a r r iv e  a t  a reason ­
a b le  arrangem ent th a t  took  in t o  c o n s id e r a t io n  th e  s e c u r ity  o f  both  
n a t io n s .
Wien th e  F in n ish  p arty  a r r iv e d  in  Moscow (Movamber 2 )  i t  was 
met by th e  Swedish M in is te r , O tto W* M inth er, who t o ld  th e  d e le g a te e  
th a t  he was tr y in g  t o  s e e  M olotov t o  p resen t Sweden1® demarche in  
Finland1® case*  U lt im a te ly  th e  demarche was never  p resen ted  a s  M inther
was not rece iv ed  a t  th e  Foreign Com m issariat. He a lso  inform ed th e  
Firm s t h a t  American M in iste r Laurence Stalnhardt had expressed  th e  
o p in ion  t h a t  th e  F inn ish  b u s in e s s  would and in  an accep tab le  agreement
At the Finnish Legation a wire from Erkko awaited th e  d e leg a te® • 
I t  stated*
Molotov’s speech i s  regarded here as a ta c tica l oaneurver to  
frighten us. The same ta c tic s  were used successfully against 
E sto n ia . We are calm. The Russians must be shown a f ir ®  front. , 
They a r e  shaken to a degree by the impression made by t h e  sp eech .
That ev en in g  th e  E ston ian  M in is ter  t o  Moscow, A. R e i, c a l le d  on 
Tanner. T heir  t a lk  was o f  a g en era l n atu re a t  f i r s t  b u t f i n a l l y  R ei 
s ta te d  b lu n t ly  th a t  S o v ie t-E a to n la n  t r e a t i e s  were d isa d v a n ta g eo u s  t o  
h is  s t a t e .  Even th e  tra d e  agreement® were not o p e r a tin g  p ro p er ly —  
S o v ie t  good® were p r iced  to o  h l$ i  mid p r ic e s  p a id  to  E ston ia  were to o  
lo w . M oreover, the S o v ie t s  had n o t r e fr a in e d  fro® tr y in g  t o  in f lu e n c e
pp. 60- 6 1 . ^ T a n n e r , op . c i t . .  p . 62. 
quoted in  Tanner l o c .  c i t .
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61Estonian domestic a ffa ir s . It i s  possible to infer from th is  that 
the Finns were led to believe that i f  they ultimately submitted to  
the Russian demands, they would suffer the same interference that 
Estonia did.
The f ir s t  round of the new conversations began the next evening
(November 3) with Stalin  absent and Molotov and Potemkin present.
Paasikivi read the Finnish memorandum but i t  made l i t t l e  impression
on the Russians. From the views exchanged, i t  was obvious that the
Russians were thinking along the same general lin es as in the earlier
sessions. Tanner sta tes, "It was plainly evident that the in telligence
with power to decide was absent from the group and that i t  was for
th is reason we were bogged down.**^
Molotov f in a lly  f la t ly  described the Finnish proposals as
unsatisfactory and repeated that the Soviet demands were minimal.
For their part, the Finnish representatives declared that they had
gone to  the maximum lim it that Finland*s security would permit. As
the session was breaking up Molotov said, 11 We c iv ilia n s  can see no
further in the matter; now i t  i s  the turn of the military to have 
63their say." J I t  i s  possible that he meant the m ilitary was about 
to present i t s  case but i t  is  more lik e ly  that he meant the events 
that were to come in December.
Negotiations resumed the next day with Stalin  present, who 
stated that i t  was now time to  discuss d eta ils . Though Russia tolerated  
an independent Finland, s t i l l  certain guarantees were required for 
Soviet security. Therefore, Hanko and Lappohja were required and
6 l Ib ld ., p. 65. 62Ib id .. p. 6 6 . 63Ibid.
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Finland could put their  cession in any juridical terns she chose— 
lease, sa le , or exchange. Finnish rejection of th is proposal was 
countered by a proposal that the islands of Hermans5* KoB, and HIstB- 
BusB just west of Hanko Cape be ceded instead of the Cape i t s e l f .
As no instructions had been issued on th is  point, the Finns declined
/I
to discuss i t .  u
On the other demands the discussion followed the sen© cycle, 
without defin ite resu lt. It should be noted, however, that the tone 
of the conversations was reported as friendly enough. A speech made 
by Foreign Minister Erkko (November) was brought up by the Russians 
who desired to attack i t s  content. In his speech Erkko had said that 
the Finnish Government was backed by a united nation and that Molotov* s 
speech gave a one sided view o f  the negotiations. He added that Finland 
would continue to  take her stand on the principle of neutrality and the 
right of self-defense. Finland would also carry on negotiations on 
the basis of trea ties  s t i l l  in  e ffec t between the two s ta te s .^  In 
their discussion of the speech, Stalin and Molotov stated that the 
text as published in Finland was purged of i t s  worst parts. They 
claimed that they had both the unexpurgated and purged texts when
the Finns expressed displeasure with the distortions that appeared
66in the Soviet press.
I t  was at th is  juncture that the second session ended with 
the Finnish representatives promising to  contact Helsinki on the
A)
Tanner, op. c i t . , pp. 675 and Wuorinen, Finland and World 
War II , p. 59.
6%BB, p. 17. b a n n e r , op. c i t . , p. 6 8 .
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Hanko islands proposal• The next day Tanner telephoned Erkko, who 
informed him that the Governor of Vlipuri province was in Helsinki 
to furnish information necessary to  calculate the value of the property 
in that part of the Karelian Isthmus which the Russians wished Finland 
to cede. The Soviet Union had promised to pay, above and beyond the 
terr ito r ia l compensation, such surns.^ That the Finnish government 
was already preparing for cession of Isthmusian territory indicates 
that Finland believed that a peaceful settlement of the matter was 
s t i l l  possible.
New instructions arrived from Helsinki on November 8 forbidding 
any discussion of exchange, lease, or purchase of Hanko Cape. The 
same d irectives applied to the islands west of the Cape, and even 
the mention of Jussarb was unconditionally forbidden. On the Karelian 
Isthmus, the cession of Ino was not to  be discussed as i t  was believed 
an extensive hinterland would be required a lso . This was tempered, 
however, by the p o ssib ility  of discussion i f  the Russians abandoned 
their demands for Koivlsto and Hanko Cape. In the Petsamo region 
the Finnish government would agree to only the northern part of 
Kalastajasaarento being ceded.
Both Paasikkvi and Tanner were deeply disappointed with the 
new d irectives as they le f t  no ground for discussion, ^anner wired 
Helsinki for permission to break off negotiations i f  the Kremlin refused 
to accept the la te s t  concessions. Erkko wired back that they were 
free to  do so since Finland had agreed to cede the maximum that her 
security and independence would allow. Paasiklvi was especially
PP* 68-69. ^Tanner, op. c i t . ,  p. 73
1,02
averse to the new instructions «nd said, ®*^ ow I f  ever would toe the
time to fi^ht. But since you of the artsy (tu rn ip  to  Pa&aonen)
can do nothing, i t  is  necessary to ©void war md back up* Iona of
69the army people but Kannerbeim understand anything*” 7 Paasiktwi 
had reference to  Kamerhei®1© ©dirice at an earlier  stag# to neke the 
concessions required in order to avoid war since the m ilitary was not 
prepared to wage a fu l l  scale war*
fanner ale© expressed severe chagrin at the ten o r  of the new 
instructions which had been approved by the Cabinet and Piet party 
groups* Especially was he unhappy over a statement by Hauno Pekkala, 
Chairman of the Social Democratic group (Tanner*s party), who had 
declared that the party approved the instructions 'but desired that 
the negotiators be directed to  manage th e  conversations in such a 
way as to avoid war* In fanner’s words, "This was truly a comfortable 
fashion of conducting b u s in e s s !  issue s tr ic t  Instructions tr m  which 
there was to be no divergence, but s t i l l  t e l l  your men to avoid a 
con flict*w?®
In lig h t of Helsinki’s instructions, the delegates decided 
immediately that they should refuse any demands for bases at tha western 
end of the Gulf of Finland* I f  that caused a break-down of negotiations, 
than they would return to Helsinkij i f  not then they could go on talking  
about territory on the fCareltan Isthmus and Suursaari* On the basis 
of compensation figure® received from the government in Helsinki, 
they drafted a memorandum concerning property to be ceded on the Isthmus 
and calculated tha sum required in compensation for property losses
69Ibid. 70lb ld .. p . 71.
in the areas* The sum required totalled  about 800 m illion Finnmarks.
Armed with the la te s t  d irectives, the Finns returned to the 
Kremlin on November 9 for another parley* When the Finnish refusal 
to cede the islands near Hanko Cap© was read, the Russians showed 
great surprise. They apparently had expected the Finns to accept 
th is proposal* When nothing more was said about Hanko, the Finns 
pointed to Suursaari on a map and proposed ceding the southern 
portion of the island* Stalin said that two masters on the island  
would never d o .^  I t  is  d iff ic u lt  to understand Stalin*s position  
on Suursaari, for even had Finland retained possession of the northern 
half, the Soviet Union, with i t s  m ilitary establishments there, would 
have been able to defend i t s e l f  from attack*
Stalin then pointed to the narrows opposite SeivastB and declared 
that the aperture necessitated a fortress on both shores (Finland and 
Estonia) or i t  would remain unclosed* The islands Finland proposed to  
cede, he said, were so tiny as to be impractical for the purpose*
He next slewed on the Ino question and observed that for defense 
purposes 20 km. of hinterland would be required, thus bearing out Erkko*s 
prediction* Pointing to the map, Tanner again stressed the southern 
half of Suursaari as the reasonable lim it of Finnish concessions on 
that Island. I f , however, the Soviet government would abandon i t s  
claims on Hanko Cape and other western bases, the Finnish government 
wo’ild undertake to sa tisfy  the Soviet demands in the ©astern part 
of the Gulf of Finland and on the Karelian Isthmus* 3^
71I b id . ,  pp. 7U -75.
7 Tanner, op. c i t . ,  p. 75} and W uorinen, F in lan d  and World War IX,
p . 60*
^Tanner, loc* cit*
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Refusing compromise, the Russians stoutly maintained their  
original demands, thus creating an impasse. The Finnish delegation 
was not, In any case, empowered to meet the Soviet demands. After 
an hour of fru itle ss  discussion, Tanner secured S ta lin ’s agreement 
to adjourn. The termination of the conversation recorded no satisfactory
agreement.*^
A dispatch cabled to Helsinki from the Finnish Legation surmised
the complete break-down of negotiations. It advised, however, that
a l l  public announcements be withheld pending further developments,
Stalin , i t  was reported, seemed to  be earnestly seeking an agreement 
This p o ssib ility  was dispelled at about 12i30 a.m. of the following 
day (November 1 0 ) with the appearance at the Legation of Molotov’s 
secretary bearing a le tte r  referring to the Finnish aide-memoire 
of November 9. As the memoire had contained the sentence, wFinland 
cannot grant to  a foreign Power m ilitary bases on her own territory  
and within the confines of her fro n tiers ,* the Finns were accused 
of misrepresenting the Soviet position . Molotov asserted that
" if • . • a piece of territory situated in the v ic in ity  of
the port of Hanko [or nearby islands] should be sold to the
U.S.S.R., • , • fit} would mean that the objection that such a 
piece of land formed part of the territory of Finland would 
cease to apply, since, after being sold to the U.S.S.R., i t  
would, ipso facto , become Soviet territory."
In view of th is  claimed "misrepresentation11 the aide-memoire was 
returned.
That same day a le tter  in reply to Molotov’s was drafted which
7l*Ib ld ., p. 76. 7^1 bid., p> 77- 76FBBi p< 6?>
reviewed the la st phase of the negotiations and asserted that the
Finnish negotiators had not misrepresented the Soviet proposals*
I t  was also made clear that, even I f  the terr ito r ies  demanded wears
ceded in toto* they would s t i l l  rmmin within Finnish boundariee*
Finnish reasons for not assenting to the Soviet demands were reiterated
as was their declared w illingness to sa tisfy  the Soviet Union elsewhere*
In conclusion the sincere desire of the Finnish government to  conclude
an agreement on the basis of the concessions proposed by Finland and
77the demands of the N.S.S.H* were emphasised*
Mo reply was received to the Finnish le tte r  but the Soviet 
press launched an attack of invective on Finland, accusing her of 
being the ploy of warmongers* the concluding paragraph of an ed itoria l 
in Krasnyl F lot, a Moscow mid-day paper, i s  a good example of the type 
of propaganda employed?
Provocateurs, warmongers, and their henchmen ©re trying to  
represent the Soviet proposals as a threat not only to the independence 
of Finland but also to the security of Scandanavia, particularly  
Sweden* the Soviet people repudiates with loathing these filth y  
Insults of the International p o lit ic a l sharpers* We know that our 
government1s sole motive is  and has ever been a concern to  restr ic t  
the war rone and to underwrite the l i f e  and peaceful work of the 
states which are neighbors of the Soviet peoples* Unshakably 
fa ith fu l to the principles of i t s  pacific policy, the Soviet 
government w ill find ways and means to  guarantee the security of 
the extreme north western land and sea frontiers of our fatherland*
Taking th is  as a cue, the Finnish delegates sent a le tter  to  
Molotov (November 13) thanking him for the friendliness shown them during
77 aIb id ., pp* 66-69*  ^ Quot @c3 ±n Tanner, op* c it* , p. 79.
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their  stay and expressing regret that the negotiations had proven 
unfruitfu l. They continued by expressing the hope that at some la ter  
date, and under more auspicious circumstances, the negotiations might 
be resumed. With that the Finnish delegation departed for h o m e ,
It i s  obvious from the instructions that were f ir s t  issued to  
Paasikivi on October 9 that Finland assumed a negative attitude toward 
Russian demand before they were even c la r ified . Such an attitude did 
not derive from stubbornness or lack of realism but rather from a 
deep and sincere desire on the part of Finland to remain apart from 
any co n flic t and to maintain her national in tegrity  and terr ito r ia l  
in v io la b ility  •
I t  is  deceptively simple in the ligh t of subsequent events to  
say that the Finnish government should have made concessions at the 
time and, thus avoided the war and the terr ito r ia l amputations 
consequent on i t .  However, the general context of European power 
p o lit ic s  le f t  the Finns l i t t l e  reason to hope that prompt concessions 
would not be met with further demands. To the exploitation of the 
Baltic States might be added the unencouraging spectacle of the 
dismembered Czechoslovakian Republic, the victim of Russia's 
Molotov-Ribbentrop partner. Weighing these fa cts , detachment might 
yet favor a policy of settlement. In the fin a l decision of the Finns, 
however, experience might be said to have cast the deciding vote.
I t  hardly strains the facts to note the sim ilarity of Stalin in 1939 
to Alexander I in 1808, Finland's dilemma is  the perennial one of 
small sta tes . Confronted by a Great Power that takes opportunity 
rather than responsib ility  for i t s  rationale, i t  must look to history
7 9 I b i d . ,  p .  8 0 .
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for ju stice , The plight o f Melos in the path of an expanding Athenian
Empire, finds i t s  just expression in the tim eless account of Thucydides?
I f  we y ield  now, a l l  i s  orerj but i f  we figh t, there is  yet 
hope that we may stand upright. • . I t  may be your interest to  
be our master, but how can i t  be ours to  be your slaves?^
Thucydides, The Pelopermesian War, tran. Benjamin Jowett, 
in C. A. Robinson, J r ., ed ., Selections from Greek and Roman 
Historians (Mew York: Rinehart and <3o•, Tnc•, I 9?9J, pp. I6l ,  103.
CHAPTER ?
LAST DAYS OF PEACE AMD UHDECIAEVD WAR
During the la s t  week® of Movenber matters on Finland’s part 
regained stable and quiet. Tbs populace of the capital was happy to  
■think that a bad phase had passed and that the situation  would tend 
to be easier , M ot so in the Soviet Union, however, for throughout 
the remainder of flovember, the Russian pres® continued to rain invective  
on Finland and Soviet planes repeatedly violated Finnish a ir  space,*
Events rapidly reached a climax cm flovember 26 with the fa te fu l 
"M alnlla  Incident,* 1»®. the Soviet allegation that Red troops in  th a  
v ic in ity  of the v illa g e  of MainlXa on the Karelian Isthmus were fired  
upon by Finnish a r t ille r y . Allegedly a ncm-commtssioned o f f i c e r  and 
three sold iers were k illed  and nine others wounded, 2 T h e r e a fte r , events 
followed on® another in  rapid succession. The Soviets demanded that 
Finnish border troops be moved 'back a distance of 20-25 km, from the 
frontier. The F in n ish  government refused to do th is  and denied that 
F in n ish  a r t i l l e r y  had. fired  the shot® on Mainila, I t  was suggested 
that perhaps the Soviet troops while practice f ir in g , had accidently  
fired  on the v illage  since three F in n ish  border guard® had reported 
that the shots came from south of F ain ila ,3
3&annerheljR, op. c i t , ,  pp. 31*-3l9f and Kiukkanen, op, c i t , ,  p, 112 , 
According to Fanmrheim, " Soviet planes had violated Finnish a ir space 
frequently since October 9*
F^RB, pp. 70-71. For the m ilitary’s view on the matter, c f . Fanner- 
helm, c i t , ,  pp. 319 and Hiukkanen, o£^ c lt» , pp. 112- 113 .
3Ib id ., p. 7 2 .
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l i t .
All attempt® to maintain peace fa iled  and on November 30, 
tha Soviet Union without wanting or the issuance of a formal 
declaration of war eoomsneed regular m ilitary operations- on land,
Hod a ir  attack was directed at industrial centers and c i t ie s ,  
especia lly  Helsinki* On Soviet news reports i t  was claimed that 
Finnish accounts of bombs being dropped cm c iv ilia n  centers were 
fabrications® The Had Air Force had merely dropped bread o n  the 
starving masses of Helsinki 1 Hence the term “Folotev's bread-baskets.*13 
At th is  point the fu l l  import of Kolotov*© statement that i t  was up 
to the military to have i t s  say was brought forcefu lly  home®
Thus begin Finland9s ordeal by combat as the David of the North 
met the Goliath of the East in battle® Tim Finns could not turn to  
Germany for succor and support as the MolotoiMlibbsntrop Fact between 
the Heich szsd the O.S.S.E* prevented such aid on tha part o f Germany* 
Hence, other aid was sought f ram the ttost, l*e# Scandanavia, France 
and Britain* In the meantime the Helsinki government turned to the 
task of conducting the war and endeavored to find a means of restoring  
peace*
Immediately on the outbreak of h o s t i l it ie s  i t  was decided that 
the Helsinki government should be reconstituted for successful conduct 
the war and, i f  possible to continue negotiations with the Kremlin*
The decision was based in part cm the feeling  in Helsinki that the
sea, and in the air along the whole Finno-Sovtet border.^  The
x*Fartnerheim, op* c it* ,  pp. 320*321s and 
HedfogelostaJana T u liffe jo llla  (Provoo, Finland! 
Sdderstrdm dsaksyhli87" IvliO'V, pp. 30-31*
j } Fekka T iilikainen,
Vferner
^^uorinen, Finland and World War II , p. 6 3 .
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K rem lin tfou ld  n o t b® lik e ly  to pursue negotiation® with the govern­
ment that had spurned i t s  demands® From the outset of the war the 
continual policy of the Finnish government was to restore the p ease  
by one means or another* Thus in  keeping with i t s  decision to  
resign , th e  ex isten t government headed by Cajander tendered it®  
resignation to President K a llio  on Hevenber 30® The next day R isto  
^yti agreed to head the new government a® Prime M inister w ith  Tftind 
Tanner assuming th e o ffic e  of Foreign M inister and Juho Ka F eesik iv i 
as m inister without p o r tfo lio .^
As soon as word ©f the Russian attack was reported to the outside 
world, Sweden and the U*S* offered to act a® mediators*35 3©th these 
offers were g r a te fu lly  accepted fey F in la n d  but the Soviet Union r e fu se d  
to accept them* tihen these e ffo rts  proved of no a v a il, the mm 
Finnish government turned to the league of Nations for aid (December 3) 
in  se ttlin g  the con flict*  Russia refused to attend th e  sessions 
dealing with th e matter. Molotov, in h is reply to the in vitation  
from the committee appointed by the league of Motions to investigate  
the Ruase-Pinnlsh c o n flic t, inform ed the © ow lttee th a t*
The U.S.5.R. i s  not at war with Finland and does not 
threaten the Finnish nation with war • • * The Soviet Union 
maintains peaceful rela tion s with the Democratic Republic of 
Finland, whose Government signed with the U.3.S.R* on December 2 
Pact [s lc j o f Mutual Assistance and friendship* This Pact 
se tt le s  f ill questions which the Soviet Government had fr u itle ss ly  
discussed with delegates former CsicJ Finnish Government now 
divested of i t s  power.3?
^Tanner, op. cit** pp. 97-98. ^ Ih id ** pp. 100-101* 
l6 £BB, p . 2 1 . 1 7 ib id ..  p . 9 5 .
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cu rta iling  export o f essen tia l raw m aterials and indu strial products 
to the Soviet Union* This seriously haispered the U*S.$*R*'s a b ility  to
P i
wag® e ffec tiv e  war* Of ©or© immediate importance to  Finland, how*
ever, was m  American loan of th irty  m illio n  dollars to be used for
22c iv ilia n  purchases*
On th e other hand, 0@rmmy9 one© a good friend of F in la n d 's , 
mwsmd a coldly cynical attitude towards her, and stated  in  e ffe c t  
th a t the Finns had brought on th e  war by not concluding a treaty o f 
non-aggression with Germany when i t  was offered* In response to  
a Finnish appeal for German support in Hoscow to end the c o n flic t, 
the W ilhelm s h ra sse  replied  that i t  could do nothing in  tteseo w * ^  
Further indications of Germany's attitude was manifested la ter  in  
December when the letch  r e fu se d  to permit tra n s it of a rts  and troop® 
to  Finland across Germany territory  and prohibited German fir~® from 
se llin g  arms to F in la n d * ^  In fa ct a shipm ent of Ita lian  airplanes, 
w hich had crossed th e  whole o f Germany and w ere ready for shipment to' 
Finland from a north Gorman port were ordered shipped back to Italy*
During th e  period German p-":" - and radio reports expressed no sympathy
for Finland, and the ' >r.h government warned Sweden on at l e a s t  three 
occasions to rem ain neutral in the Finnish co n flic t or risk  war with 
Ckmnsny* *5
2*Ibid* 2%uorinen, Finland and World War II* p« 68*
23IMZ» ^ i e s  D, Vol. VIII, p. h79.
^Tanner, op* cit* * pp. 13.7-118*
^Swuorinen, Finland and World War I I ,  p. 69*
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T hus, fo r  a l l  p r a c t ic a l p u rp o ses, F in la n d  s to o d  a lo n e  a g a in s t  
h er g ia n t  a d versary  and c o u ld  e n te r ta in  l i t t l e  hope o f  u lt im a te  
v ic to r y , th e  F in n ish  governm ent r e a lis e d  th a t  th e  o n ly  r e a l i s t i c  
co u rse  open to  them was to  make p eace  a t  th e  e a r l i e s t  p o s s ib le  
moment. T h is was an im p ortan t rea so n  fo r  th e  change in  governm ent 
In  o rd er  th a t o b je c tio n s  from  R u ssia  abou t th e  co m p o sitio n  o f  th e  
governm ent, w ould be le s s e n e d  when, and i f ,  p eace n e g o t ia t io n s  
sh o u ld  b e g in .
CHAPTER V I
THE TORTUOUS ROAD TO PEACE
Every e ffo rt was made by the Finns to  defend th e ir  independence 
during tha Winter War, although in  the opinion of Mannerheiat, the 
n a tio n s m ilitary preparedness was seriously  deficient* In h is  
Memoirs he quotes the follow ing s ta t is t ic s  to show the inadequacy of 
Finnish war m aterials t
Cartridges for r i f le s ,  quick f ir e  guns and
machine guns • • • • • • • • * • •  ................. • • •  2 months
81-MM. grenade p ro jectiles • • • • * • * • • • • • •  22 days
77-mm. sh e lls  for f ie ld  guns    21 0
122-mm* sh e lls  for f ie ld  h o w itzers.........................  2k "
Shells for heavy a r t i l l e r s .........................* • * • • •  19 n
Fuel and lubricating o il  • .  * . • • • • • • • « « •  2 months
Aviation fu e ls • • • •  .......................................   1 raonth^
The Marshal further points out that the ra tio  of Russian to  
Finnish d ivisions was nine to  seven and that the Hussion advantage in  
a r tille r y  was a nlopsided1* two regiments to  one* In addition, the 
Red d ivisions each contained an anti-tank section  and armored battalion  
with from i*0 to 50 tanks, and an a n ti-a ircra ft company, while the Finnish 
units had no such corresponding complements* Regarding automatic weapons 
and grenade throwers, Kannerheia sta tes that., on the average, the Soviet 
divisions were twice as strong as those of the Finns. Furthermore, the 
Red a r tille r y  strength, per d iv isio n , was three times as great as that of 
the Finnish divisions* Despite these d ifferen ces, the U.S.S.R. was able 
to  place 26-28 d ivisions in  the f ie ld  against nine for the Finns
%annarheim, j £ . c i t . .  p . 3& .
2Xbid., pp. 321*-325, 330.
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Hoi mil m s to  Finland’s disadvantage# homv®rg for fro© 
childhood every f&m m s  trained to  co-operate with nature* Thi© now 
stood Urns 4a good stead# and ms the Furnish sns&m were 
In white to  blond with t"c snow and placed on ski©# they had the advan­
tage o f superior m obility and bettor scm ceatant in  winter warfare# To 
these advantage*© was added the tn ia ln g  the troop© had received in  the 
fron tier mem© during October and Hpnrafcer* Buries those week© the 
troop© had been thoroughly fam iliarised  with the terrain  and country** 
sid e over which they were to  fight* f ie ld  fo r tifica tio n s had continued 
to  be erected and win© f ie ld s  laid* Moreover, the short winter day© 
handicapped the adversary* s  superior a ir  power *3 These preparations 
.proved th e ir  worth in  nesting the in it ia l  onslaught of the Soviet am ies*  
During December acid January th e  F in n ish  arm ies perform ed th e  
im possible — they wMMged to  h alt the Had advance and destroy large 
cuMbers of troops* Thus the front w  sta b ilised  and the Finnish govern* 
m n t m s  ambled to  se e k  peace on reasonable te n se *  l a  early  me Deeetaber 
& w tliitud# o f offers to  mediate the co n flic t m m  received in  Helsinki* 
Frota Denmark smm mn o ffer  to  r e q u e st Cksrwray to  p r e a c h  the Soviet 
Union on the m iter*  At the m m  t ism Sweden again offered it© good 
o ffic e s  for  the asm  purpose# foreign  M inister Halvdan ICoht o f norway# 
in  a  personal not© to  Tenner# suggested that t* »  Finn© surrender Kanko 
Gape in  return for neutrmlimatlou of the O u lf of F in lan d * In the e v e n t
3Xbid„ p. 323, 326.
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that th is  p ro p o sa l mot H elsinki's ap p roval*  tm m& prepared to  males m 
demarche i n  Mqsoos«U
Vague reports s o r e  a ls o  reoo iw sd  from  Estonia th a t  the S o v ie t  
U nion r e a lis e d  i t  had un dertaken  a  m isadventure* I t  nos rumored th a t  
th a t th e  Soviet government ex p ressed  the hops th a t  n e g o t ia t io n s  m igh t 
be resum ed I f  F in la n d  agreed  t o  com ply w ith  c e r ta in  c o n d it io n s ^  L a ter  
c ls r ifL o a t io n  o f  th is  p ro p o sa l s ta te d  th a t  A nts F lip #  th e  E to n ia n  
F o reig n  M in ister*  had l^ a rd  from  the G rem lin th a t  F in la n d  co u ld  pur«  
ch a se  peace by ced in g  Hanko and forcing fa n n e r  to resig n * ^  *Xt was 
decided to  answer t h i s  announcem ent by  sa y in g  th a t  Hank© could n o t  
be ced ed  under any circumstances and th a t  i t  d id  not behoove the S o v ie t  
U n i o n  t o  dictate how th e  Finnish government was to  t m  composed***?
After 3B2Ch debate in  the Foreign A ffairs Committee of th e  Cabinet# 
i t  wm f in a lly  decided that Germany provided the best hope for successfu l 
radiation* Therefore# Germany sms to  be approached f ir s t  on the m atte r 
and# i f  tfsis fa iled# a nunter of other sta tes might be asked to  intervene 
on Finland's behalf* W arding the la tte r  decision# i t  was considered 
best to  approach the United States as a d isin terested  mediator* Prime 
M inister ftytl and foreign M inister fanner brought the matter up in  a 
casual discussion with U« F* Arthur Sehoenfeld* the American M inister 
to  fihland# in  DeoeT&er* the la tte r  e lic ite d  in terest In the project but
Mannar, d U . pp. 115-116. 
5jbM „ p. 116. 
^Xbid. 7Ibld.
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expressed doubt if  the moment mm propitious* On January 9 tin®
Foreign JUT fairs Committee of the Cabinet decided to  request the
United States* In conjunction with Italy* to approach tbs Soviet Union
with a view of offering to  mediate and bring an end to tlsa hostilities*
I t  was further suggested that the United States ask Italy  to  ®im£L*
taneoosly urge both Genaaiy and Sweden to avouch Finland and the
Soviet Haim with ths mam  purpose* fh m  by a Joint representation
on the behalf of Finland* i t  was fe lt that a Just settlement might
bo reached* Bespits tnc in terest aroused* nothing over earn© of bh®
idea md i t  ultimately m s dropped •&
In keeping with their intention of first addressing m  appeal
to Germany* the Finns on Beeeriber IS sent Professor T* II* Eiyiaaki to
Berlin to loam i f  Germany would be agreeable to  undertake such a role*
ilia findings added little  to  shat was already known in Helsinki for
i t  m® Obviously too early for any agreement to bo reached in Moscow
bhrou# tha offices of the W ilhelm trass© W ith the cosing of the
now year* however* Finnish suoee&M m t h© front created an a ir of
in  govermemt c ir c le s  in  The moment appeared suspi«*
clous to press for German mediation and to th is end Tanner Invited
Wlpart von HLuohar* the German Minister to Finland* to the Foreign
Ministry for a discussion on January h§ 1$*0« Tamer approached the
8matter in  an oblique manner by asking Blocker what advice Germany might
% b fcJ., p p . 1 1 6 -1 1 ? . 
9X bU ., pp. U T .
lao
w
offer to  a s s is t  ti®r in  withdrawing fro® tint war* Bluohetr
coantomd lay asking w;is& Finland would suggest In ©as© the p o ss ib ility  
to  tiisetw  peace should arias* I© went on to  say ill® « M t  iw  umfairam 
abl© for pesos discussions aim® the Eads had yet to  Min a victory, but 
proadsod to inquire m to  lb® attitu de o f h is garermaent on'the matter*^ 
4ttbougb thee© comrcrsaitons nor® supposedly ecm fidefiifal, word 
of thorn lodged out* Hi® Flemish M nistor to  Gopeshagan, Paavo Pajula, 
reported to  h is t  that the CtaroBi M inister to  Moscow, Count
0* F* voo dor Soht&si&urg, had to ld  tho Itonlsh Minister there that 
Gernany hoped peace could bo matured between the two belligerents* BMme 
resorts bigm to appear In the world pros® to the effect that Germany bed 
already tresM ltted  a peace proposal to  Hereon* Bagardiag the new® report®, 
Harri fids®©, the Finnish Minister to  Franc#, reported, that he was of the 
opinion that Moscow had in stigated  the rumors as a counter now® to  A stern  
p imm to  aid Finland#-^
atttmm rmamm mm probably m U  founded, for at Blusher*® ixmUmm
Germany had already begum to  explore the p o ssib ility  of peso® in  Moscow*
»
Do a  dispatch t o  Isis goeernoesKt d ated  January 1 1 , 19b0# Bluehar urged  
an alteration in  German policy v ia^ y ts . the !I*3*S*E«^and. urged sine#
Soviet 'wmmkmm had been revealed, &tmmg®r mrnmmm to meter®' psaoe*^ 
Bespit© Me efforts, matters progressed slowly* On January 1?, Tapi©
^DQFP, Series D, ?<a. VIII, pp. 613-6U? and Issuer 
38 ,. a lt,.. PP. 117-119,
Utarassr, od. c l t . . p. 119.
22iXW, Series 0 , V ol. VIII, pp. 630-652.
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P o rm m n t to Urn Finnish Foreign J^niatar*
was bold by 0w a rn  hegatdon Counselor Seiner $£®vmmM  that no reply 
to  Blusher'a inquiry Had yet toon received fro® Berlin*3^  xt Is reasonable* 
therefore* to su sp e c t that Oemany and the Soviet liklon war® seriously 
studying the matter of peace*
Co dwsasry 19 Blubber appeared a t the Foreign grinds try  to report 
th a t  Hh© Oeraan Government i s  of th e  o p in io n  th a t  a t  the moment th er e  
a r c  no pro® poets o f  p u ttin g  an end t o  -the a® though © adsavoring
to  m itig a te  the rep ly *  HL&her wondered o u t lo u d  i f  * a f t e r  a l l  t h e ir  
v ic t o r ie s 5 tb© F in n s w ould really bo d isp o sed  t o  make peace* Mhen 
fa n n er  q u ic k ly  a ssu re #  hi®  th a t  F in la n d  s in c e r e ly  desired p esos*  the
German asked i f  Finland had really expected Berlin to mediate peace la
« ^Hoscor# Bluchsr aeeiiXrigly desired to giro fanner the to rsssion  that
Germany had not made any m pm m m teM M m  to the Krm & in and that# after 
meditating on the proposal to do so* had reached a negative decision 
regarding the' matter*^ ghc o#rwn r e p ly  and Blusher*® attitude w ould  
seem to Indicate that Qenaany did not wish to  appear incapable of making 
har influence fe lt in  Moscow*
Another atta in t to end the war throa^i Osman mediation was made 
after dsmary 2U when Biooher again called on fanner# BXuchsr started 
tammtlng that tm  Qmmm negotiation plans had leaked, out and sought
Oronnor, eg. c i t . ,  p. 120. 
P3ff, Seriea D, Tea. TUI, p. 677.
ISlancar, og. o l t . .  p. 120.
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to  blame the Finns for the breach of secrecy. Tanner sharply refuted  
th is  by reading a memorandum recounting Pajula’s report of Sehulenburg’s 
ta lk  in  Moscow about hopes for peace. Thereupon the German brushed by 
th is  point and asked Tanner i f  he had any new proposals to  make to  Berlin* 
To th is  Tanner rep lied  that, in  view of Germany1 s negative answer before, 
wI t  is  unpleasant to knock on the same door twice . w^  On th is note the 
attempt to  use Germany as a mediator at Moscow ended u n til February 17 
In the meantime other roads to  peace were being explored by 
H elsinki. On New Tear’ s day, Mrs. B ella W uolijoki wrote to  Tanner 
suggesting that she might be assigned the task of ascertaining through 
her friend Mme. Aleksandrs K ollontai, the Soviet M inister to  Stockholm, 
i f  peace were p ossib le. Tanner agreed to try  th is approach and on 
January 8 Mrs. W uolijoki came to H elsinki for in stru ctions. On January 
10 she departed for Stockholm, where the next day she reported having 
made contact with Mas. K ollontai, who thought the moment propitious for 
peace e ffo r ts . A few days la ter  Mrs* Wuolijoki informed H elsinki that 
a pair of m ilitary men were on th eir way from Moscow to  discuss the 
matter of peace. On January 21 the in it ia l  contact was mad© with the 
two men, who merely inquired about conditions in  Finland and were other­
wise reserved and uncommunicative. On the twenty-sixth a phone c a ll to  
Erkko, the former Foreign M inister of Finland, in  Stockholm d isclosed  
that no d eta ils were yet ava ilab le. Apparently the Russians wished to  
assure themselves that the Finns earnestly desired peace and were not 
ju st s t a l l ing for tim e. At th is point the whole matter cam© to  a momen­
tary s ta n d s t ill .^
^%he foregoing section  and quote are from Tanner, op. c i t . ,  
pp. 121-123.
3*7lbid., pp. 123- I 2I4.
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That Ihissla was not yet ready to nak& peace* and tlmmtam  
did not wish to push the StooKhdUi oawera&tione too rapidly# is  
prowd by a iseoKsraadim coroerniiig a stateeaot by Bolster dispatched 
m January 2S U rn the Gorman B iw sy in lts@eoif to  th® Qrnmm Foreign 
Ministry* The i^moraiidoai pointed out that the Soviet te rrito ria l 
$&m m m  statod in  the plan. upon try th© tcmsiissxi gwmrmmnt*
In tliia same regard* the esobimed*
o • • the Soviet Ckm rm at could xunnr tolerate a 
hostile Flanlah £km&r*s»ht close to l^rdngrmd arid th@
Murmansk ra ilro a d #  in  ijuudorstgesding 'with th e Tanaer**
%t± and with ttansitieim was entirely out
of the question*!-*
I t  was further stated that m m  i f  Sviniuifmid wore to head a m®
gm m m m nkt there -'a© no likelihood of agraeiaent sins# ha was too
moh 111®. Xaaoer and % tl* There was roen left* hmm&$ for e&psin-
stem and eupplMKitatiea of &uusiniinfs goverzaMMxt when i t  took over
the g m e a sn t in Helsinki*3*^  itepsrontty th is agent that B®m mztoer®
of the Beleinkl government would be alloeed to enter feusimn*© puppet
cabinet©
Despite, th is peeeln iatle nob©* which was evidently unknown in 
Finland* a significant break-through In the StoofchdUi discussions 
occurred on January Sonetlro before* whan the Swedish Foreign 
Minister* Gunther* had naked 3fne» lolXomi&i I f  Sweden night m dlate  
between Finland and the f?»s«S«B** the offer was turned down# He
*%3TP, Sarise D, Vol. VIII, pp. 703-709. 
X%M4., p . 709.
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again pressed the question an January and thia t i m  received a m  
afflrm tiw? amwer#^ Has* Kolleabal agreed to transoit the suggestion 
to  Kcsoow# ami on the twenty «cdnth received an a*'iff«er £rxm Molotov 
station* in part# that# *The o*5*S*E* !ms no objection in  principle to  
concluding an agreattmt 'with tbs % il-fanuer goeejmnsafe#11^ *
Xtim tfm abortive Kuuaiaon gevensaent was thrust unaarwmloosl^r 
aside by the Soviet Union arid tha way was opened for definite peace 
m m a U o tto *  In lbs reply th© Kremlin made no mmfyim. of Hanks* Cape# 
but stated that since war had intervened# contrary to Soviet wishes* 
even greater guarantees far the securing at the Soviet borders acre 
necessary and required# Finland was also informed th a t. I f  a detente 
nere readied* concessions larger then taose deoaaded la  Qaibber~Hcrveii>©r 
1939# weald haw to  be xaade#^
the Flnoleh gowortssmsii drafted a reply stating that i t  mm pre­
pared to  negotiate with the point of departure being the Moscow negotia­
tions of th© previous fa ll#  I t  was also pointed out# however# that ^in­
land was not responsible for the m r  and that she had on several different 
occasions expressed her ardent desire to end It# In order to find an 
m iiim ctam  solution, the Plans stated they m m  ready to code such 
territory as was dsesaed necessary for the security of Leningrad in  return 
far- cennensarate compensation elsewhere# Helsinki considered i t  s e lf -
gOtanmr. op. c lt.«  p . 125.
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e v id e n t i t m% m onetary eottpene& ticn  would be md® t o  llm d a h  e l t is o n e  
fo r  p ro p erty  lo sa o tt in  any aroas ceded* M oreover* a c n tr h lla a tlA a  o f  
tb® Qtalf o f  F in la n d  by in t o n m t lc m l agreon ont would bo co n sid ered *  23 
Whan th e  r e p ly  ooo  r e o s itw t  in  Stockholm  f o r  tff&rusel& alcn t o
Mmmv on. February 2* oim ter fe lt that I t  did not offer enough* He 
agreed* however* to forward. i t  to Mono©*# th rou gh  Mm* K o llo n ia i*
B ating  the day th e  R u ssian  Minister called on oSnther and in fo m e d  
him that Moscow had a p p r ise d  her of its  us^illiiiipiocc to  drop  It® 
dewwid® regarding Sank© Cape* Since no amtlfiKi had. boon oonocr*
t?ning Hunk® Oapo .in  the telegram o f  January 29$ Ounther evinced su r p r ise  
arid told ftae® Kbllmi&i that he- doubted i f  Finland would agree to their
it
a o tm d e m iio ii*  4  a b o r t e h i l e  la t e r  Gunther gave M »* K b lion tal*®  m w m gp  
to who th en  expressed doubt regarding th e  wisdom o f  sending the
Finnish reply to Mqcggk* Beeenee of i t s  p ositive nature* however*
O&titMir encouraged sen d in g  th e  e te te n a o t  and th e  F in n ish  r e p ly  was g iv e n  
to Moo* K dH oixtni f o r  d e liv e r a n c e  to  M om m  la t e r  th a t  dgy*«&
On F©brassy 3* htea* S o lle n t a l  again v is ite d  Oaxftber in  m  extew cly  
nervous sta te mid to ld  the Foreign M inister she -sauted i t  recorded that 
'jar acceptance of th e  reply did not ist&y hsr ap p roval o f  i t s  ©ardsesia* 
She wm& on t o  say that she had isssrely sent i t  an a m%tm o f ia fa r a o t lo a  
to  the Krosilia* Turning to  the Barsfe© Capa question* sb® asked i f  there
<twere any way o f  getting Finland to concede m  th is Item * To th is Qunthsr
23x«fmr*j0g« o lt** pp* 127-128i tm§ vtaorlam* F&afond 
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®Sa&h«r <mpmnm& doubt* m  M L im d  that tim U ta  in ternal p o litic s  
md# I t  inposslblo for her to  a lter  her foreign policy on th is  point# 
esp ecia lly  sine® th is  m e what th© figh tin g  m e afeoub*^
On th© basis of th is  iafermatlem I t  w  decided, that Foreign 
Minister fanner shoold b© asked to  v is it Stockholm to  speak with Has* 
EoH m tai personally* arrived la  the Smdieh cap ita l m  February !* 
wMr* he me immediately briefed by Mr a# k'uolljokl# Hi© la tte r told 
him that Mm* KolXc&b&i was of th© opinion 'that the Finnish reply wm 
m t  a m tisfaotory  basis for negotiations sine© i t  did not include m g  
proposal for a Soviet baa© at th© mouth of th© Oulf of Finland'* She 
had# tiorefora# sent a report m  th© Fimish rsply m  a matter of Inform* 
tlo n .26
On February fanner talked with ttan# who told him that
I t  would 'm  in Finland*© best in terest to  mk® pm&m m  the 3 *5 •£»•&* 
wm planning a massive m ilitary o tim m im  in  the Spring,* In Mr ©pinion#
Itmk® Cap© wm %he c*m  of the matter* and she pressed for Finland's 
assent to  irioaslan data&nda on th© question* Tsnmr fin a lly  proposed that# 
for th® ament# the offiolal attitudes of th eir respective government# be 
se t aside while thagr engaged in  a frank and c^on discussion of tlm  $dm  
o f both nations# I t  wm agreed to  do th is  and Tamar said that# though 
Finland coaid not to  ceding Hank© Cap## ha m s personally w illin g
to  consider cession  of sons© tmspeoifiod inland at the month of the d o lt
ag lb ld ..  pp. 129-130.
pp. Iii2-lii£.
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of Finland to th® H#3»$*it» I f  such a proposal found fairer in Moses** 
h© promised that he m ild give i t  a c t iv e  support in  Helsinki* There
m ild iimm to he te rrito ria l eospaiisatlan elsewhere to mmmg®  Finnish 
public opinion, hut lamer thought that ftegx&a and PcrajSrvi m ild
Suffice# ?fee# loHontal seised cn th is suggest!*®* and asked i f  th® 
island was so located m to  eorrespofsd to  th® Soviet Union*® original 
needs# Tanner refused to  m m  the island but assured her that I t  would 
M ne tte  t?.S.3.a.*a p a r p o s :  Hg further i* h > «  her that tea Finn**
g a m m m n t m »  read? to begin negotiations tiimedisibely# In this regard 
he suggested that Stookfetita sesnsd to  bo the m m t suitab&s p lm o  to 
MK4 them* Upm ttd® not® th® conversation closed with Hue* IcHmtal 
promising to  transmit the suggestion to  Hose**? by cable As a
rssu ltt i t  was deaMod that Tamar shotild ronain. another day In Stock­
holm to await Moscow*s reply to his cujjjeslloru
The zm zt day (F ebruary 6 ) M olotov c a b le d  th a t ?annar*a suggestions 
vm m  in s u f f ic ie n t  a s  a  b a s is  f o r  m g o tia tic fi® *  Hm* KoSXesital ask ed
Tamer to socetfu the inland fee proposed in  c-h® hops that th is night
s©rvo as an opening to m gotiations# Tanner refused to do so and 
stressed that toe suggestion was his cmn arid he was not sure that i t  
would find support in  Helsinki# 2amodiat®!y afb*tr th is  nesting with
optdas# hallomial, Tanner returned to  Helsinki#
In the Britain ant! T r a m e  h&d bm a m  actively interested
in th® kuosc-Finnish War# When th® Finns had proven that they were
2h b ld .. p. Xk:.~2Jk7. 28lt - id . ,  p p . lk7«CU*2.
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capable of stopping th® Hussion war machine, the A llies began to consider
slid in g  substantial m ilitary aid to Finland via  Noncagr and Sweden* Tbm
'League of Motions resolution o f Becembar lii urging th© nations of the
world to  aid Finland provided the id eal rationale fo r  A llied  plans to
bring Iforway send Sweden Into the 'Western camp# Sines a ll  was quiet m
the french fron t, careful attention could b® given, to the northern co n flic t
as a moans of opening a see and front against Germany a t the expense of
soScandinavian. neutral tty *
In aooordano© with these plans, the A llie s  on B^jsribsr 2? and 26 
had informed Sweden, th at, in  keeping with the League of fteticB* d ecision , 
they w@m ready to  render in d irect aid to  Finland* 1*©* supply technicians 
and tiato-vimls* To implement their e fo rt# , they requested that Swe^  ©n 
agree to expedite the program by allowing tran sit o f the Items* The 
Swedish govcitsMmt on 3 and it, 13b0, declared i t s e l f  ready to
agree t o  such t r a n s i t ,  but said that i t  preferred that the supplies be 
sent in  the *s© of fiimiish purchases from abroad* Shortly thereafter, 
Britain grantee Finland permission to recru it volunteers in  th© B ritish
Isles*  Great Britain tnm  requested p erm ission  for tran sit of such
30volunteers across Swedish territory*
Prior to the B ritish  action in  December, the question o f aid to  
Finland had come up in  the A llied  Supratu® Council (beeeraber 19) where 
©am# d iversity  of opinion was manifest* ?riae Minister Baladier of 
France desired to  dispatch an expeditionary force iisaedlately, but the 
B ritish  were hesitant because of the p o ssib ility  that suoh action would
PQ
^Ohurcriill, o|j* £ i|**  ^9* 51$ if*
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lead to  a breach w ith  th® Soviet Union, u e s p ite  th® B ritish  objections,
D o la d ie r , p o r t ly  a f t e r  th® op en in g of th e  Mew fear* ordered th e  formation
31of such a force to  aid Finland. Regardless, th e  fin a l decision to  aid
Finland wm no t reached u n t i l  February 5, 19140, and o n ly  a f t e r  i t  was
decided to p e t it io n  H om ey and Sweden t o  g ra n t t r a n s it  right® for the
e x p e d it io n , The s e a l j u s  effort® of the F in n ish  Minister to Paris, H orrl
Holma and Colonel A ladar P aason sn , the M ilitary attach© there, played
32a la r g e  part in  securing th is  decision .
That th e  A llies w ere so suddenly' galvanised in to  action or* F in la n d 9a 
behalf undoubtedly fallowed th# la u n ch in g  of a massive Soviet offensive on 
February 1 which threatened to crush th e  Finnish armies. I t  was in  
co n seq u en ce, th a t th® o v e r tu r es  o f  peace to  Moscow, via Stockholm , had 
b e e n  u n d ertak en , Th® E u sso -F in n isk  ^ar was a d v an tag eo u s  t o  th® A ll ie s  and, 
i f  i t  should end quickly with a F in n ish  defeat th e  highly b e n e f ic ia l  
d istu rb a n c e  o f  S o v ie t  economy would b® term in a ted , In  that c a s e , R ussian  
a id  to  Germany would b® p o ssib le . F urtherm ore, m  lo n g  as th e  northern 
:%r continued the A llies had adequate reason for bombing the C aucasian
o il f ie ld s  which supplied Germany w ith  p etro leu m , and a r a t io n a le  fo r
33
sto p p in g  Swedish ore sh ipm en ts to  the H eieh ,
■On. February 3 Frkko wired that Molotov was in te r e s te d  to know 
what is la n d  Tanner had in mind in  h is discussions with I to *  fC o llo n ta i.
Thus & mw hope was aroused that peace might yet be attained. A fte r  a 
co n feren ce  betw een  E yti, T anner, aw:! Major G eneral Rudolf b a ld en , lia a o n  
o fficer  for Maamerhaim1® h ea d q u a rters, i t  was decided, th a t in  lig h t of 
th e  A llied  offer®, no reply" would b© given regard in g  th e  island in mind
31
tian nertielB , oo. c i t . ,  p . 378.
^farm er, od.  c i t . ,  p .  11*9.
^Wuorinen, Finland and World War I I , pp. 70-71,
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at that tim e* Later that day Kra* Wuolijoki phoned Helsinki and also  
inquired about th® island* She said th© Soviet Union required Tanner*s 
advance assurance that th® cession would be mad® once i t  was proposed* 
To both frkko and Mrs* V uoliloki Tanner promised an answer by February 
12* &
In lig h t o f these developments, th© Finnish Cabinet decided 
that Farmerheim and h is s ta ff  should be consulted on trie matter of 
what territory  might sa fely  b© ceded* A delegation of Cabinet 
M inisters was sent to Marshal Kann®rheimfs headquarters to corrrmnicat® 
the d eta ils  of the la te s t  developments (February 10)# At headquarters, 
Tanner outlined, in  order o f preference, three p o ss ib ilit ie s  for  
future conduct o f the war and diplomacyt (1) pursuit of peace;
(2) l im ita t io n  of th® war t o  Seand anaviaj (3) i f  these plans fa iled  
to m aterialise reliance on Western aid* I t was clearly  stated that 
th is  course would undoubtedly draw F in la n d  in to th® world conflict*
From the ensuing dicusslon i t  was clearly  apparent that Maimrheln
and h is advisors preferred peace even at a sacrifice*  35
In h is resuRs o f the deliberations, Manmrhelm indicated that
the securing of peace was placed f ir s t  among the alternatives because 
of the shortage of mn and artillery*  Swedish aid wa® suggested as 
a second alternative and i t  was urged that such assistance be sought 
with great energy* In th is regard th© Marshal thought that Sweden 
should be &®ked to send trained units since the recruiting and training  
of volunteers was too slow a process. Th© vague and inadequatetly
^Tanner, op. p i t . ,  pp . 1 5 0 -1 5 1 .
35I b id .,  pp. 1 5 1 -1 5 2 .
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prepared aid offered by the West was to  be accepted only as a la s t  
resort* On. the question o f what territory  might sa fely  be ceded, 
he stated that th© island of Jussard at the mouth o f the Gulf of 
Finland m s le a s t important to Finland since maritime tr a ffic  to  
Hank© Cape and Turku would not be Impeded by i t s  possession by another 
power* On the Karelian Isttaas he suggested that a coastal str ip  
about 10 km* wide, extending from S e lv ttstd  to  In©, be ceded* The 
whole of S u ttrsa a rl Island might also  be ceded* I f these augm ented 
cessions were accepted by Moscow, the Marshal f e l t  that the Russian 
demands for Ralest&j&s&arenio should be relinquished* In return 
for these cession s, he said  that the S ep o la  and PoraJSrvl communes 
would be acceptable compensation* ^
In Helsinki, a fter  the delegation of Cabinet M inisters returned 
from their m eting with Kamerh#im4s s ta ff  a session  o f th© Foreign 
A ffairs Committee was convened on February 12 to  decide upon which 
course to pursue* Tanner presented th# three alternatives he had 
outlined to th# m ilitary leaders* In the Committee there was no 
common consensus of opinion as a t military headquarters* Defense 
M inister Hiukkanen f e lt  that no real chance for peace was possible*
He, therefore, favored a policy of seeking Swedish aid f ir s t  and, 
that fa ilin g , suggested that Finland should then turn to the A llies*  
Pfcaeikivi was of the opinion that a peace policy should b© assiduously 
pursued at a l l  costs* His opinion was based upon Sweden*a incessant 
refusal to  send m ilitary aid and the fa ct that the Western o ffers
^ I b id .. pp. 152-153
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m m  too vaguely formulated* Xlwao H a?mula* M inister o f Education, 
sided with Mukkanen and adamantly argued for a continuation of the 
war by ca llin g  in  any and a ll  outside aid offered* Ms believed that 
the D iet would never accept the harsh terms se t by the Russians* Also 
in  favor o f continuing the war was M inister of Justice* J« 0* Sdderhjelm* 
His opinion was based m  a conviction that the Finnish nation would 
not understand th® cession o f a base at the mouth of the Oulf of 
Finland since te la  was the m ry  thing they were figh tin g  to prevent* 
lie did* however* fe e l that terr ito r ia l cessions on the Karelian Isthmus* 
plus an agreement to neutralise the Oulf of Finland* would be acceptable* 
Prime M inister Kyti pressed for peace, i f  possible* I f  not, he hoped 
that Sweden could be brought to make a public announcement that she 
would send auxiliary forces to  Finland* To th is end he suggested 
that Tanner once more go to  Stockholm* President Kallio* who was 
present* although not a member o f the Committee* expressed h is desire 
for peace* Earlier the President had opposed ceding a base near Hank© 
Cape* but he now f e l t  that* i f  the island of JtiasarB were acceptable 
to the Russian** i t  should be ceded and believed that Finnish national 
pride and prestige could be satisfied *  3?
Thus th® membership of th® Foreign A ffairs Co-wdtte® of the 
Finnish Cabinet was divided with swm favoring peace and others de­
termined to continue th© fight* Th© only p ositive decision arrived 
at was that Tanner should once again v is i t  Stockholm to seek further 
Swedish aid* At a private conference a fter the session* however*
1?
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Prime M inister Hyti* President Kallio* and Foreign M inister Tanner 
decided that th® peace program should be pursued energetically*
For th is  reason they decided to cofsmmicate immediately to (Htether 
th eir in fo rm a tio n  that Finland stood ready to cede th® island o f 
Jussaro to  th® C*S*S«R*38
Immediately follow ing the conference farmer departed for  
Stockholm* Fnroute he received a wire from Erkko sta tin g  that the 
Soviet tlnion now demanded not only flank© Cape hot a lso  th# whole 
Karelian Isthmus and th® en tire western shore of lake Ladoga*
Upon arrival la  Stockholm fanner went to see Gfinthor* who informed 
him that th® Finnish note offering to cede Jussaro had not yet been 
delivered* ffe also to ld  fanner that tm had refused to transmit 
the la te s t  Moscow peso# proposals as they were too far reaching 
in  nature*^
Tanner m r t  v is ite d  Prims M inister Ransscn t© inquire i f  
more extensive m ilitary aid  could be expected front Sweden* In 
th is regard* he inquired i f  Sweden could dispatch units o f troops 
as volunteers as Germany had done in  the Spanish C iv il War* Tanner 
pointed out that i f  no aid were forthcoming from Sweden* Finland 
would be obliged to  turn to Great Britain and France* Sa that 
event* serious consequences might follow  for a l l  the Rorthersi 
countries* Hansson said that i t  was impossible for Sweden to  
send u n its o f her armed fem es to  Finland as volunteers s lim  
Germany and the U*S*S*R* would understand what these units rea lly  
were* Serious rep risa ls on the part of both sta tes could be
38Ib ld .»  P. 1 5 7 . 3 9 I b id .,  PP. 1 5 7 -1 5 8 .
expected from «ny suoh action* th fact* the Swedish fromler 
stated Germany had warned the Sw edish governm ent on numerous 
occasions to remain out ©f th® Finnish wsr»^ This w m  contrary 
to what Finland had boon led to believe as SXffeher had inquired 
o f  the WilhelBStrasae in December if they had g iv e n  any such 
advice to Sweden® Berlin had replied that no warning had been 
issued**** Tanmr pointed this o u t to Hansson and said he doubted* 
therefore* th a t  Germany would mount m  attack cm Sweden oven if she 
were to give substantial aid to  Finland® The Finnish Foreign 
Minister then informed Hansson of 1he Allied Supreme Council*® 
decision m& informed th e Swede o f  the im m inent arrival of a 
W estern m ilita r y  em m dm ion in  Finland® Us Inquired regarding 
the a t t itu d e  that Sweden would m m m  if Finland appealed for 
Western aid and requested transit right® for the ausiliaxy troops* 
As before* Hans son replied that Sweden would refuse**4** ^  view 
of this negative attitude* Finland was then fo r c ed  to pursue her 
own course in accordance with this reply*
D uring th e  days im m ed iately  a f t e r  T anner1® retu rn  to  
H e ls in k i no word was r e c e iv e d  from  Moscow reg a rd in g  th e  m a tter  
o f  th e  c e s s io n  o f  Ju ssaro* However* on February 1? th #  German 
M in ister*  B lficher* c a lle d  a t  th e F o re ig n  M in istr y  to  in form  Tanner 
th a t  Germazy s t i l l  f e l t  un ab le to  m ed iate In  th e  c o n f l i c t  a s  th e  
moment was s t i l l  u n p ro p itio u s*  He th en  made a  su g g e stio n  w hich  
B e r lin  had in s tr u c te d  him to  sa y  was hi® own* The id e a  was th a t
5,0t o l d . ,  p . 1 5 8 . Iflp c r p . S e r ie s  D , V o l. V III , p p . 5 5 8 -5 5 9 . 
^ T a n n er , o £ . e l t . ,  p . 1 5 8 .
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Kibbentrop ir& h^t advanc® in  Moscow a proposal that representatives 
from both sid es meet in  Berlin to negotiate end c la r ify  th eir  aims.
In th is  regard he suggested that Faaolkivi would probably ha the 
negotiator most acceptable to Moscow* Two problems interposed  
them selves, he pointed out, i , e ,  would the Wilhelmstrasse agree 
to  conduct the matter and would the Kremlin accept the proposal*
For h is part Tanner agreed to take up the matter with the Cabinet 
and inform Hlucher i f  an affiw aative decision were reached*^
The Finnish Cabinet expressed in terest in  SXucher’s suggestion  
and* on February 20, th* German M inister was asked to c a ll a t the 
Foreign M inistry, Tanner immediately pointed out m  apparent 
contradiction in  B&ficher's proposal# the M inister had said  the 
moment was not propitious for German mediation, yet the new pro- 
posal envisaged action on the part o f the German Foreign M inistry, 
which would ultim ately sponsor the meeting i f  i t  could be arranged. 
How was th is  to be understood? la  mmmr,  Blflcher said  that 
Germany f e l t  she could not mediate! therefore he had advanced 
th® idea of a Berlin meeting on h is own in it ia tiv e  in  the hop® 
that a contact would be helpful* Jh reply to a further question  
from Tanner, th® German said he wm unable to  guarantee that h is  
plan would succeed. Tanner then said that he assumed that Blficher 
had talked to h is superiors it# Berlin about the m atter, but 
Blficher refused indicate by m  mmmr i f  th is were so0 When asked
U3E2L> S»rte« D, Vol. VIII, pp. 77U, 7?8j c f , Tanner, 
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ftwhat conditions Moscow might propose# Blueher replied that he 
had no idea* At th is  point Tanner thanked him for the information 
and terminated the conversation*^* Thus ended the la s t  attempt 
at German mediation*
Suba@qu.ent to hi® talk with BlSeher# Tanner conferred with 
Hyti ®nd Walden* Their talk  resulted  in  a decision to ask Sweden* 
on th eir 01® responsibility* to  in it ia te  pear® negotiations which 
would include th® cession  o f Banko Cape* i f  necessary* I t was 
further decided that Walden should go to m ilitary headquarter® 
to seek th® advice from the leaders of the army on the peace pro­
posal* While Walden was away the Foreign A ffairs Committee of 
the D iet would be convened to ascertain it#  views*^5
The D iet Committee met that day (February SO) and indicated  
that it  favored reaching a peace settlement* With th is  support* 
the Cabinet decided on a peace course* To th is  end Tanner um  
directed to phone Srkko in  Stockholm and instruct him to approach 
Gunther with th® suggestion that Sweden undertake to mediate to  
bring about an end to  h o stilit ie s*  Erkko was to impress upon 
Gfinther that i t  would be in  Sweden •# in terest to mediate* for i f  
Finland turned to th© ifest for aid# the entire- Horth would be 
inexorably drawn in to  the war* A short while la ter  Srkko reported 
that the Swedish Foreign M inister had gladly assented to  the 
suggestion*^
At th® same tins# (February 20) Mannerhete received B ritish
U *KJFP* S e r ie s  D , Vol. V III , pp. 565~£86j ct .  T anner,
0£« Cit* # p* lw §
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G eneral R obert L ing and *ren eh  C o lo n el G eneva! a t  h is  h ead q u arters*  
Both mem spoke o f  th e  proposed  A llie d  a id  b u t n e ith e r  was a b le  to  
g iv e  e x p l i c i t  in fo rm a tio n  co n cern in g  th e  number o f  troop s*  th e  
tim e o f  t h e ir  departu re* o r  t e l l  w hether Norway and Sweden w ould  
a g ree  to  t h e ir  b e in g  tra n sp o r ted  a c r o ss  t h e ir  te r r ito r y *  They 
d id  make i t  c le a r  to  Mannerheim* however* th a t  th e  f i r s t  d u ty  
o f  th e  advance tr o o p s  w ould be to  c o u n ter  ex p ected  German r e p r is a l  
a c t io n s  on th e  S can d in av ian  Peninsula***?
Walden retu rn ed  from  m ilita r y  headquarter®  on February 23  
w ith  th e  above in form ation *  B ecause o f  i t s  vagueness* th e  F oreign  
A ff a ir s  Cotm aittee o f  th e  C ab in et was d o u b tfu l o f  th e v a lu e  o f  
latestm m  a id *  Peace n e g o tia t io n s*  even  more than b e fo r e , appeared  
to  be th e  o n ly  rea so n a b le  co u rse  fo r  F in land * L ater In  th e  day  
Erkko rep o rted  from  Stockholm  th a t  M olotov had com m unicated p r e c is e  
term s f o r  th e  in i t i a t io n  o f  su ch  n e g o tia t io n s*  These in c lu d e d  th e  
c e s s io n  o f  Hanko Cape* th e  K a relia n  Isthm us in c lu d in g  V lip u r i*  and 
th e  n o r th ea ste rn  sh ore o f  Lake Ladoga in c lu d in g  th e  town o f  S o rta v a la *  
In r e tu r n  th e  S o v ie t  tfo lon  was prep ared  to  ev a cu a te  Beteam s and 
o th e r  u n sp e c if ie d  areas*  Moscow a ls o  ask ed  f o r  a  d e fe n se  p a c t  
g u a ra n tee in g  th e  G u lf o f  F in la n d  be con clu d ed  betw een th e  U*S*S«R** 
F in la n d  and E ston ia*  I f  th e se  term® were n o t a ccep ted  now* new 
and more s tr in g e n t  demands w ould be made X ater*k8
^ M annerheia* o£* c it* *  pp* J 8 l* 3 8 2 w
^ T an n er* og* c i t * ,  p . 172*
That the Soviet Union a fter  almost tm  weeks o f alien®* 
(sine* Februasy 6 ) , mad* such extensive demands assy have been a 
resu lt o f th# success o f the massive offensive o f the Karelian 
fattens launched by th# Bed taay cm February 1» Another factor  
probably influencing the situ a tion  was a Swedish press report o f 
February 16, corroborated by Prims M inister Wsm&m m& lin g  
Ouster V on February 19* that any form of Swedish m ilitary aid  
to Finland was out of th# question©^ These two developments 
probably contributed to  the Russian b e lie f that Finland was in  
©position which mad# rejection  of such terms almost impossible*
Because o f these new developments* th# Foreign A ffairs 
Committee was convened fo r  the second time that day* As on th© 
February 12 opinion was divided, but i t  was fin a lly  decided that 
a ll  courses o f action should be kept open u n til d efin ite  answers 
could be obtained to several questions* These weret
(1) Could auxiliary m ilitary forces tr  expected from 
Sweden? I f  so , how many men and how soon would 
they arrive?
(2) Would Sweden permit western force® to cross her 
territory?
(3) How som  would A stern  aid reach Finland?50
When the session  terminated, Tanner telephoned Erkks
m d  instructed him to submit the f ir s t  two questions to  Ofinthsr 
with th# request for a prompt reply* The next day (February 2!t)
50Ib id ., pp. 1T2-173*
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Gflftther** reply m a reported to Helsinki* I t  stated  that Sweden 
ooul d only promise to in ten sify  her volunteer program* tfcider no 
oircvmetanees would ’Western forces be permitted tra n sit across 
'Swedish territory .^ -
That day General lin g  arrived in  Helsinki to confer with 
tbe Finnish Cabinet on tha matter of A stern  support* I t  the 
f ir s t  meeting Tanner gained the impression that the project 
was s t i l l  only vaguely formulated* Bet la ter  that evening* at 
a meeting with Xing and the B ritish  M inister to Helsinki* Gordon 
Yexwfcer* more sp ec ific  d e ta ils  were revealed* i*a* men* arms* 
end ships* were even then ready for departure* Tha two Britons 
asserted that the expedition could depart on March 15 and reach 
Finland by April 15*^  During tha course of the conversation i t  
was made clear that the A llie s  expected Finland to  obtain the 
necessary tran sit righ ts from Horsey and Sweden* In light, of 
what was already known* Tam er expressed doubt that Sweden would 
permit such transit* ftmfcer suggested that the Finnish 
government f ir s t  broach the matter to Sweden privately* This 
would allow  time for consideration* Then* when Finland formally 
requested tseetera aid* a simultaneous request for tran sit rights 
could fee made to Norway and Sweden* with & statement that the request 
was to be made public* Xh th is  way Verekcr hoped i t  would be 
possib le to  coerce Norway and Sweden in to  giving an affirm ative
5*Ib id .. pp. 173-17U. g2P>ld..  pp. 175-176.
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m m m r*  Tanner ex p r essed  doubt that th is  m il d  change th e  Swedish 
p o s it io n *  To V erek er1® query w hether Sweden m ight a»mmo a more 
p ositive attitude I f  given g u a ra n tees of aid by the West* Tanner 
f e l t  i t  was u n lik e ly  that su ch  prcsaiaes would change th® Modish
p o s it io n . 53
W hatever th e  H orwegian and Sw edish a t t i t u d e , how ever, i t
w as im p ressed  upon th e  F ilm s th a t  a  prompt r e p ly  to  th e  A l l ie s  
was e sse n tia l®  The A l l ie s  d e s ir e d  an o f f i c i a l  r e q u e st fo r  a id  
from  H e ls in k i b y  March $ a t  th e  la t e s t *  S in e s  a  tim e l im it  was 
s e t ,  Tanner in q u ir e d  how e x te n s iv e  th e  a id  w ould be th a t  th e  
W o t  proposed  to  send* V ereker l i s t e d  s e v e r a l u n it s  t o t a l l in g  
from  2 0 ,0 0 0 * 2 2 ,0 0 0  m m  armed w ith  au tom atic  weapons* T h is i t  was 
s a id  w ould make th an  e q u a l to  ab ou t tw ic e  th a t  number o f  F in n ish  
tr o o p s * ^  Jh t h i s  reg a rd  i t  i s  in t e r e s t in g  to  n o te  th a t  th e  
number of tro o p s th e  k k ste r a  A l l ie s  proposed  to  d isp& teh  had 
in c r e a se d  c o n s id e ra b ly  o v er  th e  mmber w hich th ey  had a t  f i r s t  
su g g ested *  A ccording to  th e mcmomom au th or of k% origten*s book , 
e a r l i e r  e s t im a te s  reg a rd in g  th e  e l s e  o f  th e  e x p e d itio n a r y  fo r c e  
had b een  from  6 ,0 0 0  to  1 2 ,0 0 0
Armed w ith  t h is  new in fo rm a tio n , Tanner req u e sted  m  
assem bly* The C o u n cil o f  S ta te  was to  r e p o r t on th e  e n t ir e  
m atter* As in  th e  F oreign . A ffa ir s  C om m ittee, o p in io n  was d iv id ed *
The r e s u lt  o f  th e  co n feren ce  was a  d e c is io n  th a t  Tanner sh ou ld
53 x b ld .a IV . 1 7 6 -1 7 7 . & I b id ..  p . 1 7 7 .
" W u orin an , F in lan d  and World War j l ,  p . 7 1 .
onm  a g a in  v i s i t  Stockholm * b oth  to  a s e e r ta ia  th e  Sw edish  a t t itu d e  
to  th® l a t e s t  W rat«ra p ro p o se la  and to  ta lk  w ith  th e  R ussian  
M in is te r  t o  Sweden* ita «  K ollcm tai®  On February 2? Tanner c r o sse d  
th® O u lf o f  B oth n ia  t o  Stockholm® Ih  c o n v e r sa tio n s  w ith  h is  Sw edish  
co u n ter -p a rt*  he r e v e a le d  in  g e n e ra l term s th® l a t e s t  A s t e r n  
p r o p o sa ls  and in q u ir e d  i f  Sweden w ould p erm it t r a n s it  fo r  th e  
exp ed ition ®  <3unther, a r e p ly  was th a t no tr a n sp o r t o f  fo r e ig n  
force®  a c r o ss  Sweden would he p erm itted  and no m ilita r y  in te r ­
v e n tio n  was to  be ex p ec ted  from  Sweden® B® d id* however* prom ise  
to  g iv e  F in la n d  a l l  th® econom ic a id  p o s s ib le *  i f  sh e  made p ea ce® ^  
Tanner a ls o  had a  co n feren ce  w ith  Prism  M in is te r  Hansson 
who to ld  him th a t  th® a id  prom ised  r a th e r  v a g u e ly  by Sweden 
on February 2k w ould c o n s is t  o f  o n ly  vo lu n teers®  llm a so a  c o u ld  
n o t e s tim a te  how many® Sweden s t i l l  r e fu se d  to  sen d  d ir e c t  
m ilita r y  a id  t o  F in la n d  o r  to  tak e any o v e r t a c t io n  in  Finland*®  
b e h a lf  fo r  fe a r  o f  war® Upon h ea rin g  th is *  Tanner p o in ted  o u t 
th a t  F in la n d  had m  o th e r  reco u rse  b u t to  a d d ress an a p p ea l fo r  
a id  to  G reat B r ita in  and France® W ithout s p e c ify in g  f ig u r e s  o r  
d a tes*  he o u t lin e d  th e  W estern p r o p o sa ls  and ask ed  i f  Sweden would 
be in c lin e d  to  p erm it t r a n s it  o f  th e  A llie d  tr o o p s® ^  B sassoa  
r e p lie d  in  th® fo llo w in g  vord es
^ T anner* gg® c it® ® pp 172® ^ I b id » * pp® 181-182,
The Sw edish governm ent has c le a r ly  e x p r essed  i t s  p o s it io n  
m  t h is  p o in t*  Sweden d esire®  to  ob serve n e u tr a lity  on t h is  
m a tter  a s  w e ll*  Ho t r a n s it  p a ssage o f  fo r c e s  can be p erm itted *  
V o lu n teers and sm a ll groups m igh t be p erm itted  to  p a ss  through*?8
Haneses!** l a s t  rem ark seem ed to  le a v e  open th e p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  Sw edish
a s s e n t to  p assage fo r  A llie d  fo r c e s  in  th e  g u ise  o f  v o lu n te er s*
However, when Tanner ask ed  hour many volu n teer®  m igh t b e g ra n ted
p a ssa g e , th e  Prime M in is te r 9s  r a th e r  vague r e p ly  was th a t  th e
number would n o t be v e ry  la r g e *  2b any c a se  th ey  w ould n o t be
a llo w ed  to  c a rry  arms* Dr* c o n c lu s io n  Hansson d e c la re d  th a t  i f
th e  W estern Powers a ttem p ted  to  fo r c e  p a ssa g e through H orsey and
Sw eden, "Sweden w ould f in d  i t s e l f  in  th e  war cm th e  E u ssian  s id e
and a g a in s t  F in lan d *® ^
Tanner a ls o  ta lk e d  w ith  Use* K eH o n ta i th a t  day* He
in q u ir e d  I f  Moscow9 0  demands o f  February 23 w ere canes th a t  c o u ld
be a lte r e d  through d isc u ss io n *  Una* K o llo n ta i was d is tr e s s e d
and lam en ted  th a t  th e Finn® sh o u ld  have mads p eace when th e  term s
were e a s ie r ,  i* e« «  F ebruary 6* lb s  term© now p re se n ted  w ere
firm  and u n a ltera b le*  Bom  m inor changes m igh t be made d u rin g
n e g o tia t io n s  b u t she f e l t  t h i s  was r a th e r  u n lik e ly *  Termer
e x p la in e d  to  h er th a t  a  F in n ish  r e p ly  co u ld  n o t be e x p e c ted  m
to o  s h o r t n o t ic e  s in c e  d em ocracies needed more tim e to  rea ch
d e c is io n s  than d id  d ic ta to r s h ip s*  W ith t h is  th e  co n feren ce  ended*
58Ibld.. p . 183. 55>Ibld.
^Q lbid* * p* 185*
On February 28 e v e n ts  began to  move r a p id ly , fo r c in g  
th e  F in n ish  C ab in et to  make q u ick  d e c is io n s*  Moscow Inform ed  
H e ls in k i, v ia  StoekhoXm, th a t  m  answ er to  th e  R u ssian  demands 
was ex p ec ted  w ith in  f o r t y - e ig h t  hours* T h is was tantam ount to  
an u l t i m a t u m .  o n ly  a  few  days b e fo r e  th e  B r it is h  M in is te r ,
V erek er, had ask ed  th a t  th e F in n s make m  o f f i c i a l  a p p ea l fo r  
A s t e r n  a id  w ith in  a  week and by March 5 a t  th e  la t e s t *  la s h  
day th e  F in n ish  p o s it io n  became more p reca r io u s*  On th e  K arelian  
Isthm us th e Red a m is s  were fo r g in g  ahead a g a in s t  ex h a u sted  F in n ish  
tro o p s and th e  R u ssian  term s w ere e x p e c ted  t o  became even h arsh er  
i f  t h e ir  a m is s  had co n tin u ed  su ccess®  th e  f i r s t  Vie s t e m  a id  could 
n o t be ex p ec ted  b e fo re  A p r il 1 5 , and w hat w as prom ised  w ould  
be in s u ff ic ie n t®  C onfronted  by su ch  a  s it u a t io n  th e  C a b in et, on  
th e  a d v ic e  o f  th e  Com m ander-In-Chief and h is  a s s is t a n t s  and su p p orted  
by th e  D ie t , d ec id ed  t o  seek  p e a e e * ^
On February 29 th ey  a g reed  to  a  r e p ly  to  th e  Moscow p r o p o sa ls  
rea d in g s
The F in n ish  governm ent, w hich fo r  i t s  p a r t a ls o  a s p ir e s  
toward th e  term in a tio n  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  and th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  
p e a c e , con sid er®  th a t  i t  can in  t h is  se n se  reg a rd  th e  con­
d it io n s  a s  a p o in t o f  d ep artu re fo r  n e g o t ia t io n s , and a c c e p ts  
them in  p r in c ip le . The com prehensive scop e o f  th e  p ro p o sa l 
and th e o b s c u r ity  o f  some o f  i t s  d e t a i l s  make c la r i f i c a t io n  
and d e f in it io n  n e c e s sa r y , b u t th e se  p o in ts  can  be c le a r e d  up 
in  o r a l n e g o t ia t io n s . The F in n ish  governm ent a w a its  a  sta tem en t 
a s to  when and where th e  S o v ie t  governm ent p ro p o ses th a t  th e  
n e g o tia t io n s  b egin * The F in n ish  governm ent c o n s id e r s  Moscow 
a  s u ita b le  p l a c e *63
^ Ib ld o* p« 188* ^%fano6rh®i®, gg* c i t * ,  p* 383*
^^Quoted in  T anner, o%. c i t * * pp* 19U-195*
T h is n o te  m s  s e n t  to  Srkko $m S tockholm  w ith  im tr u o tio n a  to  hoM  
I t  u n til he was directed to  d e liv e r  i t  to  Mas® fCollQKital#
Hews o f  th e  C ab in et d e c is io n  to  make p eace became known in  
H e ls in k i d u rin g  th e  day (F eb ru ary 2 9 ) and le d  to  s w i f t  a c t io n  on  
th e  p a r t o f  th e  Vfeetero A llie s #  That ev en in g  th e  French M in is te r  
to  F in la n d , C h arles Magpy, so u g h t an w ith  Tanner in  ord er
t o  in form  him th a t  A llie d  p la n s  to  sen d  o n ly  12,000 m n to  F in la n d  
had been r e v is e d  to  p ro v id e  fo r  a  fe m e  o f  2 0 ,0 0 0  P o le s , B r ito n s , 
and Frenchmen# They w ere ev en  th en  b e in g  assem b led  and were roady  
fo r  d ep a rtu re , d e s p ite  Sw edish  r e fu s a l to  p erm it t r a n s i t  of any 
fo r c e s#  2ii MagB$r*$ o p in io n  th e  Swedes and M orwsgians w ould change 
t h e ir  a t t itu d e  once th ey  w ere a p p ra ised  o f  th e  f u l l  d e ta ils #  More­
o v e r , i f  F in n ish  fo r c e s  c o u ld  h o ld  o u t for a  few  mom  w eek s, adequate  
a id  w ould a r r iv e  In  tim e and be fo llo w e d  by re in fo rcem en ts#  Magny 
w ent on to  sa y  th a t  i f  F in la n d  made p e a c e , sh e  w ould have t o  s u f f e r  
w h atever lo s s e s  o f  t e r r it o r y  th e  S o v ie t  Union req u ired  m  h er  own 
r e s p o f is ib il ity # ^ 1
D uring th e  n ig h t new in fo rm a tio n  and fu r th e r  o f f e r s  o f  a id  
a r r iv e d  from  London and F u rls#  The F in n ish  M in iste r  in  P erl® ,
Hsrrl Holm s, r ep o rted  th a t  Prem ier B a la d ie r  had d e f in i t e ly  pro­
m ised  th a t  A llie d  fo r c e s  w ould a r r iv e  in  F in la n d  by th e  end o f  
M arch, w ith  t h e ir  d ep artu re d a te  depend en t upon London# The 
p rob ab ly  d a te  wee March 1 2 , b u t n o t so o n er a s  France c o u ld  h a rd ly
^ C h u r c h ill , 2 £ . o i t . ,  p . J>'73| m&  T am w r, c £ . c i t . ,
p. 19!(.
be » $ ^ r  any e a r lie r *  The A l l ie s  m m  p roposed  to  sen d  50*000  
m m  m l  h a w  them in  F in la n d  b e fo r e  th e  end o f  March* T ra n sit  
problem s would be s o lv e d  by th e  > iest a cco rd in g  to  th e  rep o rt*
As a  p r e c o n d itio n  th e  F in n s were t o  break  o f f  n eg o tia tio n ®  w ith  
th e  K rem lin , o r  a l l  p r e p a ra tio n s would be in te r r u p te d  and th e  
shipm ent o f  a rm  and equipm ent w ould c e a s e * ®
Thus on March 1 , th e  day on w hich a  r e p ly  to  th e  S o v ie t  Onion 
w m  r e q u ir e d , th e  s it u a t io n  was com plicated®  B ecause o f  U ss te m  
p r e ssu r e , i t  was d ec id e d  th a t  th e  r e p ly  in  Erick©*® hands sh o u ld  
be h e ld  and a  new one d r a fte d  in  th e  hope o f  g a in in g  tin e *  The 
new r e p ly  read*
The F in n ish  governm ent i s  a n x io u s t o  b r in g  ab ou t a  
c e s s a t io n  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  and th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  a p e a c e , 
b u t s in c e  th e  new fr o n t ie r  con tem p lated  in  th e  p ro p o sa l 
i s  v a g u s, fu r th e r  p a r t ic u la r s  w ith  reg a rd  th e r e to  are  
req u ested *  S im ila r ly  in fo rm a tio n  la  d e s ir e d  a s  to  w hat 
com pensation  F in la n d  I s  to  receive*® ®
At the same time th e  H e ls in k i govemnsnt in q u ired  i f  th e  
A stern  A ll ie s  c o u ld  ta n s d ia te ly  d isp a tc h  $ 0 ,0 0 0  tr o o p s  to F in la n d , 
to  arrive in  Karsh, and i f  mom could he m n t later* It was also  
r eq u ested  that 100 f u l l y  manned and armed bom bers be s e n t* ®  An 
answ er to th e se  requests was r e c e iv e d  la t e r  th a t  day p rem isin g  th e  
d e s ir e d  $ 0 ,0 0 0  men by the  end o f  Karch* According to General Iron­
s id e , the B r it is h  Com m andter-in-Chlef o f  Home Force® , re in fo rcem en ts  
fo r  these w ould be s e n t  la t e r  a s needed* He a ls o  inform ed th e  
F in n s that th e  f ig u r e s  L ing and O&navs! had qu oted  to Mammerhe&a
® ?«*sier, on* c i t * ,  p* 19** Q uoted in  Tanner, ©g® c i t * ,  p* 197®
^Mannerhslia,
W orld War | | * p* 71*
M annerheln  o£* c i t * ,  p* 3% | an<;> W uoriwwi, F in la n d  apgd
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m m  incorrect and that fu l l  aid to Finland wm planned.^
In the meantime, the la te s t  Finnish reply to Russia had been
reported to the Swedish Foreign Minister, GBnther, II® expressed
to Erkko h is doubts o f i t s  efficacy  as a point of departure. In
h is opinion an affirmative reply would have been better, fls f e l t
that frontier question® could be dealt with more e ffec tiv e ly  in
negotiations. At the same time h© reiterated h is government1® refusa l
to permit A llied forces to pass through Sweden, fit also inferred
Erkko that !%*e, Kollontai had told  him that i t  was up to Finland
to in it ia te  peace negotiations by accepting the terms offered by
the On th is basis OSotber suggested that a positive
phrase be added to the Finnish reply stating that ^Finland i s
accordingly prepared in  principle to accept the Russian demands*n?8
To th is  Tanner was not w illin g  to agree before the .next day.
On March 2 no word was received from Moscow* but Helsinki
did not assume that negotiations were broken o ff  despite the fact
that the time lim it se t had expired. Sweden worked to secure better
terns for Finland, but without favorable resu lt, Keantime, Great
Britain and France s t i l l  sought to keep the Finns in the war by
announcing that the bombers they had requested would be sent at 
71once. f A
On the morning of March 3 Tanner requested that the Council 
of State be convened* Its  deliberations resulted in  another post­
ponement of the decision regarding an a ll out effort to end the
Tanner, og^ c it. p. 199. 9Xbld.. p. 198.
7M tld .. p. 199. 71fi|idt , p. 200201*
n i l
war* After the meeting Tanner, **yti, Walden, and Paasiklvt, con­
ferred  in private and decided to  assure the Freialin that the 
Finnish gomrmmnt was prepared to negotiate i f  Viipuri and 
Sortavala were emitted* T m j  phoned G&nther to  inform him of th is .
He expressed himself as pleased to hear th is and urged them to make 
peeea*^
During the day further sp ec ific  information regarding British
and French a irp o rt was submitted by Vfereker* H§ told  the F l » i  
th a t the troop® to he sen t from B rita in  would um ber only 6*000*
They would be dispatched on Kerch l l f instead o f March 15 as reported 
the day before, i f  Finland requested the aid by March 5*^3 la lig h t  
of th is , the Connell o f State was convened but the only decision
arrived at wm to await further c la r ifica tio n  of Moscowfs position*^* 
On March Jj there was s t i l l  ne'm m m r from Moscow* A llied 
requests for an o f f ic ia l  appeal for aid fTosn Finland were again made* 
That evening Colonel Ganeval called  on F yti to infant Mb  th a t  a 
contingent of 18,000 Britons and 15,000 Frenchmen would leave in 
a week, i f  the Finns would continue to fight* In addition, he said  
that the French Coaoxtnda**in-€hte£, Maurice Gamelln, had ordered 
f i f t y  British and twelve French bombers to Finland within a week*
Any troop® needed in Scandinavia m  the resu lt of .an attack by 
Germany would not diminish the assistance planned for Finland*
The troops could be expected by April 15 but thay might arrive m  
early as April 10. In conclusion, the Frenchman said that he had
^ Ibid*» pp. 201-M i. ?^annerheim, op* cit** pp. 38^-385 . 
7‘*T*nner, 2£t. c l t »» P» 20?»
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le*rn»d that Swdtn would not oppose transit by force of
The disparity between the mere extensive French plans and
the more .modest British proposals for aid to Finland led  tha Council 
©i Slat© to decide for peace on March £• At the same time the Western 
A llies  were to be asked for an extension u n til March 12 before the 
Firms 'had to ask for aid# After the Council meeting Tanner telephoned 
QSnther to authorise him to forward the Finnish reply of March 1 to  
Moscow* While talking to Qt£ntherv Tanner learned that Moeeow had 
replied to the second Finnish note# Molotov indicated that the 
U#S#S«n* was s t i l l  adamant in his demands for Fiipurl and Sortavala#
As for the Finnish decision* Molotov said the Soviet Union would 
wait a few days for Finland's response'# CHSnther said that Molotov 
had remarked to Aaaaraaon* the Swedish Minister to Moscow* that 
perhaps i t  might be well for the Kremlin to negotiate with Kuuslnen* 
Molotov had also repeated an earlier threat that i f  peace were not 
made now, greater demands would to made later# In the same conversation 
Ottnther told Tanner that contrary to what had been said In Helsinki, 
the Swedish Cabinet was unanimously opposed to allowing transit of 
Western forces to Finland#^
The Finnish reply was forwarded to Moscow that day with an 
added suggestion by Qdnther that h o s t i l it ie s  cease on March 6#
Moscow agreed to the in itia tio n  of peace conversations the next day 
(March 6) and suggested Moscow m  the place where the discussion® 
should to conducted# The IT 3 #•$*?!*, however, refused to accept the
7gJ b ld ., pp. 2C '-209 . 76 I b ld . . pp. 210-2X3.
mSwedish suggestion for m  armistice, evidently because the Bed armies 
had not yet succeeded In capturing Viipuri. Later that morning the 
Finnish Cabinet and Diet were informed of Moscow *3 acceptance* Both 
groups gave assent to the in itia tio n  of negotiation®* .Appointed 
a® representatives to the discussions were Prim  Minister Hyti,
General Walden, Paasiktvl, and Representative VSinb Foioomaa. The 
delegation le f t  that day for Stockholm and proceeded from there to 
Moscow on March ?•??
Britain and Prance s t i l l  persisted in their e ffo rts  to kmp 
the Finns fighting by making a final, offer of aid cm March ?#
According to figures transmitted by General Ironside a contingent 
of ??,?00 troops were to be dispatched -to Finland, a l l  of which would 
be placed under Mannerhslsi's ocwMtsd*?  ^ Holding fa s t  to  their  
determination to make peace, the Finns did not issue an appeal for 
such troops, but awaited word f r  m Moseow.
On March 9 the Finnish delegates m t  the Soviet delegates 
for the f ir s t  time to begin the negotiations for a peace settlement.
The Soviet demand® were now found to exceed those they had presented 
through Stockholm* In addition to their other terms, the Hueslane 
now required that Finland cede certain areas in the Salla and Kuueamo 
coenmes a® well m  agree to construct a railroad from Kemijirwi 
to the frontier yet to be delimited* ??
When word of the mm Burnt m  conditions reached Helsinki, the 
government began to reconsider the offer of Western aid. Great Britain
^ Xbldti p?# <?l!*~21B. ^Kannerheim, op. c it. . p* 3^ 5*
7 9Karrnerheim, op. c i t . .  p. 3961 and Tanner, op. c i t . , p. 22?.
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and France were s t i l l  prepared to give help as the following communique
from Premier Daladier on March 8 shows*
We have waited for several days for Finland to make her
appeal* so that we can come to your aid with a l l  the means at
our disposal. I t  i s  d iff ic u lt  to understand why th is request 
i s  s t i l l  postponed, . . .  I f  Finland does not now make her appeal 
to the western Powers* i t  i s  obvious that at the end of the war* 
the western Powers cannot assume the s lig h test responsib ility  
for the fin a l settlement regarding Finnish territory,
Daladier had agreed orally to the Finnish appeal to be allowed to
delay their request u ntil March 12 but said that he preferred an
earlier date* He said he understood Finland’s position but that
th e  Finns should also appreciate his situation since he had crusaded
so energetically against the Kremlin* Furthermore, i t  was known
that Finland could count on the arrival of British bombers with craws
in a short time. Therefore* the Finnish delay only increased their
own p e r i l .^
On the other hand, many factors tended to force Finland to 
submit to the Kremlin’s terms, as harsh and unreasonable as they 
appeared to be. Sweden in particular had pressed for a settlement 
of the con flict to safeguard the Northern States from involvement 
in the European War. The determining factor, however, was Marshal 
Mannerhelm’s advice, given on March 9, to conclude peace. In his 
Memoirs the Marshal sta tes that*
In ,/iaw of the uncertainty which attached to the expeditionary 
force, and with the conviction that our strength would be in su ffic ien t  
i f  the struggle extended beyond the spring, » . . I f e l t  compelled 
to give the government categorical advice to conclude peace*82
^Quoted in  Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p* 78. 
83-Ibid. 82Hannerheim, op. C it .> p. 3$7*
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Under the circumstance©, and faced with such advice from the 
man best qualified to a ssa y  the m ilitary situ ation , t he Finnish 
Cabinet was forced to conclude that no outside help could turn the 
t id e  of war. th e r e fo r e ,  on the morning of March 12 P r e s id en t Kallio  
signed the credentials granting power to the Finnish delegates to 
sign peace treaty. The credentials m m  cabled to Moscow and that 
e v en in g  the peace treaty v m  signed* ^ 3
The peace treaty th a t  F in lan d  was fo r c ed  to  sign seemed most 
unjust to  a r n m le  th a t  had only asked to be a llo w ed  to pursue i t s  
cim peaceful l i f e  and wanted n o th in g  but to be l e f t  out o f the 
struggles of the European Great Powers. Despite her v a l ia n t  effo rts  
in  defence of her independence and in t e g r i t y ,  Finland was forced 
to cede to the Soviet Union th e  whole K arelian  Isthnus along w ith  
her largest export center, V iip u r l*  plus V ilp u r l Bay and i t s  islands* 
Likewise, on the  western and north ern  sh o res of Lake Ladoga extensive 
areas, including the towns of KfidLsaliai and Sortavala, and th e  parish 
o f  S u o j lr v i ,  were ©tripped from her. In the Gulf of F in la n d  a nu&ber 
o f  I s la n d s  were also turned over to the U .S .8 .R . In addition, F in la n d  
agreed to lease for a period of thirty years Hanks Cape and i t s  
surrou ndin g waters a lo n g  with the  islands included in  th o se  w a t e r s .^  
Finland was given ten days to withdraw her forces from the Hanko 
a r e a , while the Keds agreed to ev acu ate  their m il i t a r y  forces from 
the Fetsamo region, but deprived Finland of the right to maintain a 
naval base th e r e . Furtherm ore, F in lan d  was forced t o  agree to  construct
^ T a n n er , o p . c i t . .  pp. 2h3$ 250. 
8UZ2S, pp.
a railroad across the center of the country from Kemijtrvi to the 
Soviet-Finnish border for the use of the Russians in their trade 
with Sweden.®-* Finally, h o s t i l it ie s  war® to cease at noon on March
13 with Finnish troops to b® withdrawn from the ceded areas at a
rate of not le s s  than seven kilometers per day. The commanders of 
both armies were charged with the responsib ility  for seeing to i t
that no damage was done to the towns, lo c a lit ie s ,  and terr itories
c Athat were evacuated. °
For Finland the treaty meant the lo ss of an area totaling  
25,000 square m iles. The population of the lo s t  terr ito r ies  was 
twelve per cent of the nation*s to ta l inhabitant®, or about 500,000
people, A ll of these were given the right to move into the areas
retained by Finland and most of them did so at the cost of leaving 
behind the homes, f ie ld s , and forests, that their ancestors had 
owned and cultivated for generations. Finland*s losses amounted 
to about eleven per cent of her to ta l economic potential and included 
her natural defenses on the Karelian Isthmus and at, Hanko Cape. As 
a resu lt the nation* s  future freedom of action in  foreign affa irs  
was lim ited, but as a s lig h t consolation, the Soviets did not force
O '*7a m ilitary pact upon Helsinki.-'»
President Kallio confirmed the decision of the Diet and ra tified  
the peace on March 16, On March 18 Paasikivi and Voionmaa departed 
for Moscow to exchange the instruments of ra tifica tio n  and on March 20 
fin a l ra tifica tion  was completed in Moscow. 35
8SSiSL> PP- 116-118. ,?6ib id ., pp. 119-120.
^%ann®rheim, op. c i t .  3 p. 388 .
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Tanner, op. c i t . , p. 260 .
CHAPTER VII
m m w B iom
Clearly the foregoing discussion gives r ise  to several 
questions o f grove import in  the present system of international 
re la tion s. I t  was Bertrand Russell who wrote« "The good I lf#  
i s  inspired by love end guided by knowledge. " The h istorian 's
task i s  to eorslruct art hypothesis that w ill make the Hnnish 
experience meaningful for the guidance o f contemporary society .
I f  the rea lity  o f  history Is  In the present, then our comem  
mist be the significance o f  h istorica l experience for the 
ground and condition o f our existence in  the present.
The common heritage o f the d t is e n s  o f the United States 
and likewise to a lesser  or greater extent, that o f a l l  democracies 
in  the Western Tradition Is the- profound fa ith  In the efficacy  
o f  the rule o f  law *to estab lish  ju stic e , insure domestic tranquility , 
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and 
secure the blessings o f liberty  to ourselves and to our p o ster ity .” 
Within ' h is framework must he mud# the herd decisions which w ill  
uphold or impair the pursuit o f these id ea ls . It was in  th is  frame­
work that President Wbodrov Wilson enunciated the doctrine o f national 
self-determination. The considered ©pinion to which the facts  
constrain us i s  that the Finnish experience (1939-1940) implies 
the necessity for a careful reappraisal ° f  th is  doctrine.
Rational self-determination was conceived in the bosom o f  
English common law with i t s  traditions o f self-imposed Individual
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responsib ility , Prior to the outbreak of the Busso-Flnrdsh con flict  
national states enjoyed sovereignty l r  the presence o f m  agency 
(the league of  Nations) incapable of oonstra.iitl.ng thee, to responslhiltyv  
Ample proof o f th is in a b ility  to enforce International resjsonaibiliiy  
and law was the Japanese invasion o f Manchuria, Xtalyffs occupation o f  
Ethiopia, and Germany’s siasitr© o f Chechoslovakia and her attack on 
Poland for which the nor—aggression pact with the Soviet Tfoion was 
the necessary precondition*
Objectively, i t  must be pointed cut that fibland also contributed 
to the sffeten ess o f the league o f Nations by her resolution, in con unction 
with Sweden, to determine whether sanctions levied hr the International 
body would be observed. Thus in  the traditional polarity o f the Great 
Bowers the a s l l  sta tes resulting tram the Treaty o f V ersailles and 
guaranteed by the league o f Nations produced a power vacuum in an 
international situation  (even by traditional Jtaropeafi standards) 
o f greet complexity* I f  a f lr e e t Bower finds ®ore advantage in  over­
throwing a settlement than in  maintaining i t ,  then i t  i s  not a peace, 
but an arm istice, Jfcusarotsrs examples illu stra tin g  th is  point might 
be drawn fro® the nineteenth century; perhaps the best of  these i s  
the great concern o f Meiterrlch and Castlereegh, at the close o f  the 
Napoleonic Wars, to prevent even tbs suggestion of  the dismemberment 
o f Franc#. Use seme principle induced Blsoaralr to oppose (unsuccessfully) 
the annexation o f Alsses-Xorrsins s t  the con d ition  o f the Franeo- 
Frusslan. Mar (1871)j for, as was remarked at the t ir o , the iwpact of  
th is  event upon the French mind v«s meh that, I f  they must take Alsace-
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Lorraine, they might m  w ell ta k e  fbrir»ndy while they were about it*
In X9£l th©r® was not on® but « tn n X  ouch perm anently d issa tisfied  
p o w s .  For th e s e  powrs th e  m l®  of form  mm a f a c t  and tin® rule 
o f lav m  more than Herr von FMttattym^Tblvag1 s  a sto n ish e d  "scrap of 
paper*"
In these d if f ic u lt  circumstances, a® has been shown, the 
Finnish goverment mm not impervious to it® peril* Great fa ith  was 
placed in the s e c u r ity  o f  the 1932 n o n -sg g reso lo n  pact with the Soviet 
Uhlong the notion® o f the Finnish Cabinet, especially  Foreign M in ister  
Mcko, o f  what might be termed the Great Bower rstloraXa were noble 
to a point, bordering on the Ingenuous* Hor can th is  be attributed  
to a flew in  Finnish logic* C le a r ly , the p o ss ib ility  of Finland 
attacking th e  Soviet Onion seamed remote indeed* t h i s  judgment 
omitted ®t le s t  two consideration calculated to  bear upon any decision  
tak en  in  Moscow* The f ir s t  i s  s  se tter  o f  geography* Tn a comparable 
situ ation , the perennial in terest o f the United Kingdom in  the affair® 
o f the Low Gountrie® has frequently occasioned fr iction  but not surprise* 
Thu® i t  domm not seem irresponsible to su g g e st that no Great Bower, 
given the o p p o rtu n ity  to prevent i t ,  could tolera-e ©. Iborlier within 
a r t i l l e r y  range o f I t s  second largest c ity  (Leningrad), and incidentally  
o f  it® g r e a te s t  n a v e l base (Kronstadt)* The second consideration, 
though le ss  tangible, i s  p rob ab ly  the more important. A proverb 
warns o f the dangers o f Judging other® by the me©aura o f one*® s e lf .
In  1939 th e  S o v ie ts  had only begun in  r ru d est way (P eton i® , Latvia, 
and Lithuania) to  dem on strate th e  e x te n t 'to which they were the 
successors o f Peter the Greet and G eh terin e II* A pp arently the S o v ie t
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!Jnior regarded th e  « 1 1  e ta  t e e  a a pawn* In the chess game o f power 
p o lit ic s;  this® the Kremlin*® addresses to Finland night be In terp reted  
a s  the obvious m y* -m  to  f o r e s t a l l  s t e l l a r  action on the pert o f m t m  
other power* Urns the .Firm..' sh government, though f u l ly  a le r te d  to 
th e  p erils  that confronted I t ,  had made two rather serious m lscfilcuteiiors. 
S in ce  a d e c is io n v properly s o - c a lle d ,  cannot bo made in  a vacuum, an  
error o f any consequence, or oven of sesm in ly  no consequence, I s  apt 
to display m  ex p a n siv e  tendency*
3c i t  proved fo r  the Finnish ca b in et*  BeXying upon the non - 
aggression p a ct wi th the Soviet U nion , F in land  p a in s ta k in g ly  prepared  
her a n tra  to  th e  Scandinavian o r ie n ta tio n *  t h i s  policy o f scru p u lo u sly  
guraded neutrality p iv o ted  upon th e  prestige o f  Sweden *s unbroken, o m  
hundred and twenty-four year reign o f  peace in  con fu n c tio n  with her 
v ita l  production o f stea l and th e  care she took to  maintain the co u n try 5 s 
rigid  posture o f defense. The a te  o f  the Finnish policy , then, was 
to secure an agreement with Sweden whereby Sw edish prestige might 
se r v e  to guarantee the n e u tr a lity  o f Finland* Shua the s e r ie s  o f
diplomatic moves, previously d is c u s s e d , whereb y i t  was hoped the cooling:
o f Finniah-Ceman .relations would serve- to r e a ssu r e  the Swedes that
Finnish p a r tn ersh ip  would in  no way compromise Sweden*a own neutrality.
The f ir s t  suggestion from the Soviet government that i t  desired 
to a lter  the s ta tu s  o f Finnish-Soviet relations C August 5, 193$) caught 
the Finnish government in the m id st of th is  delicate maneuver* At 
th is  point the fa ilure to correctly evaluate the Intentions o f the 
K rem lin le a d  them to a. course which m y  well h sve csompromised their
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position* with tin* HuaaX&ns. ** the m-go t ie  lions v ith  3*.,«dor, 
to o ffer the be a . 'nope, the Ptnnish g o w m i i i ' s  rospotses to the 
deMicreteXy mgm m r ly appro* class of t tm Soviets was framed in the 
rig id ly  correct posture o f ln£l«*tlhle neutrali ty. Thus while etresaing 
i t s  fomuX position , i t  m y well hove been take In Fbsoow for the 
preitonciory siato&icnt o f & govermssnt imable to offer morn d efin ite  
rreamirimoe, The w r it*  o f the only alternative the situation  
offered ere ii%*o##ibX® to calculate* Had the Tlmiiah p m m n t  
attempted the hasArdeus policy o f a diplomatic equestrian performance 
between Sweden fend the Soviet Union, the reeu.lt must reawin on open 
question* Perhepa mdh m. elt4»t»tive presents i t s e l f  only to the 
©aim o f lilnslght*
The decisive point in  the developing: c r is is  must bo regarded 
as ihe fa ilu re o f *he Aaland Islands negotiations with Sweden*
Tho Swedish pr&ao minister ^Tsi c j?  Hsnsss© belatedly  
admitted to Veino Tenner that i f  the Sued!©h-H rrnish a liisu s s  
hod come about in time, Hassle probably vould not have boon so 
persistent in  her demands and war might haw bean avoided.!
The splendid courage end daring o f the Firms in the fare o f  
hopeless odds was to prove hut another In the l i s t  o f  swell states  
fttnislMMrin a world o f national sta tes that fa iled  to observe and 
respect the very laws they themselves had enunciated. When the 
struggle became at la s t  a fore© im possibility* the Finnish govern­
ment was compelled at la s t  to inquire through the Russian Minister at 
Stockholm the terns o f pesos* They proved to be econos* m lly  crippling
!*teaourf c i t . ,  p. 100*
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c e s s io n a  o f  te r r ito r y *  ftom  th e  s e ttle m e n t th e  F ln n iah  s t a t e  em erged 
In  a qn»«i-^utorottou>«? c o n d itio n  w hich boded i l l  fo r  th e  fu tu r e  o f  m  
Independent H nrtlah  p o lic y *
ikp^m n. a*
Tfi&ATf OF PfACK W^T'^ r:Tf Tff? 0T
r r x iA m  a w  rm . m i m  w rr?*?  c o c m ib t
w m m .im
the f*o^ren»nt of the % -public of Finland, ©f the etm partf and 
The Presidium of the Stsprasta C ouncil of tha tlhloB  o f  ^oaiat 
Socialist Paptihliea, of  the other part,
B ain s d e s ir o u s  o f  b r in g in g  t© an and tit* h o s t i l i t i e s  w hich hapfm 
broken cast batwaan th e  two S ta te #  and o f  c r e a tin g  parmemmt peaceful 
r e la t io n #  betw een th a n ,
.And b e in g  eon vln eed  th a t  th e  c r e a t io n  o f  d e f in i t e  © © edition#  
fo r  t h e ir  sm tnal s e c u r i t y ,  in c lu d in g  gu aran tees fo r  the .a eeu r lty  o f  
the c i t i e s  of la n ln g ra d  and Murmansk and tha *hiS3tan9k r a ilw a y , i #  in 
th e  I n te r r a ta  o f  both  C o n tractin g  P a r t ie s ,
*?aw dec!dad that for th is purpose the conclusion of a Fe»oe 
Treaty Is assent!*! and haw therefore apnolntad as their Flenlpfr* 
tenti ariast
TO? OF HIP ^PfTFTjr
.^ isto  Priae *?ln i*tar o f  tha fteptxfclle o f  r i« i« n d #
duho K uatl P a a a lk ir i ,  F ftn la tar , 
f tu d b lf V a ld e s , Q *rera3 ,
V8ln£ T/o to r m a 9 P rofessor*
1IS2, pp. US-11*.
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t hp. mEsmxim o f  t f p  sum  arm cxt nr union
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST IFPLM.ItSs 
V ja tsh e s la v  F ih a ilo v i ts h  Molotov, P resid en t o f the  C ou n cil o f  
Cornmlftsars of the U.3*S,E. and Comud«««r f o r  Foreign  A ffa ire , 
Andrei Ala k ssn d ro v i ish  Shdsnov, Member o f  the  Presidium  o f  
the  Supreme Council o f  the  
A laksander M ih a ilc v lta b  f a s i le v s k t ,  B rig ad ie r! 
who, having exchanged th e ir  c re d e n t ia ls ,  found in due and p roper 
o rd e r , have agreed upon, the fo l lo w in g  p ro v is io n s  t
ARTICLE I*
H ostilities  b a t m e n  F in la n d  and the U.S.S.H, shall be Immediately 
c o n c lu d e d  according to the p r o c e d u r e  d e f in e d  I n  the .Protocol attached 
to the p r e s e n t  Treaty*
ARTICLE' 2*
The frontier, between the Republic of Finland and the Tf*S.f,*3* 
shall follow a new boundary lin e  by which shall be incorporated in  
the territory of the U.S.S.R. the whole of the Karelian Isthmus, the 
c ity  of Viipuri am! Viipuri Bay with the islands thereof, the western
tt
and northern coastal area of take Ladoga w it h  the towns of Kskisalmi 
and Sortavala and the church v illage of StiojSrwi, a num ber of islands 
In the Gulf of Finland, the territory east of FarkSjarvi and the church 
v illage  of Kuola.larvi, and parts of th e  Bybachl and Sredni P e n in s u la ® -*  
in conformity with the map attached to the present Treaty*
The exact delimitation and establishment of the frontier lin e  
shall be effected  by a mixed committee of representatives of the 
Contracting Parties, which shall be appointed within ten day® of the 
signing o f the present Treaty.
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m ncm  %
loth Contracting Parties undertake to reirails from a ll  acts 
of aggression directed against each other, and undertake not to 
conclude any a ll ia n c e  or to become? parties to any coalition  directed  
against either of the Contracting Parties.,*
mtmm  Is*
The Republic of Finland agree* to lease to the Soviet Union
far thirty years in  consideration of m  annual rent of eight tail l i e s
n
Finnish marks to be paid by the Soviet felon, the cape of Hango 
arid the au.rroundlng w ater* w ith in  a radius of five  nautical stile* 
to the sou th  and e a s t  and thro# n a u tic a l mile* to th e west and 
north thereof, and a r« b sr  o f islands situated therein, in con* 
f  a m i t y  w ith  the map a tta ch ed  to too  pro sent T reaty—fo r  th e cstafe* 
l±&hmnt of a naval base capable of defending the access to th e  
Oolf of F in lan d  against, agfresslonsf and in addition for the defence 
of toe naval base the Soviet Onion i s  gran ted  the right to m ain ta in  
th ere  a t  I ts  own expense armed land and air force units of th e  
necessary strength*
Ihe Government of Finland will, withdraw within ton days of 
too entry Into force of the present Treatr  to# whole o f i t s  armed
ff t?
forces from toe cap* o f ftogo, and toe caps of Hango with the islands
appertaining thereto w ill pass into toe administration of toe 0*S*S*H* 
in. conformity with to ts Article of toe present Treaty#
ARTXCLK S#
The U.^.S.R* undertakes to withdraw i t s  m ilitary forces from 
the Fwtsasso area which to# voluntarily ceded to Finland
under the terms of the Feme® Treaty of 1^20*
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F in la n d  undertakes as provided in the Peace Treaty of 1920, 
not to maintain warships and other armed vessels in  the waters 
adjoining the Artie coast belonging to i t ,  with the exception of 
armed vessels of le ss  than one hundred tons, which Finland may 
maintain there without l i m i t ,  and a mjocimum of fifteen  war vessels  
or other armed Ships, the tonnage of which may in  no case exceed 
four hundred tons.
Finland undertakes, as provided in  the said Treaty, not to main­
tain submarines and armed a ircraft in  the waters mentioned.
Finland further undertakes, as provided in the said Treaty, 
not to eon s tru e  t  on t h i s  coast airy naval harbours, naval bases or 
naval repair yards, which are larger in size than is  necessary for 
the said vessels and their armament.
ARTICLE 6 .
The Soviet Union and i t s  nationals, as provided in the Treaty 
of 1920, are granted free right of transit via the Petsamo area to  
and from Norway and the Soviet Union i s  granted the right to establish  
a Consulate in the Petsamo area.
Goods transported via the Petsamo area from the Soviet Union 
to Norway, likewise goods transported via the said area from Norway 
to the Soviet Union, shall be free of a l l  inspection and control, 
with the exception of the control necessary for the conduct of transit 
tra ffic ;  nor shall Customs duties or transit or other charges be 
imposed.
Control of the above mentioned transit goods shall be permitted 
only according to the established practice in such cases in inter­
national tr a ffic .
Nationals of the Soviet Union who travel via the Petsamo area 
to Norway and from Norway back to the Soviet Union, shall be en titled  
to unhindered passage with passports issued by the due authorities 
of the Soviet Union.
With due observance of the general provisions in force, unarmed 
aircraft of the Soviet Union shall be en titled  to maintain air tra ffic  
between the Soviet Union and Norway via the Petsamo area.
ARTICLE 7.
The Government of Finland grants to the Soviet Union goods 
transit rights between the Soviet Union and Sweden, and for the 
development of th is  tra ffic  by the shortest railway route the Soviet 
Union and Finland regard as necessary the construction, each on i t s  
own territory, and i f  possible in the course of the year 29h09 of a
tfrailway connecting Kandalaksha with Kemijarvi.
ARTICLE 6.
With the entry into force of the present Treaty, trade relations  
between the Contracting Parties shall be renewed and for th is purpose 
the Contracting Parties shall proceed to negotiate regarding the 
conclusion of a Trade Agreement.
ARTICLE 9.
This Peace Treaty shall enter into force immediately after i t s  
signature and shall la ter be ra tified .
The exchange of instruments of ra tifica tion  shall take place 
within ten days at Moscow.
The present Treaty i s  drawn up in duplicate in the Finnish, 
Swedish and Russian languages, in the City of Moscow on March 12th, 
19U0.
Risto Kyti J.K. Paasikivi V. Molotov A. Shdanov
R. Walden VlinB Voionmaa A. Vasilevski.
APPENDXX B1
PROTOCOL ATTACHED TO THE TOEATT OF p ACE 
CONCLUDED sbtWSEK FINLAND AND thf union of 
SOVIET SOCIAI.IST REPUBLICS ON MARCH 12TH, 19i»0
Translation
The ex tra ctin g  Parties estab lish  the following procedure for 
the cessation of h o s t i lit ie s  and the transfer of troops to behind the 
frontier fixed by the Treaty of Peace.
1. Both Contracting Parties shall cease h o s t i l i t ie s  on the 13th 
day of March, 19UC, at 12 o'clock noon Leningrad time.
2. With the object of ceasing h o s t i l it ie s  from the prescribed 
hour onwards, a neutral zone one kilometre in breadth shall be arranged 
between the advanced positions of the troops, for which purpose the 
troops of that Contracting Party, which, with reference to the new 
fron tier, occupies territory belonging to the other Contracting Party, 
shall be withdrawn a distance of one kilometre on the f ir s t  day.
3* The transfer of m ilitary forces to the other side of the new 
frontier and the movement of the m ilitary forces of the other Contracting 
Party to that frontier, shall begin at 10 a.m. on March 15>th, 19ii0, 
along the whole of the frontier between the Gulf of Finland and Lleksa, 
and at 10 a.m. on March 16th, 191*0, northwards of Lieksa. The transfer 
shall be effected  in marches of not le s s  than 7 kilometres per day, 
the troops of the other Contracting Party moving forward in such order 
that an intervening distance of not le ss  than 7 kilometres i s  maintained 
between the rearguard of the withdrawing troops and the advance guard 
of the other Contracting Party moving towards the new frontier.
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h. In accordance with Clans® 3* the following time lim its are 
fixed for the transfer of troops to the various sections of the frontiers—
(a) in the sector comprising the upper reaches of the Tuntsajoki, 
Kuolajarvi, Takala, the eastern shore of Lake Joukamojarvi, the 
transfer of the troops of both Contracting Parties sh all be com** 
pleted at 8 p.m. on March 20th, 191*0$
(b) in  the Latva sector east of Kuhmoniemi, the transfer of 
troops sh a ll be completed at 8 p.m. on March 22nd, 19l*0j
ft ft ft(c) in  the sector Lonkavaara, Vartsila, Matkaselka railway 
station , the transfer of the troops of both Contracting Parties 
sh a ll be completed at 8 p.m. on March 26th, 191*0$
(d) in  the sector Matkaselka railway sta tion , Koitsanlahtl, 
the transfer of troops sh a ll be completed at 8 p.m. on March 22nd, 
191*0 $
(e) in  the sector Koitsanlahtl, Enso railway sta tion , the 
transfer o f troops sh a ll be completed at 8 p.m. on March 2$th,
191*0$
( f ) in  the sector Enso railway station , Paations&ari, the 
transfer of troops sh a ll be completed at 8 p.m. cm March 19th,
191*0$
5. The evacuation of Red Army troops from the Petsamo area shall 
be completed by April 10th, 19l*0.
6. The Army Commands of both Contracting Parties undertake, during 
the transfer of troops to the other side of the frontier, to take the 
necessary measures, in  the towns and lo c a lit ie s  to be ceded to the other
ex tra c tin g  Party, to  preserve Umm tr m  damage m d  t o  take the asses* 
&my measures to pmm^rm tmmm9 loeallt& es, defensive md  economic 
estSblishseeiiie {b r id g ea, da&a, aerodrome, b a rra ck s, depots, ra ilw a y  
ju n c t io n s ,  in d u s t r ia l  e s i a b l i®hzmnt&9 Urn tel® graph a y stew , e l e c t r i c  
|sowr stations) froit dcna$s and destruction#
To All questions a r is in g  out o f  the cession by one C o n tra c tin g  
Party to the other of the areas, lo c a lit ie s ,  towns or other objects 
wsntlofted in  Clause €  of t he p r e se n t Protocol, s h a ll  be decided on th e  
spot by representstiires of both  ex tra c tin g  P i t i e s  for which purpmm 
the Amy Comands sh all appoint special delegates on each of the main 
r e n te s  u t i l i s e d  by b oth  A m iss*
S * . The exchange o f  prisoners o f  war shall be effected with the 
s&niwisa o f delay a f t e r  the cessation o f  h o s t l l  t i e s  in  accordance w ith  
a Special airee^ent#
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